Metaethical Minimalism: A Demarcation, Defense, and Development by Franklin, Aaron
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ  
METAETHICAL MINIMALISM: A DEMARCATION, 
DEFENSE, AND DEVELOPMENT 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 
requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
in  
PHILOSOPHY  
by  
Aaron 
Franklin 
June 2020  
The Dissertation of Aaron Franklin is approved:  
 
 
Professor Daniel Guevara, Chair  
 
 
Professor Janette Dinishak 
 
 
Professor Paul Roth 
 
 
Professor David Landy  
 
 
 
 
Quentin Williams  
Acting Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies  
 
 
Copyright ​©​ by  
Aaron Franklin  
2020  
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract  iv 
Acknowledgments  vi 
0. Introduction  1 
1.   A Survey of Metaethical Minimalism 14 
2. The Variety of Metaethical Minimalisms and the Burdens they Carry 39 
3. A Minimalist Response to the Respectability Challenge 57 
4.  A Minimalist Response to the Proliferation Challenge 81 
5. The Epistemic Condition 101 
6. Transcendental Sentimentalism 128 
7. Transcendental Sentimentalism for the Metaethical Minimalist 162 
8. Bibliography 178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 Abstract  
Aaron Franklin 
Metaethical Minimalism: A Demarcation, Defense, and Development 
The aim of this work is to demarcate, develop, and defend the commitments and 
consequences of metaethical minimalism. Very roughly, this is the position that a 
commitment to objective moral truths does not require any accompanying ontological 
commitments. While there are few, if any, who call themselves “metaethical minimalists”, I 
endeavor to uncover existing articulations of metaethical minimalism which have been 
presented under different names, attempting to identify the common ground between 
them. As I interpret the position, all metaethical minimalists are committed to the same 
positive pair of claims (what I call the Objectivity Thesis): “a) Moral truths are strongly 
mind-independent; b) there are moral truths.”  Taken by itself, however, this pair of claims 
is not sufficient for differentiating their view from the moral realist’s. Consequently, the 
minimalist must also articulate that which they are denying about the non-minimalist 
approach, or what I call the “negative ontological thesis”. I offer my own version of this 
negative thesis and argue for its dialectical advantages. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus my attention on attacks on the viability of metaethical 
minimalism in the form of two “challenges” that aim to problematize a commitment to 
objective moral truths absent any accompanying ontological commitment. The 
big-picture takeaway from these chapters is that minimalism can defend itself by playing to 
the dialectical advantage I find for it in Chapter 2 as well as by being creative about 
iv 
minimalist constructions/reworkings of plausible principles/lines of reasoning that seem 
to contradict it. 
The temptation to embrace quietism is strong among minimalists, but in Chapters 
5, 6, and 7 I aim to show that there is a positive alternative available for the minimalist 
interested in developing a full picture of their position. Chapter 5 is aimed at providing an 
adequate understanding of the distinction between the objects of purely normative 
thoughts and objects of thoughts about reality. Building on this are Chapters 6 and 7, 
which argue in favor of an account of the relationship between emotion and evaluative 
knowledge that is consistent with metaethical minimalism. 
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Introduction: 
Very little, if anything, is obvious in metaethics. This fact is evidenced by the wide 
variety of theories populating the metaethical landscape. It is not obvious whether moral 
propositions are true for the same reasons that non-moral propositions are true or for some 
other reasons. Nor is it obvious whether moral judgments are sourced from rational 
intuition, perception, affect, or something else entirely. And so on. The strength and 
creativity of arguments constructed by contemporary metaethicists for their respective 
views demonstrate the adaptive pressure they are under to render what is unobvious more 
perspicuous.  Among these competitors is metaethical minimalism. Very roughly, this is 
the position that a commitment to objective moral truths does not require any 
accompanying ontological commitments. The aim of this work is to delineate, develop, 
and defend the commitments and consequences of this position. My goal presently will be 
to offer a brief general introduction to some of the background reasoning and pattern of 
thought of those who sympathize with it.  1
The minimalist’s view is ​minimal ​because her account of ​that because of which 
a moral proposition is true draws on no metaphysical or ontological resources nor any 
other considerations external to the moral domain.   If asked why a particular moral 2 3
proposition is true, the minimalist will answer with the moral reasoning that best supports 
1  In the following articulation, I set aside the nuances and differences in approach to the metaethical 
minimalism that I will explore in Chapter 1 and offer instead a vision of it which I take to be both 
sufficiently ecumenical and reflective of the direction I think is most promising for the position. 
2 Though my views on the subject differ radically from Scanlon’s, I employ “domain”-talk in this paper in a 
way that he helpfully characterizes in his (2014): “The term ‘domain’ as I am using it is just a way of referring 
to the fact that statements can make claims about different subjects: some make claims about the natural 
world, some make claims about numbers, some make claims about reasons. This is a common-sense idea.” 
3 Here and in what follows I follow Kramer (2009, 2017) in making the distinction between “second-order” 
and “domain-external” propositions.  
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that proposition. If asked whether there are moral facts, the minimalist will answer 
affirmatively and present as evidence a few examples of obvious moral truths such as, “It is 
wrong to torture children for fun”. If asked why this proposition is objectively true, a 
minimalist answer would be that it is objectively true because it should be accepted by all 
persons, regardless of their personal feelings on the matter. If asked whether there are 
moral properties, the minimalist would likely answer “yes, because there are actions which 
are morally forbidden or obligatory, and if you prefer speaking that way, we can say these 
actions have the properties of forbiddenness or obligatoriness”. The minimalist approach 
here is to answer seemingly meta-level questions about moral matters with normative 
commitments rather than ontological commitments.  For the minimalist, answering the 4
property question in the negative, supposing it is a coherent question at all, would amount 
to a denial that any act is forbidden or obligatory. Such a position could entail that every 
act is permissible. That the validity of this entailment can be questioned is beside the 
present point. The key point is that the minimalist takes it that answering the question 
about moral properties is of a piece with the ongoing project of getting clear on what is 
morally required of us.  5
It might be suspected that the minimalist and the non-minimalist theorist are 
talking past one another, answering two different questions—one about what is morally 
true and one about what is required to explain this truth. Conversely, there has been some 
4  See Dworkin (1996) for more of these kinds of responses to what the non-minimalist theorist reads as 
metaphysical questions. 
5 To be sure, deliberation about moral properties is a normative deliberation happening at a much higher 
level of abstraction than deliberation about more concrete moral questions like “Is it wrong to lie to one’s 
friend about how they look in an outfit?”, but substantive moral commitments still fall out of abstract 
deliberation, such as if nothing at all is forbidden then everything is permissible. Or so says the minimalist. 
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question as to the ​difference​ between the minimalist and the moral realist (one variety of 
non-minimalist metaethicist); after all, both the realist and the minimalist insist that they 
accept that there are moral facts, truths, properties, etc..  The concern that the two camps 6
are either indistinguishable or are talking past one another can be alleviated by homing in 
on the central question to which they offer a diverging response: “Should anything 
external to the normative domain (i.e. claims the acceptance of which implies more than a 
normative commitment) be included in an account of ​that because of which​ moral 
propositions are true?”. The non-minimalist metaethicists replies in the affirmative and 
posits the variety of truthmaker they favor in order to complete this account.  The 7
minimalist either firmly replies in the negative or, in taking up a stance I will explore in 
more detail in Chapter 2, may offer the less committal reply that they simply have no 
reason to believe that anything external to the moral domain is required for an adequate 
account. 
The minimalist is aligned with the truthmaker theorist in accepting the 
meaningfulness of talk about moral properties, facts, and their objectivity. The two diverge 
because of the truthmaker theorist’s belief that claims containing these terms are made 
external to the moral domain and thereby make some claim for what is true of some 
external or internal, natural or non-natural normative reality. The truthmaker theorist 
believes that propositions like, “It is a fact that torturing children for fun is wrong” contain 
terms which refer  to or are grounded by entities (e.g. the property of wrongness, the very 8
fact mentioned, or whatever object(s) grounds the truth of this fact) which account for the 
6 See Dreier (2004) for an analysis of this confusion. 
7 I call this kind of metaethicist the “truthmaker theorist” throughout the chapters that follow. 
8 Or ​attempt ​to refer in the case of error theorists, who I will contend are a type of truthmaker theorist. 
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moral proposition’s truth and how we can have knowledge of its truth. That is, they think 
that in order to make sense of why it is that this domain-internal claim (“torturing children 
for fun is wrong”) is a fact requiring making domain-external claims about the existence of 
an entity or state of affairs which makes it the case that it is a fact. Depending on the 
truthmaker theorist’s metaethical commitments, this entity or state of affairs could be 
mental, physical, or non-natural.  
In sum, a succinct expression of her position is that the metaethical minimalist 
does not share a commitment to domain-external truthmakers and will instead offer a 
domain-internal claim to account for ​that because of which​ moral truths like “Torturing 
children for fun is wrong” are facts. This account could be as simple as “Children are 
innocent, torturing involves inflicting pain, and inflicting pain on innocent persons is 
always wrong”.  The truthmaker theorist does not reject domain-internal justifications and 9
deliberations (unless she is an error-theorist of a particularly strong sort), but she contends 
that we ought to be after something more than just another set of domain-internal claims 
when asking whether moral propositions are factual or objective. 
*** 
In the spirit of virtuous circularity, the version of minimalism presented above is 
informed by the work done in the chapters that follow, work that I divide into 3 parts: a 
demarcation (Chapters 1 and 2), a defense (Chapters 3 and 4), and development (Chapters 
5, 6, 7) of metaethical minimalism. These tasks are ordered in accordance with what I take 
9 Again, whether this a sound or adequate line of moral reasoning is not presently at issue. 
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to be the most illuminating path for the reader, though ideally each part should be 
comprehensible as a stand-alone project. 
 
1. Demarcation 
Chapter 1 is primarily concerned with accurately representing existing 
articulations of metaethical minimalism, despite the fact that there is not a wide-spread 
acknowledged allegiance between the thinkers whose articulations I present. In fact, the 
umbrella term “metaethical minimalism”, while present to a limited extent in the 
literature, is herein my own term of art and is not used by any of the theorists whose work 
I use to construct its meaning. While this task is of inherent interest, I undertake this task 
in order to highlight an apparent point of disagreement among minimalists: what exactly 
they wish to deny about the ontological/metaphysical commitments of the 
non-minimalist metaethicist.  
As I present the situation, all metaethical minimalists are committed to the same 
positive pair of claims (what I call the Objectivity Thesis): “a)​ ​Moral truths are strongly 
mind-independent; b) there are moral truths.”  Taken by itself, however, this pair of claims 
is not sufficient for differentiating their view from the moral realist’s. Consequently, the 
minimalist must also articulate that which they are denying about the non-minimalist 
approach, or what I call the “negative ontological thesis”. This negative ontological thesis is 
expressed in a number of different ways. Through Chapter 1, I present a survey of the 
variations of this negative thesis offered by minimalists. As will become apparent, any 
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singular defense of metaethical minimalism will require deciding between the right 
statement of denial with respect to ontological and metaphysical theorizing in metaethics. 
At the start of Chapter 2, I offer my own recommendation for what the target of 
the minimalist’s negative ontological thesis should be: what I call the “Moral Truthmaker 
Conditional” (MTMC): “For any moral proposition, if it is true, then there exist(s) some 
truthmaker(s) which ground(s) its truth.” The benefit of adopting this as the target of the 
minimalist’s negative thesis concerns the dialectical advantage it offers.  I argue that other 
versions of metaethical minimalism on offer carry a burden of justification for the reason 
that they marry minimalism with a ​rejection​ of the belief in MTMC.  I argue further that it 
is not necessary that the minimalist offer this rejection and that their minimalism can 
consist solely of an attitude of non-acceptance towards the truthmaker theorist’s belief in 
MTMC. The crux of my argument will be that we do not have sufficient reason to believe 
that the truthmaker’s position has prima facie status and that merely holding the attitude 
of non-acceptance towards propositions which do not have prima facie status does not 
require an accompanying justification. I call this stance ‘bare minimalism’. 
 
2. Defense 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I will focus my attention on attacks on the viability of 
metaethical minimalism, or what I identify in Chapter 2 as the metaethical position which 
is defined by the non-acceptance of a central presupposition of much of metaethical 
theorizing: “For any moral proposition, if it is true, then there exist(s) some truthmaker(s) 
which make(s) it true” (MTMC).  
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Though more often than not in metaethical arguments, MTMC is taken as an 
unargued for ​ab initio ​truth, some truthmaker theorists do present positive arguments for 
its acceptance. The most compelling of these arguments are what I will call the 
respectability challenge from Donelson’s (2018) and the norm proliferation challenge 
from Enoch’s (2011), McPherson (2011) and Enoch and McPherson’s (2017). The 
respectability and proliferation challenges are attacks on the viability of minimalism from 
two opposing directions: on the one hand, the respectability challenge questions whether 
the minimalist can fully vindicate the truth of propositions for whom there are no 
truthmakers; on the other hand, the proliferation challenge argues that minimalism turns 
out to be too permissive with respect to the normative authority of discourses if the 
existence of truthmakers for constituent propositions is not a constraint on distinctly 
authoritative discourses.  
Chapter 2 offers a defense of metaethical minimalism in the face of the 
respectability challenge. This is the argument (found in Donelson 2018) that if the 
minimalist does not accept that there are moral truthmakers, then they can maintain no 
difference in respectability between moral discourse and those discourses which do not 
merit our respect an account of their lacking truthmakers. That is, it is not obvious on 
what grounds the minimalist could maintain their non-acceptance of the existence of 
moral truthmakers if they are committed both to the possibility that discourses can differ 
in respectability and that there are true moral propositions. My response to this challenge 
will involve showing why the reasoning at the core of the respectability challenge is not 
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decisive in favor of the existence of moral truthmakers in virtue of the fact that one of its 
central premises is either undermotivated or begs the question against the minimalist.  
Chapter 4 addresses what I take to be the challenge it is most pressing for the 
minimalist to solve, as it is, so far as I can tell, the most commonly cited reason why a 
minimalist approach to metaethics is unlikely to work. This is the proliferation challenge. 
This time, the challenge for the minimalist is to explain/vindicate the special, authoritative 
status moral norms have in our practical deliberations. According to the truthmaker 
theorist, this special status is explained by the fact that the moral standard (according to 
which moral norms are true) “tracks normative reality” (Enoch and McPherson 2016). 
The proliferation challenge does not posit truthmakers to explain the truth of particular 
moral claims like “Torturing others for fun is wrong”. Instead, it focuses on the truth of a 
second-order claim about what is morally correct; namely, that these moral claims have 
distinctive authority in our practical deliberations. 
According to the proliferation challenge, the minimalist must either deny that 
moral norms have distinctive authority or they must accept the existence of a normative 
reality (i.e. truthmakers) which makes it true that moral norms are distinctly authoritative 
(thus giving up their minimalism). The proliferation challenge gets its name for the 
following reason: if the minimalist grasps the first horn of this dilemma, then there are no 
constraints on the proliferation of competing normative systems to our own. Truthmaker 
theorists illustrate this point by asking us to imagine an anti-moral or “schmoral” domain 
of discourse that is 1) equal to the moral domain in coherence and scope, and 2) features in 
the practical reasoning of an imaginary community in a formally identical way to the way 
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moral norms feature in our own practical reasoning. According to the schmoral standard, 
for example, the fact that an action will cause pain stands in favor of performing that 
action. If neither the schmoral or moral domains’ constituent propositions are rendered 
authoritative by their standard’s tracking a normative reality, on no grounds can the 
minimalist explain the truth of the following: “despite this formal symmetry, it is incorrect 
to weigh schmoral reasons as heavily as moral reasons, even for schmoral reasoners”? Of 
course, the proliferation challenge’s conclusion is premised upon the notion that, in their 
non-acceptance of the existence of truthmakers, the minimalist denies themselves any 
other way to account for the fact that moral norms have a distinctive authority in our 
deliberations. Resisting this supposition will be the guiding thrust of my defense.  
Though importantly different, the respectability challenge and the proliferation 
challenge are motivated by similar concerns over minimalism’s ability to vindicate moral 
discourse. The former demanded that the minimalist make sense of the fact that moral 
discourse deserves any consideration in our deliberations whatsoever and the latter 
demands the minimalist makes sense of the distinctive consideration it deserves. Because of 
this difference, the solution I offered to resist the respectability challenge will not suffice as 
an answer to the proliferation challenge. 
One big-picture takeaway of Chapters 3 and 4 is that minimalism can defend itself 
by playing to the dialectical advantage I find for it in Chapter 2 as well as by being creative 
about minimalist constructions/reworkings of plausible principles/lines of reasoning that 
seem to contradict it. 
3. Development 
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Chapters 1 and 2 of this work constitute an attempt to construct a well-behaved 
version of metaethical minimalism—one that reflects a common strain in the work of 
contemporary metaethicists who are skeptical of metaethical ontology. Chapters 3 and 4 
comprise a defense of this thesis from challenges to it that can be found in the 
contemporary literature. Insofar as metaethical minimalism is a philosophical stance 
regarding what we can do without moral truthmakers, the work of the preceding chapters 
can be understood as the construction and defense of a largely ​negative​ project. While 
there is nothing wrong with engaging in a philosophical project that is meant solely to 
dissuade, it is fair to wonder if there is anything else for the metaethical minimalist to do. 
The temptation to embrace quietism is strong among minimalists, but in Chapters 5 and 6 
I aim to show that there is a positive alternative available for the minimalist interested in 
developing a full picture of their position.  
This is more than a matter of mere preference; embracing quietism results in the 
eliding of some of the most pressing philosophical mysteries left for the minimalist to 
solve; first, the issue of what secures the difference between truthmaker-backed truths 
about reality and normative truths; and second, the necessary conditions of our having 
knowledge of normative truths in the first place.  
Chapter 5 is aimed at resolving this first mystery in a way which results in an 
adequate understanding of the distinction between the objects of purely normative 
thoughts and objects of thoughts about reality. That is, the non-quietist minimalist wants 
to be able to draw a distinction between what is real/existent and what is not (and is 
perhaps only “actual”) using a philosophically sound principle that vindicates their 
10 
  
minimalistic treatment of norms. This is the role Skorupski (2009) wants “the causal 
condition” to play for minimalism. According to it, the objects of pure normative 
judgments (value, reasons, etc.) can be the value of a variable in an existential claim and 
therefore ​referred​ to unproblematically. However, like propositions, universals, and 
possible worlds, they are not the kind of thing that can bump into, act upon, or be acted 
upon by any other object. Consequently, they cannot be measured, weighed, or 
documented in space and time.  
According to the truthmaker theorist’s own “semantic condition,” causal facts 
about norms place no restriction upon their reality, a reality which is claimed for them by 
those propositions which quantify over them existentially. According to the causal 
condition, causal facts entail that norms are not part of reality and therefore do not exist. 
If the causal condition is a suitable replacement for the semantic condition for the 
metaethical minimalist, then it must be able to do two things: 1) neatly divide up the 
domain of discourse into real objects and irreal objects and 2) determine that normative 
objects fall into the latter category. In the first part of Chapter 5, I argue why the causal 
condition fails to meet these goals. In its second part, I offer my replacement condition 
which, I argue, does a better job: the epistemic condition. According to the epistemic 
condition, something (X) is real/existent insofar as 1) it is, ​in principle​, possible for some 
epistemic agent have non-inferential knowledge of X and 2) a necessary condition upon 
having this non-inferential knowledge of X is a conception-independent presentation of X 
to the epistemic agent.  
11 
  
 Building on this positive picture are Chapters 6 and 7, which argue in favor of an 
account of the relationship between emotion and evaluative knowledge that is consistent 
with metaethical minimalism. That is, it argues that minimalism is consistent with a form 
of sentimentalism. Broadly construed, moral sentimentalism is the position that human 
emotions or sentiments play a crucial role in our best normative or descriptive accounts of 
moral value or judgments thereof. In Chapter 6, I introduce and sketch a defense of a new 
form of moral sentimentalism I call “Transcendental Sentimentalism”. According to 
transcendental sentimentalism, having a sentimental response to an object is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of a subject counting as having non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge about that object. In unpacking each component of this position, I argue that 
it is both distinct from and more explanatorily attractive than the other approaches to 
explaining the relationship between emotion and moral thought, including what 
Kauppinen (2014, forthcoming) calls epistemological sentimentalism and explanatory 
sentimentalism. I conclude by offering a sketch of what I take to be the most promising 
strategy for demonstrating the truth of transcendental sentimentalism, suggesting an 
original form of transcendental argument. If successful, this form of argument would 
establish transcendental sentimentalism by demonstrating that not having a sentimental 
response to x disqualifies (in the normative sense) a person from counting as having 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge of x. 
In Chapter 7, I draw upon the arguments made in Chapters 5 and 6 in order to 
present a positive picture of evaluation that incorporates transcendental sentimentalism 
and metaethical minimalism. I argue that a beneficial consequence of marrying 
12 
  
transcendental sentimentalism with metaethical minimalism is that the former’s 
conception of “sentiment” becomes more developed. I also show how the explanatory 
demands placed on metaethical minimalism by the epistemic condition can be met by 
appealing to sentiment. The result of this coupling is a pair of positions that become 
stronger in virtue of being packaged together. In doing so, I aim to show how each 
commitment of metaethical minimalism I theretofore have identified can work together in 
the interest of showcasing not only what metaethics should ​not​ be concerned about but 
what positive philosophical contributions a metaethics scrubbed free of moral truthmakers 
can make. If nothing else, my hope is that the reader comes away from these final 3 
chapters, as well as those preceding, believing that there is positive work left for the 
minimalist—i.e. the minimalist does not have to be a quietist. 
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Chapter 1: A Survey of Metaethical Minimalism 
 
To my knowledge, there is no philosopher who calls themselves a metaethical 
minimalist—  though there are some who have gone out of their way to eschew the label. 
Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is to present the core tenants of metaethical 
minimalism found in the work of those who prefer other names for their position. 
Consequently, what follows is more a work of construction than a strict summary of a 
philosophical position. As is the case with all minimalisms, metaethical minimalism is 
guided by a belief in what we can do without. Metaethical minimalists believe that we can 
do without metaphysics and ontology in metaethics. This is not because they believe along 
with the error theorist that we must answer ontological questions about ethical properties 
in the negative, but because of a belief that ethics is a category of discourse that does not 
require a metaphysics or ontology to be understood as trafficking in objective truths. 
The aim of this chapter is to identify a common line of thought that runs through 
the works of a number of different thinkers in order to prepare the ground for a general, 
working account of metaethical minimalism. As will quickly become apparent, the 
presentation of this common line of thought varies widely. An ancillary aim will be to 
prepare the ground for a refinement of the minimalist thesis which will occur in chapter 2. 
 
Describing Metaethical Minimalism: A first pass 
14 
  
In his seminal minimalist work “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it”, 
Ronald Dworkin argues, apropos of the essay’s title, in favor of the thesis that moral truth 
is objective and that accepting this objectivity is obligatory on moral grounds. 
Consequently, any meta-ethical view that explicitly or implicitly denies this objectivity 
advocates a commitment to a ​morally​ dubious position. Any position that takes moral 
truth to be mind-dependent, for example, is committed to the belief that the fact that 
slavery is wrong depends on what some set of people think about slavery. This runs 
contrary to a judgment that seems intuitively correct: that slavery is wrong, no matter what 
anyone thinks!  
So far nothing I have claimed about Dworkin sets him apart from the moral realist 
who takes moral truth to be grounded in mind-independent reality. For all metaethical 
minimalists, like for robust moral realists , metaethical inquiry begins with objective 10
moral truth. That is, despite all the differences we will find between the ways they object to 
metaphysics and ontology, minimalists agree on what I will call the objectivity thesis: 
The Objectivity Thesis: ​a)​ ​Moral truths are strongly mind-independent. b) 
There are moral truths. 
This minimal gloss on “objectivity” is where the departure from realism begins: 
minimalists understand objective truth solely as that which is true independently of what 
is thought to be true. Following minimalist Matthew Kramer (2009), I use “​strong 
mind-independence” to indicate that which obtains independently of not only an 
individual’s view, but also of the collective views of a group or community. The realist 
10 See Enoch (2011) for an especially clear articulation and defense of this position 
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thinks that moral truths, if they are strongly mind-independent, must be true in virtue of a 
mind-external reality. The minimalist, on the other hand, thinks that moral truths, if they 
are true in this way, are true in virtue of a moral argument:  
"The only intelligible case for the ‘mind-independence’ of some moral judgment is 
a moral argument showing that it would still be true even if no one thought it was; 
the only intelligible case against it is a moral argument for the opposite claim." 
(Dworkin 2011, p.10) 
According to the minimalist, traditional moral realists illicitly build in a grounding in 
reality as a condition of objectivity. The minimalist declines to begin with this assumption, 
opting instead for reading into “objective truth” a negative sense—i.e. as merely ​not 
dependent upon someone thinking it true. 
Subpart b) of The Objectivity Thesis sets the minimalist apart from the error 
theorist who agrees that moral judgments claim to be strongly mind-independent but 
argues that there are in fact no such moral truths. The minimalist argument against the 
error theorist is demonstrating the very possibility of metaethical minimalism. That is, if 
the minimalist is right that there are objective moral truths without any ontological or 
metaphysical commitments, the motivation for error theory disappears insofar as it is born 
from a concern about the implausibility of a sui-generis normative reality. 
***  
The calling-card of the metaethical minimalist is not their positive commitment to 
objective moral truth, but rather their negative commitment that The Objectivity Thesis 
does not entail any robust ontological commitments. This negative ontological thesis is 
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expressed in a number of different ways. In the following sections of this chapter I present 
a survey of the variations of this negative thesis offered by minimalists. As will become 
apparent, any singular defense of metaethical minimalism will require deciding between 
the right statement of denial with respect to ontological and metaphysical theorizing in 
metaethics. 
 
Dworkinian Minimalism 
Let’s return to Dworkin to see an example of one early attempt at constructing a 
negative ontological thesis:  
"Some so-called moral "realists" add to the confusion by... declar[ing] that there 
really are objective and normative properties or facts in the universe, which is true. 
But they declare this in language that strives for metaphysical resonance, as if its 
truth was to be discovered in some philosophical domain other than that of 
substantive evaluation. If I am right, they share the fallacy of the archimedeans, 
which is to suppose that some sense can be assigned to the supposedly 
metaphysical claims that is not itself a normative sense, or that there is some way to 
establish a normative proposition other than through substantive normative 
arguments…” (1996, p. 127) 
Dworkin’s reading of metaphysical claims about normative facts is that, to the extent that 
they are possible to make sense of, they are nothing but restatements of The Objectivity 
Thesis with a little added flair. This is a consequence of his position that not only are 
metaethical thesis non-neutral with respect to substantive normative commitments, but 
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there is also ​no sense​ to be made of them “that is not itself  a normative sense.” That is, his 
hostility to them as claims does not amount to a denial of their truth, but to the fact that 
metaphysicians and ontologists want to understand them as pointing to something 
external to normative or moral discourse. 
Implicit in Dworkin’s argumentation is the premise that metaphysics and ontology 
play no part in the grounding of moral truth. This is apparently a position born of an 
epistemological point: moral judgments are true in virtue of what we discover not by 
observation of reality but by “substantive evaluation.” Philosophers trick themselves into 
thinking something is revealed about external reality as a result of being susceptible to 
metaphor: 
“What about the baroque claims I added at the end, about moral "facts" being "out 
there" in an "independent" realm? These are not things people actually say… But 
we can make sufficient sense of them, as things people might say, by understanding 
them as inflated, metaphorical ways of repeating what some of the earlier further 
claims say more directly: that the wrongness of abortion does not depend on 
anyone's thinking it wrong, for example." (​ibid​, p.99) 
This account of how realists get into the habit of committing themselves to more than 
they need to is common among minimalists. Something about the allure of our picture of 
objective empirical truth leads the realist to think that all instances of objective truth must 
share an analogous metaphysical and ontological picture. 
What is distinctive about Dworkinian minimalism in comparison to other 
articulations we will review is a willingness to self-describe as a realist: 
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“ I regard my view of morality as a "realist" one (though, given the notorious 
ambiguity of the term, not much turns on the attribution)" (​ibid​, p.127) 
I will argue that the minimalist should avoid this label for the purpose of articulating how 
their position differs from the robust realist’s and why moral claims differ from empirical 
claims. However, Dworkin reads “realism” as just a way of restating The Objectivity 
Thesis: 
“But by itself the claim that moral convictions correspond to reality is just 
redundant. ‘The proposition that abortion is wrong corresponds to a fact’ can be 
understood as just a wordy way of saying that abortion is wrong." (​ibid,​ p.103), 
It is possible that Dworkin himself began to rethink this (and any other) label for his view 
by the time he wrote ​Justice for Hedgehogs ​(2011). Therein he offers this observation about 
his own position: 
“In what philosophical pigeonhole does it rest? ​Is it a kind of moral realism?​ Or 
constructivism? Or even anti-realism? Is it itself a nonmoral metaphysical theory? 
Or a quietist or minimalist theory that just ignores rather than really escapes 
troublesome metaphysics? ​None of these labels fits exactly— or exactly 
doesn’t fit​— because each is stained with the mistaken assumption that there are 
important philosophical questions about value that are not to be answered with 
value judgments." (p.11, my emphases) 
However, Dworkin still seems to think that describing moral facts as reflective of reality 
may be fine in the course of engaging in regular moral discourse because its meaning is not 
misunderstood in that context. What is unclear is whether he regards this as permissible 
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because “reality” is a term that has multiple senses depending on the discourse in which it 
appears or because making reference to moral reality is to speak in metaphor.  
Matthew Kramer, who is strongly influenced by Dworkin’s minimalism, also calls 
himself a realist. Like Dworkin, he thinks that ontological and metaphysical claims about 
moral truths are claims about substantive moral matters. Unlike Dworkin, Kramer has an 
account of the distinctive role that such claims play in normative deliberations: they are 
ways of articulating abstract moral principles. Abstract moral propositions like, “There is a 
mind-independent moral reality” are to be contrasted with concrete moral propositions 
like “Inflicting pain on others for fun is wrong”:  
"Attentiveness to the distinction between abstract ethical propositions and 
concrete ethical propositions is of crucial importance throughout this book, for 
the perception of a fundamental divide between meta-ethics and substantive ethics 
has been very widespread among philosophers largely because the character of 
abstract ethical propositions as ethical propositions has been neglected." (p.4) 
The distinction between purportedly “meta”-ethical claims and first-order ethical 
propositions is not correctly regarded as a distinction between claims which are made 
external to moral discourse and those that are made internal to it. Rather, the distinction is 
one of specificity—the debate over meta-ethical matters is a debate over the most abstract 
principles with moral substance. According to Kramer,  
"Whereas most meta-ethical theses are logically neutral among a vast array of 
concrete moral stances, none of them (or virtually none of them) is logically 
neutral among all such stances." (p.5) 
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While the position that “there is a mind-independent moral reality” is neutral with respect 
to the propositions “Abortion is impermissible” and “Abortion is permissible”, it is not 
neutral with respect to the moral propositions “What is the right action depends on what 
someone thinks” and “There are actions which are right irrespective of what anyone 
thinks”. 
Kramer is aligned with Dworkin in thinking that determining the right abstract 
moral theses is not a matter of metaphysical theorizing, but of normative deliberation: 
“The key questions of moral ontology and moral epistemology are abstract moral 
questions. To address them adequately, we have to have recourse to basic moral 
considerations…” (200). However, care must be taken here. One could imagine a 
non-minimalist position according to which abstract metaethical questions are answered 
by engaging in moral deliberation, and these answers justify domain-external ontological 
and metaphysical claims. This is not Kramer’s position. Regarding his many claims that 
resemble those of the robust moral realist, Kramer says, “[M]y invocations of propositions 
and truth and facts (and other such things) are all minimalist in tenor" (29). Were he to 
endorse a robust interpretation of these invocations, he would, in also endorsing moral 
realism, imply a commitment to metaethical claims that are made external to and about 
moral discourse. 
Kramer’s view is Dworkinian because of his insistence that it is a ​realist​ view. The 
title of his work, ​Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine​, belies his motivation for adopting 
the label. It is, in effect, a restatement of The Objectivity Principle, which is itself 
understood as a moral principle by Kramer:  
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"The existential mind-independence of basic moral principles is strong. Their 
continued existence as correct principles of morality does not depend on the 
continuation of the mental functioning of any people individually or collectively." 
(pp. 26-27)" 
Questions arise for this kind of approach; including, is “existence” generally a minimal 
notion or does it just have a minimal sense in the context of moral discourse? A closer look 
at Kramer’s statement of his position reveals that he regards “reality” and “existence” as 
having a different, non-causal sense in the moral context: 
“Given that the reality of any moral property is always itself a moral matter, and 
given that in countless circumstances there will be dispositive moral reasons for the 
reality of various moral properties, the causal inefficacy of such properties is no bar 
to their existence as such." (pp. 201-202) 
Kramer and Dworkin feel at liberty to regard their views as realist because they find an 
appropriate use of the term “existence” in discourse-internal deliberation.  
For Kramer and Dworkin, their adoption of the “realist” label makes it somewhat 
complicated to state concisely and forcefully what they deny about ontological and 
metaphysical theorizing in metaethics. They are unwilling to deny that there is a distinctive 
normative or moral reality, only that when they do say it they mean something different 
from the robust moral realist or the moral naturalist. Their negative ontological thesis, 
then, is more precisely regarded as a two-pronged negative ​semantic ​thesis: i) that there are 
no meta-level claims about ethical discourse that are neutral with respect to ethical 
commitments, and ii) that claims that philosophers suppose have implications about a 
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discourse-external ontology, in fact, do not, but are rather restatements of substantive 
positions internal to ethical discourse. The Dworkinian minimalist thinks that we are 
incapable of making truly neutral claims about the external grounds of ethical propositions 
even if we tried—such an act would entail “‘taking up sides’ in [a] substantive moral 
dispute” (Dworkin, 101) and nothing more. 
 
Putnam’s Ontology-free Ethics 
In his work ​Ethics without Ontology​, Hillary Putnam takes up a pragmatist stance 
that is plausibly included under the “metaethical minimalist” heading. One difficulty in 
pinning down Putnam’s precise position is born of his idiosyncratic use of “objective”. In 
a chapter entitled “Ontology: an Obituary”, Putnam asks, 
"If ethical claims are ​objective​—or, better, to use the language Conant employed 
in describing my position, if they are bonafide instances of assertoric discourse, 
forms of reflection that are as fully governed by norms of truth and validity as any 
other form of cognitive activity—how is it that we so often can’t agree on which 
ones are true?" (74-75, my emphasis) 
His answer is that there is an important difference between claims about ethical matters 
and empirical matters; only the latter involves descriptions of objects. However, Putnam 
concludes that this is not dispositive of the objectivity (rooted in some other sense than 
that of a literal “object”) of the former, as is possible to tell from the way these claims 
function in our discourse:  
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“[I]t is right that certain crucial ethical statements are not descriptions, but that is 
no reason for classifying them as outside the range of the notions of truth and 
falsity, good and bad argument, and the like… (77-78). 
The first component of the minimalist’s objectivity thesis is consistent with Putnam’s view 
only if he believes that, in addition to being capable of being “true” and “correct”, ethical 
claims are mind-independently true.  
Things become simultaneously clearer and more complicated by Putnam’s 
discussion of the “existence” of value, during which he indicates that the objectivity he has 
in mind is similar to what the Platonists attempt to explain using metaphysics:  
"I have claimed that ethics and mathematics can and do possess objectivity without 
being about sublime or intangible objects, such as “Platonic forms” or “abstract 
entities,” and that the idea that “exist” has a unique and determinate meaning, one 
cast in stone, so to speak, is mistaken." (2) 
Putnam’s primary target in his argument against ontology in ethics is what he regards as a 
Platonistic stance towards objective truth. The idea of “existence”, especially as it relates to 
value, that such a stance advocates is unnecessarily inflationary:  
“But why will I be rejecting inflationary (for example, “Platonic”) metaphysics? 
My answer is that I hold, with the pragmatists and again with Wittgenstein, that 
pragmatic pluralism does not require us to find mysterious and supersensible 
objects behind our language games; the truth can be told in language games that 
we actually play when language is working, and the inflations that philosophers 
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have added to those language games are examples, as Wittgenstein said—using a 
rather pragmatist turn of phrase—of “the engine idling.” (22). 
This coupled with the idea that ethical claims are objective secures Putnam’s place among 
metaethical minimalists, though there is no evidence that he has any tendency to call his 
view “realist”, like Dworkin and Kramer call their own.  
Attending to this difference between Putnam’s view and the Dworkinians’ and 
what is distinctive about Putnam’s is that it allows us to identify the target of his version of 
the negative ontological thesis: the idea that ethical claims are descriptions; 
“If there is anything that today’s “naturalist” (in the sense of scientistic) 
metaphysicians tend to overlook, it seems to me, it is that judgments to the effect 
that such-and-such is a good reason are not descriptions." (65) 
Later, he claims, “‘Terrorism is criminal’ and ‘Wife-beating is wrong’ aren’t descriptions; 
they are simply evaluations that convey moral condemnation" (73). While this may appear 
close to verging on non-cognitivism, according to Putnam it is not correct to say that in 
making ethical claims we do not make assertions, or that we do not make assertions about 
what exists. So long as we keep in mind that the sense of “existence” we employ when 
making normative claims is unlike that in use when offering descriptions of objects, there 
is nothing wrong with interpreting utterances like “There exists a moral reason to refrain 
from lying” as a literal assertion of existence. Putnam’s negative ontological thesis is thus 
the claim that, while it is right to say that value, reasons, and norms exist, they do not exist 
in a way such that we can offer descriptions of them like our descriptions of reality. 
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Parfit’s Non-metaphysical Cognitivism 
Derek Parfit’s, in ​On What Matters​ defends a position he calls “Non-metaphysical 
cognitivism” that is similar to Putnam’s in that it relies on a “multi-sense” view of existence 
according to which there are least two meanings of “exist”: one reserved for empirical 
claims and one reserved for normative claims. However, whereas Putnam premises his 
position upon the denial that normative claims describe, Parfit’s route to minimalism relies 
on a detour through a debate over the ontological status of possible states of affairs. We 
should have no qualms about regarding value, reasons, and norms as existent in a different 
sense than natural objects exist because there is no analogous problem with claiming that 
there are possibilities that exist in a different way than the way that actualities exist:  
"We ought, I believe, to accept a different view. According to what I shall call 
Possibilism: There are some things that are never actual, but are merely possible. 
There are some things that might happen but never actually happen, and some 
things that might exist but never actually exist... But Possibilists like me need not 
believe that merely possible entities are real. Loux defines Actualism as the view 
‘that only what actually exists is real’. But Possibilists can agree that only what is 
actual and real is actual and real. We are Possibilists because we believe that there 
are also some things that are merely possible, rather than being actual and real." 
(467) 
If Parfit and the possibilists are right, there is a discourse we participate in every day that 
relies on an intuitive distinction between what is real and actual, on the one hand, and 
what exists only as a possibility, on the other. 
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Such a position, Parfit believes, demonstrates that the assumption that there must 
be a metaphysical or ontological state of affairs which accompanies every fact about what 
exists is unfounded: 
“Just as there are some things that we ​could​ have done, there are some things that 
we ​should​ have done. And there are some things that we have reasons to believe, 
and to want, and to do. These claims, we can add, do not conflict with what 
Russell called our robust sense of reality. Unlike entities that are merely possible 
rather than actual, such normative properties and truths do not have a ​lesser 
ontological status. Like numbers and logical truths, these normative properties and 
truths have ​no​ ontological status.” (487). 
Importantly, Parfit thinks there ​are​ normative truths (and that he has identified the most 
important ones). The minimalist stance he takes up is minimalist in the sense I have 
employed the term insofar as he believes that there are such truths while denying that there 
is an ontological ground for them: "When such claims assert that there are certain things, 
or that these things exist, these claims do not imply that these things exist in some 
ontological sense" (479).  
At the outset of this section, I said that one challenge facing metaethical 
minimalists was making it clear what precisely they are denying about the ontological, i.e. 
naming the target of their negative ontological thesis. For Dworkinian minimalists this 
target is the very meaningfulness of ontological claims about the normative and for 
Putnam this target was descriptivism about ethical judgments. For Parfit, the target seems 
to be the very notion that he should be required to have the conversation at all:  
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“When we claim that there are things that we could have done, these claims don’t 
commit us to the existence of strange entities as parts of reality… These properties 
and truths are not, in relevant senses, either actual or merely possible, or either real 
or unreal. In asking whether there are such normative truths, we need not answer 
ontological questions. There are, I believe, some such truths, which are as true as 
any truth could be. " (487) 
Again, recall that Parfit’s move is to say that what he has claimed about possible states of 
affairs applies by analogy to normative properties. At points he extends this line of thought 
to apply to abstract entities like numbers or logical truths:  
“When we are trying to form true beliefs about numbers or logical truths, we need 
not answer ontological questions. As one way to sum up these claims, we can say 
that, though there are these numbers and truths, these entities exist in a 
non-ontological sense." (481) 
The philosophical work done by Parfit’s repeated assertion that “we need not answer 
ontological questions” is difficult to pin down, especially if it is taken as a 
meta-philosophical judgment about the worthiness of focusing our attention on the 
present issue. Is it that such questions need not be answered because they should be 
regarded as meaningless? Or is it simply unnecessary that we worry about answering such 
questions in the course of determining whether something is a normative (or logical, or 
mathematical) truth or not?  
Parfit evidently prefers a quietist approach to ontological questions. According to 
this quietist approach, my concern that the negative ontological thesis should be made 
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more precise is ill-founded. Instead, all the minimalist needs is their positive component to 
the objectivity thesis perhaps coupled with an “and that’s all folks!” added at the end as an 
inoculation against the temptation to theorize further.  
Even if Parfit is correct that any ontological questions about normative, logical, or 
mathematical truths need not be answered, there is at least one answer that the minimalist 
owes their non-minimalist interlocutor: why is it that for the truths of some domains we 
do​ need to answer ontological questions and for others we do not? Put another way, it is 
fair for those curious about minimalism to ask “What mistake am I making when asking 
ontological questions about normative truths or thinking that such questions require 
answers?”. The negative ontological thesis is an answer to ​this​ question. For Dworkinians, 
the mistake being made is supposing that the ethical discourse can be theorized about 
using ethically-neutral, discourse-external claims. For Putnam, the mistake the 
non-minimalist makes is identifying evaluations or normative judgments as descriptions.  
This much is clear: Parfit believes that it is a mistake to think “exists” has a 
univocal ontological sense. Furthermore, he is comfortable saying of normative properties 
that “these entities exist in a non-ontological sense" (481). So, any attempted construction 
of Parfit’s negative ontological thesis cannot use the “existence” of normative properties or 
truthmakers as its target. At the same time he makes it clear that he is no realist about 
possible states of affairs or (by analogy) normative properties:  
"When we claim that there are things that we could have done, these claims don’t 
commit us to the existence of strange entities as parts of reality…” (487). 
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The question for the metaethical minimalist is whether there is any coherent formulation 
of their position that denies that there is any normative component to “reality” while 
affirming the (non-ontological) “existence” of normative properties. 
 
Scanlon’s Domain-Relative Minimalism 
T.M. Scanlon, in his ​Being Realistic About Reasons​, denies that his metaethical 
view is “minimalist.”  Irrespective of how he employs the term, Scanlon’s view is 11
minimalist in a sense relevant to our current task in that he affirms that there are objective 
moral truths (about reasons for action) while denying ​something​ about ontological or 
metaphysical implications of this commitment. Furthermore, he makes it clear that he has 
the ​negative​ sense of “objective” (discussed above) in mind when clarifying his 
commitments:  
“A subject matter is independent of us, and judgments about it are objective in a 
further sense, if these judgments are judgment-independent and, in addition, the 
standards for assessing such judgments do not depend on what we, collectively, 
have done, chosen, or adopted, and would not be different had we done, chosen, 
or adopted something else. Call this choice-independence… I believe that many 
truths about reasons for action are both judgment-independent and 
choice-independent. " (94) 
11 “My view is not minimalist” (28). 
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“Choice-independence” is Scanlon’s term for a stronger mind-independence that builds in 
the negative claim that choice-independent truths are also not dependent on there being 
some stipulated or conventional principle which implies their truth. 
Scanlon, like normative realists, is comfortable talking about “normative 
properties” and facts about reasons, though for Scanlon claims involving these terms are 
moves made within a particular domain of discourse and ought to be understood relative 
to the standards of that domain.  
“[My view] holds that statements with all these domains are capable of truth and 
falsity, and that the truth values of statements about one domain, insofar as they 
do not conflict with statements of some other domain, are properly settled by the 
standards of the domain that they are about… So a domain is better understood in 
terms of the kinds of claims it involves, and hence in terms of concepts that it deals 
with, such as number, set, physical object, reason, or morally right action." (19) 
According to the standards of the domain of claims about physical objects, existential 
commitments to such objects imply their robust or ‘thick’ existence.  
“Claims about the existence of objects in the spatio-temporal world do seem to 
involve a ‘thick’ or ‘robust’ idea of existence. But the ‘thickness’ of these existential 
claims is provided by the idea of that world itself. For physical objects to exist is for 
them to have spatio-temporal location, to have various physical properties, and to 
interact causally with other objects. The relevant idea of “thickness” is thus 
domain-specific” (28).  
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Existential claims made about normative properties or reasons for actions do not imply 
such thick existence according to Scanlon. 
Scanlon apparently is also moved by the same “queerness” concerns that the idea 
of a thick existence of non-natural properties gives rise to:  
"To put this point in a slightly different way, our ontological commitments in this 
general sense do not represent a claim on our part about what the world contains, 
in any meaningful sense of “the world.”... if we respond to this first worry by 
denying that numbers, say, are part of the natural world, while still insisting that 
they are part of “the world” we invite questions about what this shadowy “world” 
is to which numbers and perhaps other non-spatial entities all belong. It is better to 
avoid such questions altogether." (24) 
At the end of this passage, we see Scanlon express a quietist attitude similar to Parfit’s. 
However, unlike with Parfit’s view, it is possible to pin down the reasons such questions 
are misguided according to Scanlon’s view. The mistaken presupposition such questions 
rely on is an “idea” of existence that cuts across all domains of discourse. According to 
Scanlon, there is no domain-transcendent existence that is entailed by all domain-internal 
existential claims. This idea of domain-transcendent existence is the most plausible target 
of Scanlon’s negative ontological thesis, were we to construct one for him. That is, the 
mistake the moral realist makes is inferring from any existential claims about normative 
properties that some state of affairs obtains in a natural or “shadowy” world. This is a 
mistake because there is only ever a domain-internal idea of existence conveyed by these 
claims. 
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One significant worry about this domain-internal approach to “existence” is that it 
appears to allow for as many kinds of existents (and their various ways of existing) as there 
are domains. Scanlon admits this consequence: 
“According to my view, as long as this way of talking was well defined, internally 
coherent, and did not have any presuppositions or implications that might conflict 
with those of other domains, such as science, by accepting these statements we 
would be committed to the existence of things quantified over in the existential 
statements counted as true in this way of talking. They would be among our 
“ontological commitments.” Can we take seriously an idea of existence that comes 
so cheaply? My answer is that the question about such entities is not whether they 
really exist. This question is settled by the standards of the domain, assuming, as I 
have stipulated, that their existence does not entail implausible claims about other 
domains, such as the natural world.”  (27) 
Born of this worry is one of the most pressing challenges to metaethical minimalism, one 
that will be the focus of a subsequent chapter (4). Namely, that this form of minimalism 
allows for the possibility of the existence of “counter-reasons”--a coherent set of reasons 
that count in favor of performing morally repugnant actions. Though any form of 
metaethical minimalism will need to have an answer to this challenge, our present question 
concerns minimalism’s negative ontological thesis: is there a preferred way of articulating 
the negative ontological thesis that avoids or lessens the concerns about the proliferation of 
ontological commitments?  
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Skorpuski’s Cognitive Irrealism 
Let’s suppose we want to answer “yes” to the preceding question. According to the 
survey offered so far, the minimalist has a few routes open to them: deny that any 
seemingly ontological claims about normativity are actually claims about ontology, deny 
that we are in the business of describing when asserting that normative properties exist, or 
deny that we should even entertain ontological questions when they arise about such 
existence-claims. The strategy pursued by John Skorupski differs from these approaches by 
involving an explicit denial that there is any sense in which norms or normative properties 
exist. The reason why Skorupski is not a moral skeptic is that he affirms that ​there are 
objective reasons for action (or what he calls “reason-relations”) and that we have beliefs 
about them. However, reasons are not in the category of that which is potentially real at 
one time/place and not real at another time/place; rather they are, when actual, “​irreal​.” 
Put another way, if Skorupski is right, the question “Are moral reasons real or are there 
none of them at all?” presents a false dichotomy—the unpresented possibility is that moral 
reasons are not real but it is true that there are actually quite a few of them.  
While it is true that we can existentially quantify over reasons, Skorupski (unlike 
Putnam, Parfit, and Scanlon) does not take this to imply the ​existence​ of reasons. To claim 
of something that can be quantified over is to make a semantic claim; to claim of 
something that it is ​real​ is to make a further claim about the causal role it can play: 
“The real is that which has causal standing. How widely the notion of cause should 
be understood is a further philosophical question; but ​however​ widely we 
understand it, I argue, this criterion makes reason relations irreal. It does not 
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follow that propositions about them cannot be true, and it does not follow that 
reason relations are fictions or constructs. They are what they are, independently 
of what we think they are. Their objectivity is the unconditioned condition on 
which the Normative view explains the possibility of knowledge and freedom.” 
(30) 
Here we see Skorpuski reiterate the minimalist understanding of objectivity as 
mind-independence. Any minimalist who wants to regard reasons or value as lacking 
existence must find some way of distinguishing discourse about normative matters from 
discourse about the fictitious. True statements of the latter are true in virtue of some 
choice or fact about minds. The same is not true of the former. 
Skorupski makes a compelling argument against what he calls “the semantic 
condition” by appealing to ordinary language. He points out that the ease with which we 
understand sentences such as “(1) There are characters in War and Peace who do not exist 
and characters who do” shows that we have an understanding of what “there is” that is 
different from our understanding of what “exists”. Those who advocate for an ontological 
interpretation of all existential quantification are at odds with this ordinary understanding: 
“[A]ccording to the semantic condition, if we assert [(1)] we must ‘admit’ all the 
characters in  War and Peace into ‘our ontology’. If we don’t want to admit them 
we must find some other way to regiment these sentences, in which no variable 
ranging over purely fictional characters occurs. This is a metaphysical not a 
semantic claim. What basis is there for it? As just noted, it is hard to see a basis for 
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it other than the thought that whatever one can think and talk about is real. But 
why on earth should we think such an extraordinary thing?” (423) 
This does not mean there is nothing of importance conveyed by existential quantification: 
“to be” for Skorupski is not to exist, rather “to be is to be actual, to be actual is to be the 
value of a possible variable” (425). ​There are​ actual fictions, numbers, propositions, sets, 
and reasons, but none of these are existent in the way a natural object is. 
Skorupski substitutes the semantic condition for what he calls “the causal 
condition”;“[T[he real is whatever has the power of acting or being acted upon'' (426). He 
intentionally keeps the notion of “power” vague so as to not beg the question in favor of 
naturalism. While beliefs about reasons, value, and norms are real and causally interact 
with other objects, it is not clear that these normative items are themselves capable of 
causally interacting with anything. The same can be said of numbers: while my belief that 
3 is a prime number can cause me to write it down on the list I am making of prime 
numbers, it would be strange to think that the number itself or its primeness has the power 
of acting upon objects. The causal condition allows Skorupski to make a principled 
division between the real and the irreal. In a refreshing change from the argumentative 
strategy of many non-realists, he does not rely on an appeal to our intuitions regarding the 
“queerness” of a purely normative reality. 
Skorupski’s negative ontological thesis is bolder relative to those of his minimalist 
peers: reasons do not exist nor are they in the category of that which is possibly real. He 
does not wish to reserve a weaker “non-ontological” idea of existence for the normative, 
nor does he dismiss the very debate over the ontology of the normative as misguided. 
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Despite this apparent difference, it is not clear why any of the minimalists surveyed would 
regard Skorupski’s minimalism as giving up too much.  After all, what sets Skorupski apart 
from the moral skeptic is the same thing that sets all metaethical minimalists apart from 
them: a belief that ​there are ​actual, objective (mind-independent) reasons for action. While 
his position itself makes for what, in my assessment, is the most plausible articulation of 
metaethical minimalism currently on offer, Skorupski’s reliance on the causal condition is 
not without its problems. Critiquing this argument and offering another condition in its 
stead will be the focus of chapter 5. 
**** 
So far, my aim has been to present metaethical minimalism as it exists in the wild; 
despite the differences in approach we found, what justifies my grouping these positions 
under one category is a shared commitment to objective normative truths and a denial of 
something​ about the ontological implications of this commitment. Though difficult to 
prove, I suspect that the differences we find between these minimalists reflect a divergence 
of strategy regarding the proper articulation of the minimalist position, rather than a 
difference of substance. Despite the fact that Skorupski does not think it is correct to 
regard truths about reasons for action as “facts”, I do not believe he would take issue with 
Scanlon’s stance on moral facts, even when he says "A view of the kind I am calling 
Reasons Fundamentalism, which takes there to be ​facts​ about which things are reasons..." 
(9). This is because we can plausibly interpret Scanlon here to be affirming the objective 
truth of reason-propositions and understand him as favoring a minimalist interpretation of 
the term “fact”. Similarly, while Putnam is careful to reject the notion that normative 
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judgments are “descriptions”, his minimalist peers have no problem employing the term 
liberally in a way that does not commit them to the idea that normative judgments paint a 
picture of some occurrent reality-inhering state of affairs. The question is where to draw 
the line of minimalist interpretation of terms; what is at stake in properly answering this 
question is the ability to construct a coherent minimalist position. 
In the next chapter, I will follow Skorupski’s lead and argue that metaethical 
minimalists would do best by using their negative ontological thesis to target the idea that 
asserting an objective normative truth necessarily entails the existence of a normative 
portion of reality. I argue that taking aim at the notion that true normative propositions 
have truthmakers has numerous dialectical advantages and allows minimalists to continue 
using “fact”, “description”, and “property” without issue. In chapter 5, I depart from 
Skorupski by arguing that the causal condition is inadequate and by replacing it with 
another criterion which allows a principled distinction between truths which do require 
truthmakers and those which do not.  
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Chapter 2: On the Variety of Metaethical Minimalisms 
and the Burdens they Carry 
My aim in this chapter is to analyze the justificatory burdens of a minimalist 
approach in metaethics. Ultimately, I will conclude that some of the versions of 
metaethical minimalism on offer presently do require justification for the reason that they 
can be more plausibly interpreted as accompanying the minimalist approach with a 
rejection of a central premise of truthmaker theory. However, I will argue that it is not 
necessary that the minimalist be burdened with justifying this rejection, and that their 
minimalism can consist solely of an attitude of non-acceptance of this central premise. 
This ​bare​ minimalism, I will argue, is a rationally permissible default position, or starting 
point, in metaethical discourse. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this 
latter view for metaethical inquiry. 
It might be thought that the minimalist’s chief theoretical rival is the moral realist. 
However, I contend that the distinctiveness of the minimalist approach should be 
understood as a lack of endorsement of a belief that the realist shares with many 
anti-realists; i.e., contra minimalism, the majority of metaethical theories accept, either 
implicitly or explicitly, the following premise: 
Moral Truthmaker Conditional (MTMC): “​For any moral proposition, if it is true, 
then there exist(s) some truthmaker(s) which ground(s) its truth.​”  12
12 I have chosen not to include any mention of necessity in my rendering of the truthmaker conditionals in 
this essay, this is not to suggest that I have a settled position on Truthmaker Necessitarianism, only that I 
wish not to wade into the waters of whether truthmaker theory implies that contingent truths do not have 
truthmakers or whether all truths are necessary truths. See e.g. Armstrong (2004), Rodriguez-Pereya (2006), 
and MacBride (2013) for more discussion of this issue. 
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By “truthmakers”, truthmaker theorists mean entities or states of affairs existing in natural 
or non-natural reality whose existence and accessibility explain the truth and knowability 
of, in the context of metaethics, moral propositions.​ ​Though I will argue that MTMC is 
neither common sense nor has ​prima facie​ status , its content is relatively easily 13
understood. Just as my statement “There is a red ball in the Oval Office” is true only if 
there exists a red ball somewhere in the Oval Office at the time I make this statement, 
MTMC claims that there is something(s) which play an analogous role to that played by 
the red-ball-in-the-Oval-Office state of affairs for moral propositions. Many thousands of 
pages have been written in efforts to present the most plausible candidates for “some moral 
truthmaker(s)” quantified over in MTMC’s consequent. Some truthmaker theorists think 
that these “somethings” are not merely ​analogous​ with truthmakers of empirical 
judgments, but turn out to be the same sort of natural entities. Other truthmaker theorists 
argue that moral truthmakers must be non-natural or irreducibly normative to explain 
certain distinctive features of moral judgments (e.g. their action-guidedness, their 
objectivity, their authority, etc.). In the latter group are those anti-realists who accept 
MTMC and employ it, sometimes implicitly, as a premise in arguments aimed at showing 
that moral judgments are wholly false or true only figuratively or in a fictional sense.   14
Of the theories populating the metaethical landscape, minimalism stands alone in 
its non-acceptance of MTMC--this is because minimalism is ​defined​ by a willingness to 
believe the antecedent of MTMC without affirming its consequent. Insofar as this is a 
minority position, perhaps even fringe, it might be thought that the minimalist would 
13  By “prima facie status” I mean the status of being a proposition which should be accepted until being 
given reason to doubt it, believe it false, or not accept it. 
14 See Mackie (1990), Joyce (2006) and (2009), and Streumer (2017) 
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need to do a great deal of work to justify this lack of acceptance. I will argue that this is 
incorrect. Even if MTMC is true, it is not ​obviously​ true. That is, we should not treat 
MTMC as having ​prima facie​ status, supposing that it ought to be believed until sufficient 
reason has been given for its rejection. I will also argue that MTMC is not a piece of 
common sense nor does it fly in the face of common sense to not accept it. However, 
accepting​ MTMC does not fly in the face of common sense nor does it flout that which has 
prima facie status. On the basis of this argumentation, I will conclude that the 
non-acceptance of MTMC is a rationally permissible default position which is not 
burdened by justification ​ab initio​ any more than any other default position. However, I 
will first discuss the state of non-acceptance to which I have been referring and how it 
relates to belief and disbelief. I will argue that these three propositional attitudes differ in 
required justification depending on the ​prima facie ​status of the proposition which is their 
object. 
By “lack of acceptance” and “non-acceptance” I have in mind an attitude of 
non-belief towards a proposition that can result only after considering the proposition’s 
content. It might be thought that rocks exhibit a lack of acceptance towards MTMC, but 
this would be in a different sense than the minimalist’s lack of acceptance on account of 
rocks inability to assess and consider MTMC’s plausibility. Non-acceptance is also 
different from disbelief in that someone who disbelieves P ​believes​ that P is not the case, 
whereas someone who does not accept P merely ​does not believe​ P is the case after 
consideration of P. Both the person who disbelieves P and the person who does not accept 
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P are rightly categorized as ‘non-believers’ of P. So defined, I offer the following two claims 
about the propositional attitude of non-acceptance as it relates to its justification: 
1) When P has no status as a prima facie truth or prima facie falsehood, the attitude 
of non-acceptance towards P is not burdened by the need for justification when 
taken as a default position in an inquiry about P or some related matter for which 
P has some implication.  
2) If challenged, a sufficient defense of the default position taken up in 1) is that the 
person who takes up this position is not aware of any evidence or reasoning which 
would rationally require them to believe or disbelieve P.  15
If MTMC does not have prima facie status, then the minimalist who does not 
accept it is not burdened with justifying this non-acceptance as a default position. 
However, this lack of burden does not apply to all minimalists, as many MTMC 
non-believers in metaethics go further than mere non-acceptance and offer a ​rejection ​of 
MTMC aimed at rationally grounding disbelief of MTMC. I will call this variety of 
minimalism “Minimalism+”. Minimalism+ is rampant among those views which I take to 
be plausibly categorized under the “Minimalist” genus, including most, if not all, of those 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
 There are various strategies the Minimalist+ may employ to justify their rejection 
of MTMC, but most often they rely on one of three following sets of premises: ​1)​ The 
only sense that can be assigned to any meaningful metaethical claim is a normative sense, 
15 Sometimes non-acceptance does require justification. Having an attitude of non-acceptance calls out for 
justification when its object is a proposition which is obvious, common sense, or in some other way a prima 
facie truth. Plausibly, if I do not accept that there needs to exist a red ball in the Oval Office for the judgment 
“There is a red ball in the Oval Office” to be true, then I need to justify this non-acceptance. 
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not a metaphysical or ontological sense. This is because all meaningful second-order claims 
are really normative claims in baroque disguise and debates over their truth are really 
substantive normative debates. Therefore, insofar as MTMC is a claim about morality 
with intended non-normative sense, it either should be rejected as nonsensical or restated 
so as to reveal its normative sense. This is Ronald Dworkin’s position found in his (1996) 
and (2011); ​2)​ The only things which truly exist are natural objects or properties, and 
while moral judgments are true, the standards for truth in the moral domain differ than 
the standards of truth in the empirical domain;  only according to the standards of the 
latter domain do its propositions require truthmakers. This is Scanlon’s position 
articulated in his (2014); ​3)​ There is no explanatory need to posit moral truthmakers 
because moral judgments do not represent states of affairs and are instead expressions of 
non-cognitive psychological attitudes. This is the expressivist non-cognitivist position 
most commonly associated with Blackburn (1985), (1998) and Gibbard (1992). 
 When assessing the viability of minimalism as a competitor among metaethical 
positions, it is a common practice in metaethics to do so by assessing the soundness of the 
minimalist's rejection of MTMC. As evidenced from the sets of premises above, there are 
many targets of contention one can find in the Minimalist+’s rejection, not the least of 
which are the claims that there are only natural objects/properties, the claim that moral 
judgments gain their sense in some other way than representing some state(s) of affairs, and 
the plausibility of the entire expressivist non-cognitivist programme. 
The fact that metaethical minimalists, so far as I can tell,  have always accompanied 
their non-acceptance of MTMC with an argument for its rejection gives, I aim to show, 
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the mistaken impression that the minimalist stance requires justification in the same way 
that any other metaethical theory requires justification. As a consequence of this 
impression, minimalism is often treated as a meta-ethical theory. In their (2016), Kremm 
and Shafer say that “[Minimalist] claims rest on a controversial view of the meaning of 
terms like ‘true’ and ‘fact’. And even if one accepts that minimalism is the correct theory of 
our ordinary use of these terms, one could go on to argue that there are also more 
philosophical uses of them…” (4). The “controversial view” Kremm and Schafer refer to is 
that notions like “true” and “fact” cannot be used to raise questions about the nature of 
ethical discourse, but are instead notions which are of meaningful use only in first-order 
moral discourse. Notice also that they regard minimalism a “theory” of the meaning of 
these terms which disqualifies their use in second-order questions.  This interpretation 
corresponds to the first set of premises for the rejection of MTMC offered above.  
Another example can be found in Donelson (2018), according to whom “[the 
minimalist] arrives at [her] view because she rejects as suboptimal all the other solutions ” 
and, consequently, that “assessing whether minimalism is to be preferred to its rivals is to 
take stock of its supposed theoretical advantages vis-a-vis those rivals” (127). Rejection is 
front and center in this account of minimalism, and minimalism’s soundness is taken to be 
entirely the soundness of this rejection of MTMC as it compares with the soundness of the 
truthmaker theories that presuppose it. 
Minimalism +’s justificatory burdens are relatively heavy for the following reason: 
though ultimately MTMC may turn out to be false, it is not the case that it should be 
treated as false until proven otherwise. Therefore, the tenability of a minimalist’s disbelief 
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towards MTMC is dependent upon the soundness of their rejection of it.  That is, 16
Minimalism+ must be justified. 
The observation central to my reinterpretation of the dialectic between 
minimalists and MTMC-believers is this: it is open to the minimalist to​ not accept​ MTMC 
while offering nothing in the way of an argument for its ​rejection​. Such a stance would 
amount to an acceptance of the truth of moral propositions without an acceptance that 
there exist truthmakers for them. I call this stance “bare minimalism” in order to contrast it 
with Minimalism+. Distinguishing these two kinds of minimalism allows us to see which 
variety of minimalism has dialectical burdens and in virtue of what they carry that burden. 
According to my account of the attitude of non-acceptance which individuates it 
according to its justificatory burdens, bare minimalism is a rationally permissible default 
position if MTMC is not a prima facie truth. 
Much of the above analysis has moved rather quickly and, though I hope what I 
have said is relatively intuitive, it is fair to request that I supply evidence that my division of 
propositional attitudes and their justificatory burdens is adequate. In what follows I will 
present this evidence in the form of an example of how my account works in a context 
which may be more familiar than the debate over moral truthmakers—belief, disbelief, and 
non-acceptance of the proposition that God exists. 
 Consider the following table whose two dimensions are the categories of 
psychological attitudes at issue and two propositions they can take as their object: 
16 Sometimes disbelief does not require justification. For example, if I disbelieve the claim that all birds are 
from Mars, it does not seem that I am required to immediately supply thorough justification for this 
disbelief. However, a disbelief of a claim that is not a prima facie falsehood does demand justification in the 
form of a reasoned rejection. 
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  Disbelieves  Does not Accept  Believes 
MTMC  Minimalist+  Bare Minimalist  Truthmaker 
Theorist 
“God exists”  Atheist  Agnostic  Theist 
The body of the table is populated by the categories of persons who have each 
psychological attitude towards the proposition listed on the left-most column. I do not 
wish to defend the categories of persons in the bottom-most row as settled definitions of 
these terms which ought to be adopted in all matters, but only insofar as they can be used 
intuitively enough to aid in the clarification of my present point. 
Suppose that the proposition “God exists” does not have ​prima facie ​status (i.e. we 
should neither think it is ​prima facie​ true nor ​prima facie ​false). In that case, the atheist 
who disbelieves the existence of God is on the hook for answering questions like “On what 
grounds do you believe that God does not exist?”. The atheist might reply with the 
argument from evil: reasoning from the fact that there is evil in the world to the 
non-existence of a God that is an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient being. Or 
perhaps the atheist prefers the argument that the existence of a supernatural God would 
run contrary to a naturalistic worldview and therefore could not be. On these grounds, the 
atheist believes that it rationally required that theism be disbelieved. The rationality of the 
atheist’s disbelief is dependent upon the soundness of whatever line of reasoning is its 
ground. However, demonstrating this rejection of theism to be unsound does not thereby 
prove that one ought to be a theist. The possibility left open is to simply not believe, or 
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have an attitude of non-acceptance towards, the proposition that God exists.  
The agnostic does not believe that God exists, but this position is constituted by an 
attitude of non-acceptance; the agnostic has assessed the proposition and believes he is 
rational in not believing it. While true according to a literal rendering of terms, it gives the 
wrong impression to say that the agnostic also does not believe that God does not exist; it is 
more helpful to say that they accept no reasoning according to which any argument in 
favor of God’s existence is necessarily unsound. If the theist thinks non-believers (a 
category in which I include both atheists and agnostics) ought to believe the proposition 
that God exists, then it is incumbent upon the theist to present evidence or reasoning in 
favor of the non-believers believing it (or such is the case according to my stipulation that 
the proposition is neither prima facie true or false). The atheist thinks, on the basis of their 
rejection of the proposition, that there is no nor could there be any such evidence or 
reasoning which demonstrates its truth.  
If my analysis is correct, the agnostic does not carry the burden of justifying their 
stance of non-acceptance that God exists as a default position. However, it is plausible that 
the agnostic can justifiably retain their stance only by engaging with and assessing the 
reasoning offered by both the atheist and theist in favor of believing or disbelieving the 
proposition that God exists. That is, while the burden of justification is not present ​ab 
initio​, the burden of response is relatively heavy.  
If MTMC does not have prima facie status, the case outlined above should be 
formally identical to MTMC’s.  Under the stipulation that neither MTMC nor the 
proposition that God exists has prima facie status, if you believe that the agnostic stance is 
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a rationally permissible default position, you should also believe the bare minimalist stance 
is a rationally permissible default position. The Minimalist+ disbelieves MTMC and 
presents grounds for why its rejection is rationally required. The truthmaker theorist 
might show these grounds unconvincing or indecisive as arguments aimed at disproving 
MTMC, but in doing so they have not demonstrated the reason why a non-acceptance of 
MTMC is not a rationally permissible starting point. As it is for the theist, it is the burden 
of the truthmaker theorist to offer reasoning in favor of the non-believer believing the 
proposition which is the object of their positive doxastic attitude. Taking up bare 
minimalism as a default position does not require justification.  
Of course, the success of this argument is dependent upon the truth of what has so 
far been merely stipulated: that MTMC does not have prima facie status. We must now 
assess whether we have sufficient reason to grant MTMC this status. Before proceeding, a 
warning of sorts is necessary: I do not believe the following argument has any bearing on 
the truth of MTMC, nor do I believe, in offering it, I will have presented reasons why 
anyone who already accepts MTMC should not accept it. If in what follows there is more 
of what resembles sociological data and discussion of what is intuitive or unintuitive than 
my reader thinks should be brought to bear on philosophical questions, I would ask them 
to keep in mind the modesty of my argumentative ambitions here. The question whose 
answer I seek is whether there is enough reason to suppose that MTMC is of the status 
“that which should be believed until we have been given reason not to believe it”, ​not 
whether MTMC should be believed.  
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First, consider MTMC’s more general rendering, abstracted away from moral 
content: 
General Truthmaker Conditional (GTMC):​ ​“​For any proposition, if it is true, then 
there exist(s) some truthmaker(s) which ground(s) its truth.​” 
If GTMC had prima facie status, then, plausibly, so too would MTMC by virtue of being 
a specific rendering of the more general principle. The position which involves the 
acceptance of GTMC, known as Truthmaker Maximalism, is contentious in the 
truthmaker theory literature. It is often thought that the biggest challenge it faces as a 
theory is its incredibility;  it seems perfectly plausible to believe that mathematical, logical, 17
or modal claims to be true for some other reason than the existence of mathematical, 
logical, or modal truthmakers. Reasoning that supports the plausibility of this belief is 
that, unlike empirical propositions, mathematical and logical propositions are true no 
matter what exists in the world or what states of affairs obtain. 2+2=4 and A->A are just 
true no matter what is the case, or so it seems.  It is plausible to suppose that, if GTMC is 18
true, it would have to be justified by the best local truthmaker theories winning out over 
non-truthmaker alternatives in the mathematical, modal, and logical domains. 
Debates over the existence of mathematical, logical, and modal truthmakers are 
contentious. Some minimalists argue that their rejection of moral truthmakers is justified 
because their metaethical minimalism has “companions in guilt” in other domains for 
which there are not obvious candidates for truthmakers. It may or may not be a successful 
strategy to invoke companions in guilt to justify a rejection of MTMC, but, again, my 
17 See MacBride (2013) for a discussion of this point. 
18 This line of reasoning can be found in Rodriguez-Pereya (2006) 
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ambitions are more modest than demonstrating the soundness of a rejection of MTMC. 
These companions in guilt lend credence to the claim that MTMC, if true, is not ​obviously 
true in virtue of the fact that it is derivable from a principle which has universal application 
across all other domains. That is, one reason to believe MTMC has prima facie status 
would be if there were no other candidates besides moral propositions for inclusion in the 
category “true propositions which do not require truthmakers”. If there were no such 
candidates, the metaethical minimalist would be out on a limb by herself, and you ought 
to be able to supply good reasons for going out on a limb by yourself. As evidenced by 
metaethical minimalism’s companions in guilt, this is not the case. 
MTMC might be ​prima facie​ true if moral propositions were sufficiently similar 
or analogous to the kinds of propositions which do, ​prima facie​, require the existence of 
truthmakers in order to be true. ​Prima facie​, empirical judgments are of this category. As 
mentioned above, the existence of a red ball in the Oval Office seems to ground the truth 
of the empirical judgment “There is a red ball in the Oval Office”. In this case, the red ball 
in the Oval Office is the truthmaker of this judgment; if there existed no red ball or it 
existed somewhere other than the Oval Office, the judgment would be false. This principle 
this case relies on can be represented with the following conditional: 
Empirical truthmaker conditional (ETMC):  “​For any empirical proposition, if it is 
true, then there exist(s) some truthmaker(s) which ground(s) its truth.​” 
I do not mean to imply that everyone believes ETMC nor do I mean to consider its validity 
here. Its purpose in this discussion is to grant to the truthmaker theorist that among all the 
versions of the truthmaker conditional, ETMC has the greatest claim to the status of​ that 
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which should be believed until we have been given reason not to believe it​. Are moral 
judgments sufficiently analogous to empirical judgments such that not believing both are 
grounded by truthmakers is a position that runs contrary to what is ​prima facie​ true? One 
reason to suspect that they may be is that we often make moral judgments about the same 
objects and states of affairs which are the subject-matter of empirical judgment; in this 
way, they have similar subject matter. However, some moral propositions, especially those 
occurring at a high level of abstraction, seem also to share qualities with non-empirical 
judgments, specifically logical and mathematical judgment; e.g. they can be deliberated 
over ​a priori​, are often claimed to have universal application, and are sometimes taken to 
be absolute. Additionally, it is precisely those abstract moral propositions which seem to 
do the truth-determining work in the moral domain. That is, the truth of moral 
propositions about concrete states of affairs which resemble empirical propositions seems 
to ​depend​ on the truth of relatively abstract moral principles which do not resemble 
empirical propositions. 
It would seem that moral propositions are in some ways analogous to empirical 
propositions and in other ways disanalogous. Or, only a certain class of moral propositions 
are analogous to empirical propositions, and it is not the class of moral propositions that 
appear to play a fundamental truth-determining role in the domain as a whole. . In light of 
this, it is difficult to see how one could justify the claim that moral judgments are 
sufficiently analogous to empirical judgments so as to show that MTMC has prima facie 
status in virtue of ETMC having prima facie status.  19
19 I am not enough of an expert in the history of philosophy to be fully confident in the following point, but 
we may be able to appeal to authority to assess what ought to be granted the status of that which should be 
believed until given a reason to reject. If our philosophical authorities exhibited behavior which implied the 
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Evidence which might not initially be thought of as having value in metaethical 
debates, but is worth considering here, is the folk metaethical beliefs of the general 
population. Despite some realist interpretations of the data from the earliest studies on 
folk metaethics, Polzler (2017) finds that subjects do not show signs of having consistent 
beliefs about the status of moral propositions, suggesting that if there such a thing as folk 
metaethics, it does not seem to involve an endorsement of sweeping metaphysical 
principles like MTMC. What these data suggest in this context is that MTMC is not a 
pretheoretical starting point or default position to which philosophy must answer. Even if 
a philosophical theory or claim does contradict ordinary belief, this does not necessarily 
affect its final plausibility, but it does at the very least indicate that most people need 
convincing before believing it. The evidence cited above suggests that this is a dialectical 
burden which the minimalist, in not accepting MTMC, does not have.  
Even if MTMC is not a piece of folk metaethical common sense, perhaps it has 
common sense status among those with enough philosophical training to properly 
understand its content. Were this so, then the minimalist would be under dialectical 
pressure to justify her non-acceptance of it in philosophical contexts. However, it is 
difficult to find a reason to believe that MTMC has prima facie status in this way. First, I 
can personally attest to the fact that not all philosophers find MTMC intuitively or 
of the tendency throughout the history of philosophy (since Plato?) to treat the theoretical and the practical 
separately, this would suggest that there has been reason enough to suppose that answers about the former 
subject do not give us sufficient reason to think we have answered an analogous question about the latter. 
Simply put, inquiring into empirical and moral matters separately is not something which has been taken to 
require philosophical justification. This neither means that it is correct that no justification for this 
bifurcation can be given nor that it is correct that they be always treated separately. It is only meant to further 
establish that it is not taken as obvious among those with philosophical training that the moral and empirical 
are sufficiently similar so as to render the default non-acceptance of MTMC and acceptance of ETMC in 
need of justification. 
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obviously true. I do not expect this fact to move the needle in this debate, but I would ask 
the reader, even those who are committed to MTMC’s truth, whether MTMC was their 
intuitive starting point or a result of some extra-intuitive philosophical theorizing. If it was 
the latter, then my argument that MTMC should not be granted prima facie status is 
aided.  If it was the former, then the question becomes whether MTMC’s intuitiveness is 
strong enough to the extent that a non-acceptance of it by other philosophers would have 
to be justified. It would be a cost to the plausibility of my argument if enough 
philosophers answer ‘yes’ to this question, but the minimalist has yet no reason to suspect 
this is the case.  
In this section, I have attempted to show why MTMC, if it is true, is neither 
common sense nor should have prima facie status. As a consequence, the minimalist who 
does not accept MTMC does not need to justify their non-acceptance of it in virtue of 
flying in the face of common sense or denying a ​prima facie​ philosophical truth. 
Importantly, I have not argued that MTMC is a​ prima facie​ falsehood, meaning that the 
truthmaker theorist’s acceptance of it does not come at a cost of plausibility the likes of 
some positions incur in virtue of flying in the face of common sense or being premised 
upon a prima facie falsehood. Solipsism and Panpsychism are possible members of this 
latter category. 
At this point, one could scarcely blame the reader for not knowing what to make 
of bare minimalism or why it should be of interest. After all, the mere non-acceptance of 
MTMC appears not so much a philosophical stance as a state of doxastic inertia. Perhaps I 
have succeeded in showing that being in such a state is not irrational, but it is not clear how 
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bare minimalism nor the pointing out of its possibility contributes to metaethical inquiry. 
For those hostile to metaethics generally, perhaps identifying one's bare minimalism will be 
of value, as adopting it, unlike adopting Minimalism+, does not require wading into 
metaethical waters at all. 
It is clear that those who take up bare minimalism as a default position can still 
contribute positively to metaethical inquiry. This is because not all metaethical debates are 
about the ontology of moral truthmakers. Debates over how or whether different 
normative concepts reduce to one another, the debate between motivational externalists 
and internalists, and issues of freedom and responsibility are all fair game for the bare 
minimalist. If there are philosophers who think these and other non-ontologically-infused 
debates are of interest can use the bare minimalist stance to bracket ontological issues 
which are orthogonal to these interests. 
However, a question remains unanswered: is there any value of bare minimalism 
itself to metaethical inquiry? That is, can the bare minimalist contribute anything ​vis a vis 
their bare minimalism? I have avoided calling bare minimalism anything more than a 
“default position” in order to contrast it with a settled position in philosophy. Taking up 
the position of minimalism+ implies that there is something settled about one’s thoughts 
about which one has this position. Bare minimalism, taken up as a ​settled​ position, does 
not have much content and appears only to imply a refusal to take part in debates over 
moral ontology. Taken as a ​default​ position, however, the bare minimalist has the 
potential to be recognized as a primary interlocutor in debates about the truth of MTMC 
which are not focused on the soundness of arguments aimed at rejecting it (Minimalism+). 
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Because the bare minimalist stance does not involve a rejection of MTMC, the bare 
minimalist has no reason to believe that believing MTMC is unjustifiable. And if MTMC 
does not have prima facie status, truthmaker theorists ought to have reasons which they 
can present to the bare minimalist which justify their believing it. Because so much of the 
metaethical literature is premised upon the truth of MTMC, there is ordinarily little 
motivation to make these reasons explicit. However, faced with the bare minimalist the 
truthmaker theorist is given an opportunity and motivation to present these reasons. The 
important difference between their dialectic with the bare minimalist and their dialectic 
with the Minimalist+ is that the truthmaker theorist will not be given the impression that 
they have demonstrated that believing MTMC is rationally required simply by virtue of 
refuting the arguments with which the Minimalist+ tries to reject it. 
In sum, recognizing bare minimalism allows one to take up minimalism not as a 
settled position, but as a methodological starting point in debates about the truth of 
MTMC. A ​methodological​ ​minimalist​ is thus describable as a metaethicist who  
1) does not accept MTMC,  
2) does not reject MTMC, and  
3) is a participant in dialectics about the truth of MTMC.  
[~1), ~2), and 3)] is true of all truthmaker theorist’s participating in dialects about the 
truth of MTMC with minimalists, and will be the methodological minimalist’s chief 
interlocutor. [1), ~2), and 3)] is true of metaethicists who take up Minimalism+ as a settled 
position (Scanlon, Putnam, Blackburn, and perhaps Dworkin). [1), 2), and ~3)] is true of 
those who take up bare minimalism as a settled position in the way described above. If I am 
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correct that MTMC is not a prima facie truth, then the bare minimalist needs no 
argument taking [1), 2), and ~3)] as their default position. However, if presented with the 
reasons for the truthmaker theorist has for accepting MTMC, then as a responsible 
interlocutor, the ​methodological​ minimalist must contend with the following dilemma: 
either show why these are not compelling reasons for accepting MTMC or give up 1) as a 
result of this dialectic.  
Though often tangled up with negative arguments against various brands of 
Minimalism+, some truthmaker theorists do present positive arguments for MTMC. The 
most compelling of these arguments are what I will call the respectability challenge from 
Donelson’s (2018) and the norm proliferation challenge from Enoch’s (2011), McPherson 
(2011) and Enoch and McPherson’s (2017).  
The respectability and proliferation challenges are attacks on the viability of 
minimalism from two opposing directions: On the one hand, the respectability challenge 
questions whether the minimalist can vindicate the truth of propositions for whom there 
are no truthmakers. On the other hand, the proliferation challenge argues that minimalism 
turns out to be too ​permissive​ with respect to the normative authority of discourses if the 
existence of truthmakers for constituent propositions is not a constraint on distinctly 
authoritative discourses. I turn my attention towards answering these challenges in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 3: A Minimalist Response to the 
Respectability Challenge 
In chapters 3 and 4, I will focus my attention on attacks on the viability of 
metaethical minimalism, or the metaethical position which is defined by the 
non-acceptance of a central presupposition of much of metaethical theorizing: “For any 
moral proposition, if it is true, then there exist(s) some truthmaker(s) which make(s) it 
true.”​ ​The metaethical minimalist believes that they can consistently affirm that moral 
propositions are true while denying that there exist truthmakers which make them true. 
The minimalist’s hope is that their account can retain the intuitive objectivity of moral 
truth without taking on the ontological commitments of the moral realist.  
This chapter will be dedicated to defending metaethical minimalism in the face of 
a challenge to it found in Donelson (2018): if the minimalist does not accept that there are 
moral truthmakers, then they cannot explain how and why domains of discourse  differ in 20
respectability. “Respectability” is Donelson’s term of art designating a normative 
dimension along which domains of discourse can differ. As we will see later, respectable 
discourses are those which traffic in propositions which are 1) non-vacuously true and 2) 
ought to be taken seriously in practical deliberations. The minimalist cannot explain the 
respectability of moral discourse by way of reference to truthmakers, so the challenge is for 
20 With my “domains of discourse” I am following Scanlon’s use of the term “domain” in his (2014, p.23): 
“The term ‘domain’ as I am using it is just a way of referring to the fact that statements can make claims 
about different subjects: some make claims about the natural world, some make claims about numbers, some 
make claims about reasons. This is a common-sense idea”.  
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them to find some other way to non-arbitrarily differentiate moral discourse from those 
discourses which do not merit our respect.  
Because the goal of this chapter is to provide a response to the respectability 
challenge on behalf of the minimalist, a necessary intermediate step will be to draw out 
precisely what is meant by “respectability”. This will be done more thoroughly in the 
following section, but one way of initially getting a grip on the concept is by considering 
examples of discourses which do ​not​ merit our respect. Examples include discourses 
trafficking in the claims of defunct scientific theory, astrological theory, discriminatory 
social codes, or descriptions of supernatural forces or entities. Though these discourses 
differ in terms of the degree of harm and the nature of the transgression (moral or 
epistemic) that is involved in their use, it is an intuitive notion that they are united by the 
fact that none of them should be taken seriously in the course of our epistemic or practical 
deliberations. The principles of alchemy ought not figure into our modeling the chemical 
interactions of oil and water, and Victorian-era rules of propriety ordinarily ought not 
matter in our deliberations over what to wear to a party. Using Donelson’s term, what 
unites these discourses is a lack of “respectability.” A plausible way of accounting for this 
lack of respectability is by pointing out that there exists no truthmakers for alchemical 
principles and Victorian standards of etiquette—consequently, the propositions which 
they license should not to be taken seriously.  
Of course, not all metaethicists believe moral discourse ​is ​respectable—namely, 
error theorists and other moral nihilists. For these skeptics, identifying moral discourse as a 
fellow member of the group of unrespectables is not any real problem because there are no 
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non-vacuously true moral propositions in the first place. However, taking on a skeptical 
position does not make for a productive defense of minimalism due to the fact that error 
theory and moral skepticism is premised upon MTMC, and minimalism is defined by a 
lack of belief in MTMC. While the error theorist, like the minimalist, denies the existence 
of truthmakers of moral propositions, he arrives at this position by accepting (sometimes 
implicitly) MTMC, denying its consequent and inferring that no moral propositions are 
true. Consequently, the skeptic can explain respectability in exactly the way the 
respectability challenge demands; he can say that, like any discourse, moral discourse 
would only have been respectable if there were truthmakers for its constituent 
propositions. In other words, the moral realist and moral skeptic share in the belief that 
truthmakers explain respectability.  
Because the minimalist does not accept MTMC, she does not believe that she must 
deny that moral propositions are true if she denies that there are truthmakers which 
ground their truth. However, the respectability challenge suggests that truthmakers do 
more than simply ground truths; their existence is also an indispensable part of a complete 
explanation of a distinctive feature of discourses which traffic in non-vacuous truths: 
respectability. If successful, the challenge shows that in denying the existence of 
truthmakers, minimalism is rendered explanatorily deficient. That is, it is not clear how the 
minimalist can maintain their non-acceptance of MTMC if they are committed, in 
addition to the truth of some moral propositions, to the respectability of moral discourse. 
Donelson thinks that in the face of the respectability challenge the minimalist must either 
1) accept MTMC and deny that moral propositions can be true, 2) accept MTMC and 
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affirm the existence of moral truthmakers, or 3) deny that discourses can differ in 
respectability.  
In what follows I carefully analyze what Donelson means by “respectable” and 
then present the respectability challenge in perspicuous form, highlighting the central role 
that knowability plays in Donelson’s understanding of the challenge. Next, I will show 
why the reasoning at the core of the respectability challenge is not decisive in favor of 
MTMC in virtue of the fact that one of its central premises is either undermotivated or 
begs the question against the minimalist. I then offer a clarifying account of the conceptual 
connection between the non-existence of truthmakers and unrespectability. I take this 
clarification to be of value because a misapprehension of this relationship could give rise to 
misplaced doubts about the possibility of respectability without truthmakers. Finally, I 
will make an unorthodox suggestion that will, if tenable, further dissolve concerns about 
minimalism’s lack of explanatory power ​vis a vis​ the knowability of moral propositions. 
 
The Respectability Challenge in Full Form 
Donelson says that respectable discourses “deserve some weight in relevant 
practical deliberations” (127). This is the intuitive core of the concept of 
respectability—some domains of discourse just shouldn’t be taken seriously. If this is true, 
it is entirely fair to ask what criteria must be met for a discourse to be taken seriously. 
Donelson characterizes respectable discourses as those whose constituent propositions 
“can be non-vacuously true” (127). In part, he seems to have in mind that the propositions 
of respectable discourses must be true not merely according to the arbitrary stipulation of 
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discourse-governing principles or axioms. So far, so good; if a proposition is true merely by 
stipulation, or true because it is licensed by a standard which is arbitrarily stipulated, it 
seems like it would be a mistake to weigh this proposition as heavily  in our deliberations as 
more substantive truths.  
Donelson’s next step is to translate this condition into a metaphysical fact about 
respectability; he says that respectable discourses are those whose constituent propositions 
are not “totally unmoored from the world” (129). Of course, this characterization has 
literal purchase only if one thinks there must be a world which houses entities which 
“moor” all non-vacuously true propositions. A worry about this step is that in defining 
respectability in terms of a ​way​ in which non-vacuous truths are made true by the world is 
that Donelson is begging the question against the minimalist who does not accept 
MTMC. That is, while certainly true that a “mooring in the world” guarantees that a truth 
is not merely vacuous, the leap Donelson is in danger of making is supposing that this 
mooring is ​necessary​ for non-vacuous truths.  The question-begging worry is magnified 
when attending to the way he chooses to cash out non-vacuous truth in the context of 
historical judgments: “If historical judgments can be [non-vacuously] true, some sets of 
events made the true ones true, and if that is so, we can come to know which are true by 
being in the right relationship with those events” (127-128). It is unclear whether 
Donelson means that historical judgments require this “right relationship” with events 
because they are about ​history​ or because this is how he is analyzing “non-vacuous” at the 
start. 
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Obviously, the respectability challenge would not get off the ground if the 
reasoning it offered against the minimalist’s non-acceptance of MTMC relied on the 
premise that for all non-vacuously true propositions, truthmakers “made the true ones 
true”. Happily, this is not the core of Donelson’s argument. He also says that in cases of 
non-vacuous truth, “we come to know which are true”, and this, I take it, is the heart of 
the matter for Donelson. Discourses merit our respect only if, for some set of their 
constituent propositions, their truth can, in principle, be substantiated. That is, for any 
respectable discourse, we can substantiate the truth of its constituent propositions in 
virtue of our ability to grasp ​that because of which​ they are true, where ​that because of which 
they are true cannot be a mere stipulation or choice. The position-defining belief of the 
truthmaker theorist is that this relationship of grasping between knower and ​that because 
of which​ some proposition is true is a relationship of access to truthmakers.  
Here then is the reasoning behind the respectability challenge:  
1. Discourses differ in respectability. 
2. Discourses are respectable only if we can know the non-vacuous truth of some 
non-empty set of their constituent propositions. (The Principle of Knowability) 
3. We can know the non-vacuous truth of the constituent propositions of a discourse 
only if we can access the truthmakers of some non-empty set of the constituent 
propositions of a discourse. (The Conditions of Knowability—Access Rendering) 
4. If there exist no moral truthmakers, then we cannot access them. 
5. If there exist no moral truthmakers, then we cannot know the non-vacuous truth 
of the constituent propositions of moral discourse. (From 3, 4) 
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6. If there exist no moral truthmakers, then moral discourse is not respectable. (From 
2, 5) 
7. Therefore, there exist moral truthmakers or moral discourse is not respectable. 
(From 6) 
Quite clearly, the premise doing most of the substantive work in this line of reasoning is 
premise 3, which is a claim about the conditions of knowability. I will call this the “Access 
Rendering” of the conditions of knowability. Upon being presented with this challenge, 
and after identifying the key contentious premise, the state of the dialectic between the 
minimalist and the truthmaker theorist can be put thusly: the truthmaker theorist claims 
that even the minimalist must agree that there is a way in which we know moral 
propositions to be true (if any of them are true) and the way in which we know 
propositions to be true is by accessing their truthmakers. Therefore, the minimalist has 
reason to accept MTMC.  
Premise 3 
Insofar as the Access Rendering of the conditions of knowability is not a piece of 
common sense and its universality lacks ​prima facie​ status,  it is fair to ask why we must 21
accept its truth. If someone was already convinced of MTMC, then they should accept the 
Access Rendering in virtue of the fact that it straightforwardly follows from MTMC. That 
is, if you already accepted that truth-bearers are made true by truthmakers, it follows that 
the substantiation of the truth of a proposition requires in some way getting in touch with 
21  By “prima facie status” I mean the status a proposition can have of being that which should be treated as 
true until given evidence of its falsity. I argue elsewhere why I believe MTMC should not be granted prima 
facie status and I believe my arguments there apply equally well to the Access Rendering. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will simply assume the Access Rendering does not have prima facie status.  
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their truthmakers. Obviously, taking MTMC to be the source of the Access Rendering’s 
plausibility would mean the respectability challenge begs the question against the 
minimalist, so we ought to look for a more charitable reading of the situation on behalf of 
the truthmaker theorist.  
If it were a semantic consequence that the Access Rendering is implied by the 
concept of knowing the non-vacuous truth of propositions, this would ground the Access 
Rendering’s universality. That is, if there were no other way of coherently articulating 
under what conditions non-vacuous truths can come to be known, then the minimalist’s 
simultaneously holding that moral propositions are known and knowing them doesn’t 
involve access to truthmakers would be evidence of their being conceptually confused. 
Minimalism would thus be proven an incoherent position. Luckily for the minimalist, 
such a strong view is not plausible, as evidenced from how substantiation of truth and 
knowability has been discussed in this essay already. The minimalist can offer what I will 
call “the Neutral Rendering” of the conditions of knowability: : “For any discourse, we 
can know that its constituent propositions are true only if we can apprehend ​that because 
of which​ they are true.” The difference between the Access Rendering and the Neutral 
Rendering is that only the Access Rendering is ontologically-laden and implied by the 
truthmaker conditional. “Apprehension”, as opposed to “access”, is an epistemic 
relationship that can plausibly obtain between a target of inquiry presented in conception 
of the epistemic agent. We can ​apprehend ​meaning, a solution, a rule, a distinction, the 
significance of something, etc.. Though nothing in my defense relies on a complete 
analysis of these terms, I submit that the awkwardness of talking about “accessing” a rule, a 
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distinction, or significance, belies the difference in meaning between it and 
“apprehension”. To my ears, “accessing” implies a grasping of something which is 
presented as existing apart from the epistemic agent.  
In the Neutral Rendering, “that because of which” is intended as a neutral stand-in 
for whatever grounds or that in virtue of which a proposition is true. Whatever “that” is in 
this locution, it requires more than an analysis of terms to justifiably hold that “that” 
necessarily refers to an existent truthmaker which is the target of an epistemic relation of 
access. The broader minimalist defense I offer will require making further reference to this 
Neutral Rendering of the conditions of knowability. Presently, I intend it as a 
counterexample to the claim that the Access Rendering is a semantic consequence of the 
conditions of knowability. 
A more promising thought on behalf of the Access Rendering is that it ​explains 
knowability globally and that because knowability is central to explaining respectability, it 
is the only rendering of the conditions of knowability that is available to the minimalist 
wishing to answer the respectability challenge. That is, even if the Neutral Rendering is a 
possibile articulation of the conditions of knowability, the Access Rendering offers an 
account of “apprehending ​that because of which​”, that involves explaining “apprehending” 
in terms of “access” and “​that because of which​” in terms of truthmakers. We can find this 
move in Donelson’s line of reasoning: “We claim that particular judgments within the 
discourse have truthmakers; these objects we can investigate in order to come to know 
which judgments are true. This kind of epistemic upshot is not present for the minimalist. 
Neither knowability nor even hints about how moral judgments are known follow from 
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the fact of a moral truth, if there are no truthmakers” (128). The ability to claim that 
truthmakers can be searched for to figure out which propositions are true is a powerful 
resource that allows the truthmaker theorist to make sense of what is going on when we 
apprehend ​that because of which​ a constituent proposition of a respectable discourse is 
true. The idea is that if the minimalist cannot countenance truthmakers, they are denying 
themselves the resources to make sense of this central aspect of our epistemic lives. 
Supposing that the Access Rendering’s raw explanatory power does not have 
immediate prima facie status, we should wonder why we should think it makes for a 
plausible explanans of the knowability of moral truths. The best way to understand the 
truthmaker theorist’s thought process here is to see them modeling epistemic access on 
observation of empirical states of affairs. The implicit line of reasoning seems to be this: 
I. Knowledge of empirical states of affairs involves the perception of those states of 
affairs or the observation of the best evidence we have for that state of affairs. 
II. Veridical observation and perception require standing in the right kind of 
relationship with the object of perception existing in physical space. 
III. Knowledge generally speaking is conditioned upon a relationship which is 
analogous to that relationship between observer and empirical states of affairs. 
IV. Therefore, abstracting away from empirical content and spatiality, this 
relationship of knowing can be understood as the relationship of access between 
the judger of the truth of a proposition and the truthmaker of that proposition. 
Truthmaker theorists’ accounts may diverge on the details of the similarities and 
differences between our epistemic access to moral truthmakers and our epistemic access to 
66 
  
empirical truthmakers, but all these accounts are committed to access sharing a general 
form. 
*** 
I have tried to make explicit the commitments operating in the background of the 
respectability challenge and draw out a plausible, non-question begging line of reasoning 
in their support. The flaw of the respectability challenge is that the Access Rendering, if it 
is to play the strong explanatory role required for the challenge to work, requires 
significant theoretical support and is not sufficiently argued for by Donelson. More 
importantly, no reason is offered as to why a non-ontological version of the conditions of 
knowability (the Neutral Rendering) is incapable of playing an explanatory role. To be 
sure, the Access Rendering presents a picture of substantiatibility that more closely 
resembles perception than does the Neutral Rendering. But to suppose that the Access 
Rendering has greater explanatory power in virtue of this greater similarity would be to 
beg the question against the minimalist; the very purpose of the respectability challenge is 
to demonstrate that, like empirical truth, moral truth requires truthmakers.  
Moreover, we are not bereft of arguments in favor of the explanatory power of the 
Neutral Rendering and it is possible to think of examples which suggest that the Neutral 
Rendering has explanatory advantages over the Access Rendering. It is perfectly plausible 
that specific moral propositions are true in virtue of being determined by a general 
principle or rule. Evidence from ordinary language suggests that the Neutral Rendering is 
the more accurate description of the conditions under which someone comes to know why 
a specific proposition is true when determined by principle. E.g. I know that it is wrong to 
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lie because I apprehend (say) a principle of deontology and the power of this principle to 
determine the truth of “Lying is wrong”. It is simply more awkward to say that I “access” 
this principle and “access” its power as truthmaker of the proposition “Lying is wrong”. 
This example does not prove that the Access Rendering is ​not​ the proper account of the 
conditions of the knowability of moral propositions, only that its applicability is far from 
obvious​ and that argument is required to overcome what counterintuitive implications it 
has. 
The minimalist can and should accept the knowability principle: that we must be 
able to substantiate some set of the constituent propositions of any discourse that merits 
our respect. Furthermore, the minimalist ought to accept that we should be able to 
articulate the conditions of knowability which grounds substantiatibility of moral 
propositions. However, even upon agreeing with the truthmaker theorist this much, the 
minimalist does not yet have good reason to accept that making sense of knowability 
requires anything more than a Neutral Rendering of the conditions of knowability: “For 
moral discourse, we can know that its constituent propositions are true only if we can 
apprehend that because of which they are true”.  
The truthmaker theorist may think that the minimalist owes us an 
ontologically-laden explanation for how we apprehend that because of which moral 
propositions are true, but it is not clear how this is established by the respectability 
challenge without begging the question against the minimalist who does not accept 
MTMC. For his part, Donelson claims that the grounds of moral propositions are 
something “we can investigate in order to come to know which judgments are true” (128). 
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The minimalist can agree, insofar as apprehending that because of which moral 
propositions are true involves the procedures for justification and deliberation over what is 
made claim to in the proposition in question, and this procedure can be understood on 
analogy with a kind of investigation. If the truthmaker theorist has a literal investigation in 
mind, the kind which has ontological implications for the object of investigation, then the 
minimalist awaits a reason for why she ought to believe this kind of object exists as the 
target of moral justification and deliberation.  
The minimalist need not commit to throwing out the Access Rendering entirely, 
only that it does not have as general an application as the truthmaker theorist suggests for 
it—i.e. the problem with premise 3 lies in its “only if” construction. The minimalist can 
and should accept the ​weaker​ Access Rendering:  
“If we can access the truthmakers of some set of the constituent 
propositions of a discourse, then we can know the non-vacuous truth of the 
constituent propositions of that discourse ”  
I will discuss this weaker rendering and its implications in the section which follows. 
If the Neutral Rendering of the conditions of knowability is substituted in for 
premise 3 of the respectability challenge, then all the respectability challenge shows is the 
following: 
 Minimalist Conclusion to the Respectability Challenge ​(MC): “if there is no 
member of the category ‘that because of which moral propositions are true’, then 
moral discourse is not respectable.  
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For the minimalist, this conclusion is at its most substantive an epistemic or practical 
principle and at its least a trivial truth, but in neither case does the minimalist need to 
accept it has ontological implications. That is, in a move which should be unsurprising to 
those familiar with minimalist strategies, the minimalist can hold that the truthmaker 
theorist’s central ontological or metaphysical premise (the Access Rendering) is a 
spruced-up version of a normative claim about how we ought to reason or act. Using 
reason-talk as a substitute for “that because of which”,  MC amounts to the claim that if 22
there are no reasons that moral propositions are true, then moral discourse does not merit 
our respect. 
In sum, the argumentative force of the respectability challenge hangs on a premise 
(The Access Rendering) which is unargued for or baldly begs the question against the 
minimalist. Moreover, we have seen that there is another possible articulation of the 
conditions of knowability which could figure into a perfectly acceptable version of the 
reasoning at the heart of the respectability challenge, one with no ontological implications 
for ​that because of which​ moral propositions are true. The minimalist has been given no 
decisive reason to opt for an ontological version of the conditions of knowability (premise 
3) and therefore, in the face of the respectability challenge, has been given no decisive 
reason to accept MTMC. 
 
22 This rendering of the minimalist conclusion of the respectability challenge is meant to be an aid for 
comprehension, I do not wish to imply that I accept any flavor of reasons-fundamentalism nor do I wish to 
imply that the success of my argument depends on reasons-fundamentalism. For more on 
reasons-fundamentalism, see e.g. Scanlon (2014). 
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An Analysis of the Relationship Between Unrespectability and the Non-existence 
of Truthmakers  
The above has been my argument that the respectability challenge does not 
succeed in offering the minimalist a reason to stop disbelieving MTMC. In what follows I 
will present an analysis of why it is natural for the truthmaker theorist to think that there is 
a logical connection between unrespectability and the non-existence of truthmakers. I will 
offer a way in which both the minimalist and the truthmaker theorist can accept that the 
logical connection holds without this connection bearing on their debate over the 
acceptability of MTMC. This is offered as a therapeutic recognition of a common ground 
between the two camps and as an inoculation against the temptation to read more into the 
relationship between truthmaking and respectability than is warranted. 
The logical connection can be best understood by first attending to the following 
conditional, which both minimalists and truthmaker theorists should accept:  
A​: “If a proposition is unknowable, then either there exist no truthmakers which 
ground its truth or they exist and we cannot access them.” 
This is trivially true, for its negation would imply the incoherent claim that there could be 
propositions we could not know to be true in spite of their being true and our being able 
to access their truthmakers (i.e. apprehend that because of which they are true).  We can 23
connect this claim up with the previous discussion of the minimalist’s acceptance of the 
23 Gettier cases may show that the fact that a proposition is true and our apprehending its justification may 
not be sufficient for having knowledge. The claim I am operating with here is weaker: namely, that the fact 
that a proposition is true and that we are able to apprehend that because of which it is true is sufficient for 
the ​knowability​ of said proposition.  
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Weaker Access Rendering; according to it, access to truthmakers is sufficient for 
respectability, thus implying the conditional, 
B​: “If there exist truthmakers for a given discourse’s constituent propositions and 
we can access them, then that discourse is respectable.” 
Returning now to the point of this section; there is a logical connection between the 
non-existence of truthmakers and unrespectability, but it is a sufficiency relation that is 
implied by conditionals A and B. That is, a discourse’s unrespectability is sufficient for the 
non-existence of truthmakers serving as grounds of its constituent proposition or our lack 
of ability to access them. This is the contrapositive of conditional B;  
C:​ “For any discourse, if it is unrespectable, then there exist no truthmakers which 
ground the truth of its constituent propositions or they exist and we cannot access 
them.” 
The minimalist should have no qualms accepting all of A, B, and C despite the fact 
that they involve general claims about unrespectability and the non-existence of 
truthmakers. As you’ll recall, the Weaker Access Rendering of the conditions of 
knowability (“If we can access the truthmakers of some set of the constituent propositions 
of a discourse, then we can know the non-vacuous truth of the constituent propositions of 
a discourse ”) is a specific version the more neutral rendering such that if a discourse does 
not meet the conditions of the Neutral Rendering then necessarily it does not meet the 
conditions of the Weaker Access Rendering. A, B, and C are just specific versions of a 
more general claim working in the background: that insofar as a proposition is 
72 
  
unknowable or a discourse unrespectable, then no possible rendering of the knowability 
conditional is true of it. 
The point of this analysis is to show that it is natural to think there is a logical 
connection between the non-existence of truthmakers and unrespectability because A, B, 
and C are all true. Moreover, grasping this logical connection is of positive value and helps 
us explicate some discourses’ unrespectability. Consider the following explicantia 
regarding discourse surrounding the existence of witches:  
W1​: Discourse about witches has been demonstrated unrespectable, and as a 
consequence, we should not believe that there exist any truthmakers for positive 
claims made about witches.  
W2​: If there had existed truthmakers for propositions about witches and we could 
access them, then witch discourse would have been respectable. 
Both ​W1​ and ​W2​ are true and are of potential clarificatory aid, but we must be careful 
not to think that they imply the truth of the stronger claim, “For any discourse, it is 
respectable only if there exist truthmakers grounding its constituent propositions.” This 
conditional is a version of the generalized version of the truthmaker conditional (GTMC), 
and presupposing its truth would beg the question against the minimalist’s 
non-acceptance of MTMC. I do not wish to argue that Donelson was making this mistake, 
only that it might be a tempting line of thought to think that GTMC followed deductively 
from the logical connection between the existence of truthmakers, our access to them, and 
respectability. Though however tempting and natural it may be, we must prevent 
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ourselves from falling for it on pain of the irrationality of accepting an invalid piece of 
reasoning. 
 
An Unorthodox Suggestion to Further Dissolve the Respectability Challenge 
I will conclude this essay by gesturing at an unorthodox suggestion aimed at 
dissolving what may be the remaining reasoning in support of MTMC to be found in the 
respectability challenge. This remaining support for MTMC is argued for as follows:  
More than knowability, that we have a ​capacity ​to know calls out for explanation, 
and the minimalist has offered nothing in the way of such an explanation. It is no 
explanation at all to describe this as the capacity of being able to apprehend that because of 
which moral propositions are true. Surely there is more that can and must be said to aid in 
our understanding of this ability. If there isn’t, then we should be as skeptical of this 
“capacity” as much as we are skeptical of any explanation offered by psychics of their 
capacity to see the future or any explanation offered by mind-readers of their capacity to 
tell us what others are thinking. Their claims are not respectable in part because ​there is no 
good explanation​ of how they are apprehending the grounds of these claims beyond the 
same vague notion of “apprehension” used in the Neutral Rendering. By her own 
admission, the minimalist interprets the Neutral Rendering of the conditions of 
knowability as a normative/epistemic claim about what is required for the justification of a 
proposition’s truth, not as an explanatory claim aimed at making sense of the mystery of 
our capacity for moral knowledge. Therefore, the real dilemma the minimalist faces is the 
following:  
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The minimalist’s explanatory dilemma (MED): “Either the capacity for 
apprehending that because of which moral propositions are true is utterly 
mysterious or there is some further explanation for how we gain moral 
knowledge.” 
The truthmaker theorist’s reasoning continues: grasping the first horn of the dilemma 
renders philosophy impotent in the face of a central question of epistemology and justifies 
skepticism about the respectability of moral discourse. This gives us reason to grasp the 
second horn, and doing so means that we should attempt to construct a model for how we 
substantiate moral facts. Until we can demonstrate where the disanalogies lie, we should 
construct this model on analogy with the best account of substantiability we presently 
have: our epistemic access to empirical states of affairs, i.e. perception. Veridical 
perception, i.e. the kind that explains our capacity for empirical knowledge, involves a 
perceiver being in the right kind of relation with the object of perception. Therefore, we 
have reason to accept a model of epistemic access to moral facts that involves an 
authoritative moral judge being in the right kind of relation (i.e. gaining ​access​ to) an analog 
of the object of empirical perception (i.e. the moral truthmaker). Reasons to accept this 
model are simultaneously reasons to accept the truth of MTMC. Therefore, the 
minimalist has reason to accept MTMC if they do not want to render our capacity for 
knowledge utterly mysterious and license moral skepticism. 
It might be suspected that my suggestion is that the minimalist grasp the first horn 
of MED, as this would be consistent with a kind of quietism that is a close cousin of some 
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minimalisms.  However, I will not recommend endorsing quietism, as I am optimistic 24
about the ability of philosophy to answer or aid in the answering of explanatory questions. 
Rather, I wish to make the following unorthodox suggestion: the capacity for a person to 
know moral propositions does not demand explanation.​ ​(The positive component of this 
suggestion, which I can only parenthetically mention here, is that having the capacity to 
know is a normative status that is tied up with the broader normative category of being a 
person, not part of a physical or metaphysical ​description​ of an individual). Instead, it is the 
failure of this capacity and unknowability that demands explanation and is of relevance to 
unrespectability. Consequently, respectability is not better understood via a metaphysical 
account of our capacity for knowledge. Rather, respectability is understood by contrast 
with ​unrespectability​, and unrespectability is conceptually tied up with the ​failure​ to 
know. If this suggestion is correct, then the real mistake of the respectability challenge is 
supposing that anything like the Access Rendering of the conditions of the knowability 
was required to secure the vindication of any discourse whose respectability was not 
already on the line. Consequently, answers about the metaphysical nature of our capacity 
for knowledge are not relevant to the task of explaining respectability. I will demonstrate 
what I mean by returning to the example of the claims made by psychics and mind-readers. 
I contend that the claims of psychics and mind-readers are not shown to be 
unrespectable because we are found bereft of explanations for their alleged capacities and 
therefore conclude that their claims do not satisfy the knowability principle. Were this 
how it worked, this would amount to a failure to explain knowability, given that according 
24 E.g. Dworkin (1998), Parfit (2011), and perhaps Scanlon (2014) 
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to our best explanatory practices, the Access Rendering of the conditions of knowability is 
the​ explanans of knowability. Rather, and this I suggest is the case with every discourse 
(even the kinds that generally merit our respect), evidence of unrespectability and 
unknowability is antecedent to our apprehension of conditions of knowability and our 
understanding of our capacity for knowledge. Evidence that the discourse trafficked in by 
psychics and mind-readers is ​systematically​ and ​completely​ unrespectable is evidence that it 
fails to satisfy the knowability principle because, by definition, the constituent 
propositions of an unrespectable discourse are not knowable. Consequently, this is also 
evidence that there exists no truthmakers for any of its constituent propositions because it 
follows logically that if the constituent propositions of an entire discourse is unknowable, 
then it must be the case either that there exist no truthmakers for them or they exist but we 
cannot access them. 
If an unsuccessful search for truthmakers does not determine the unrespectability 
of the claims of psychics and mind-readers, then there must be some other means of 
determining their unrespectability. What is this mark of unrespectability? My answer is 
that we find discourses are unrespectable because they fail their users and cause their users 
to fail. In the case of psychic and mind-reading discourses, those who traffic in them have 
more false beliefs and make more mistaken predictions within other discourses than those 
who do not. That is, neither psychic discourse, mind-reading discourse nor their use merits 
our respect because they are used to the epistemic detriment of its users.  When we 25
conclude that neither a discourse nor its use merits our respect, we find by logical 
25 With “users of a discourse” I refer both those who sincerely make its claims and those who believe its 
claims. 
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consequence that it fails to satisfy the knowability principle. Because it fails to satisfy the 
knowability principle, there are no conditions under which its constituent propositions 
can be known. So goes my suggestion. 
Importantly, being  “caused to fail” by a discourse is not a state which can only be 
judged to obtain from the domain-internal standards of another discourse that is in 
conflict with the failure-inducing discourse. That is, while forming beliefs about 
supernatural entities may cause someone to disbelieve scientific claims, supernatural 
discourse is not thereby unrespectable only according to the no-more-authoritative 
domain-internal standards of scientific discourse. Requiring that all normative judgments 
be made according to domain-internal standards is a tenant of T.M. Scanlon’s form of 
minimalism—a consequence of this feature of his position is that there is no way to secure 
a minimalist explanation of respectability that performs just as intuitively as the 
truthmaker theorists’. Wodak (2016) makes the point succinctly about deciding between 
respectability of discourse about witches and scientific discourse:   
“Scanlon never gives us an asymmetric condition to serve as a tie-breaker. Indeed, 
it’s not clear how he could. He may say that scientific discourse has ‘demonstrated 
success’ in ‘predicting and explaining what seem to be obvious facts about this 
world’ (20), and witch discourse has not. But how are quietists entitled to make 
such comparisons? What domains are such comparisons are internal to? If they are 
internal to the scientific domain, they add nothing: we already knew that scientific 
claims meet scientific standards but supernatural claims don’t, and vice versa. So 
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this is still a symmetric condition, and cannot serve as an explanation for why 
quietists are justified in privileging science” (p.12). 
The solution is that there must, for the minimalist, be a notion of mistake which is 
domain-transcendent. That is, some discourses cause its users to make mistakes that are 
more significant than a violation of the domain-internal standards of another discourse. It 
is true that a belief in the supernatural power of witches causes the believer to disbelieve 
scientific truths, but this constitutes a failure of witch-discourse not because it runs up 
against the standards of another discourse, but because it contradicts the 
domain-transcendent truths that scientific discourse trafficks in. Disbelief in a 
domain-transcendent truth is one way of making a domain-transcendent mistake. Great 
progress is to be made by minimalism by abandoning Scanlon’s austere domain-internality; 
I demonstrate this strategy further in the following chapter.  
If my above suggestion is correct, then the respectability challenge mistakenly 
reverses the order of these steps. I.e. it mistakenly takes respectability to be secured by the 
satisfaction of the knowability principle and this knowability to be secured by explaining 
how the conditions of knowability obtain for whatever is the object of inquiry. 
Understanding how these conditions obtain then requires positing a plausible model of 
our capacity for knowledge. Because the Access Rendering of the conditions of 
knowability has explanatory power in the empirical domain, the thought is that the 
respectability of moral discourse can be secured through positing an instance of the 
capacity for moral knowledge that is implied by the Access Rendering. According to my 
suggestion, however, the respectability of moral discourse is only ever in question if we 
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have antecedent evidence of its unrespectability. That is, if we have evidence that moral 
discourse failed its users or its users failed in some way because they traffic in moral 
discourse.  This failure may plausibly amount to having more false beliefs and imply being 26
disposed in some way analogous to being disposed to making mistaken predictions. The 
positive claim that the minimalist then must commit to then to fend off concerns about 
the respectability of moral discourse is a relatively humble one: that such a failure is not 
exhibited by users of moral discourse on account of their use of it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 We can see how this tracks the principle of knowability upon respectable discourses if we bear in mind the 
Neutral Rendering of the conditions of knowability (“For any discourse, we can only know that its 
constituent propositions are true if we can apprehend that because of which they are true”). Implied by my 
suggestion is that if we have reason to believe that no user of a discourse could apprehend that because of 
which the constituent propositions of this discourse are true, then we also have reason to believe that said 
discourse fails this user or that user fails because they traffic in said discourse.  
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Chapter 4: A Minimalist Response to the Proliferation 
Challenge 
Introduction 
According to the truthmaker theorist, metaethical minimalism lacks the resources 
to vindicate or explain our practice of moral deliberation and claim-making. With the 
respectability challenge, the truthmaker theorist argued that the minimalist could not 
account for the moral domain’s respectability if 1) there are no moral truthmakers and 2) 
we accept that it is a feature of all unrespectable discourses that they lack truthmakers for 
their constituent propositions. The respectability challenge placed pressure on the 
minimalist to offer an alternative condition of respectability which allowed for articulating 
the contrast between the moral domain and domains which do not merit our respect. In 
this chapter, I focus on another challenge put to minimalism by truthmaker 
theorists—what I call “the proliferation challenge”—and offer a way for the minimalist to 
resist its conclusions. This time, the challenge for the minimalist is to explain the special, 
authoritative status moral norms have in our practical deliberations. According to the 
truthmaker theorist, this special status is explained by the fact that the moral standard 
(according to which moral norms are true) “tracks normative reality.” The proliferation 
challenge does not posit truthmakers to explain the truth of particular moral claims like 
“Torturing others for fun is wrong”. Instead, it focuses on the truth of a second-order 
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claim ​about​ what is morally correct; namely, that these moral claims have distinctive 
authority in our practical deliberations. 
Though importantly different, the respectability challenge and the proliferation 
challenge are motivated by similar concerns over minimalism’s ability to vindicate moral 
discourse. The former demanded that the minimalist make sense of the fact that moral 
discourse deserves ​any​ consideration in our deliberations whatsoever and the latter 
demands the minimalist makes sense of the ​distinctive​ consideration it deserves. Because of 
this difference, the solution I offered to resist the respectability challenge will not suffice as 
an answer to the proliferation challenge. Though a necessary condition for any 
distinctively authoritative discourse, it is not sufficient to attribute moral discourse’s 
authority to the fact that it does not fail nor causes its users to fail. As will be explored in 
more detail below, this is most clearly seen when considering numerous examples of 
domains discourses which meet this condition and yet fail to have distinctive authority. 
According to the proliferation challenge, the minimalist must either deny that 
moral norms have distinctive authority or they must accept the existence of a normative 
reality (i.e. truthmakers) which makes it true that moral norms are distinctly authoritative 
(thus giving up their minimalism). The proliferation challenge gets its name for the 
following reason: if the minimalist grasps the first horn of this dilemma, then there are no 
constraints on the proliferation of competing normative systems to our own which are 
intuitively implausible. Truthmaker theorists illustrate this point by asking us to imagine 
an anti-moral or “schmoral” domain of discourse that is 1) equal to the moral domain in 
coherence and scope, and 2) features in the practical reasoning of an imaginary community 
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in a formally identical way to the way moral norms feature in our own practical reasoning.
 According to the schmoral standard, for example, the fact that an action will cause pain 27
stands in favor of performing that action. If neither the schmoral or moral domains’ 
constituent propositions are rendered authoritative by their standard’s tracking a 
normative reality, on no grounds can the minimalist explain the truth of the following: 
“despite this formal symmetry, it is incorrect to weigh schmoral reasons as heavily as moral 
reasons, even for schmoral reasoners”? Of course, this conclusion is premised upon the 
notion that, in their non-acceptance of the existence of truthmakers, the minimalist denies 
themselves any other way to account for the fact that moral norms have a distinctive 
authority in our deliberations. Resisting this supposition will be the guiding thrust of my 
defense.  
It might be thought that this challenge can be dissolved straight away by simply 
pointing out that moral propositions about reasons for actions are true and schmoral 
propositions, insofar as they contradict these true moral propositions, must be false. 
Therefore, moral propositions constituting reasons for action have greater authority than 
schmoral propositions in virtue of their truth. The minimalist, by definition, accepts a 
deflationary/minimalist account of ‘truth’, so this solution would not force the minimalist 
into accepting the existence of moral truthmakers. According to this solution, the 
proliferation challenge presents no distinctive worry about the tenability of metaethical 
minimalism.  
27 See Enoch (2011), McPherson (2011), Enoch and McPherson (2016), Wodak (2016), Donelson (2018) for 
this version of the challenge. 
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The problem with this reply is that, according to the standard internal to the 
schmoral domain, schmoral propositions are true and moral propositions, insofar as they 
contradict schmoral propositions, are false. Much in the way that chess players accept the 
rules of chess as their standard for correct chess moves, the community of schmoral 
reasoners accepts the schmoral standard and deliberates on what to do according to it. The 
minimalist wants to claim along with the moral realist that moral propositions are true and 
schmoral propositions are false, but if both are constituents of equally coherent domains 
of discourse what difference between them grounds the fact that we ought to opt for one 
over the other? Can’t an exactly symmetrical claim be made by the schmoral reasoner that 
moral propositions are false according to the schmoral standard? The truthmaker theorist 
claims that any metaethical account wanting to vindicate our ordinary deliberative 
practices must explain this difference between the moral and schmoral domain, i.e. the 
difference between a standard that is “robustly” normative and a standard that is merely 
“formally” normative. For the truthmaker theorist, the difference between the two is 
precisely that, while there exists a normative reality undergirding the moral standard, no 
such underdirging obtains for the schmoral standard. 
The Proliferation Challenge 
Rendered more precisely, the reasoning of the proliferation challenge runs as 
follows: 
1. There are different standards of correctness according to which something counts 
in favor of performing an action. 
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2. What counts in favor of performing an action according to robustly normative 
standards for action has distinctive authority in our deliberations in comparison to 
what counts in favor of performing an action according to merely formally 
normative standards of correctness (McPherson 2011, MS 9-10).  28
3. What counts as a reason for action according to the moral standard has distinctive 
authority in our practical deliberation. 
4. That something counts in favor of an action according to the schmoral standard 
does not have distinctive authority in practical deliberation. 
5. The difference in authority between what counts as a reason for action according 
to robustly normative standards (like the moral standard) and what counts in favor 
of an action according to merely formal standards (like the schmoral standard) calls 
out for explanation. 
6. We can explain this difference in authority between the schmoral and moral 
standard only if we commit to the claim that moral reasoners, in holding moral 
reasons in special regard, “track the normative structure of reality” (19 E&M). I.e. 
Only if we posit truthmakers which ground the truth of claims about the 
distinctive authority of reasons for action according to robustly normative 
standards. 
7. We have reason to believe that for any moral proposition, if it is true, then there 
exist(s) some truthmaker(s) which ground(s) its truth. (MTMC) 
28 “Having distinctly authoritative” is not meant to be a sociological or physical description of how norms are 
treated or thought of in our practical deliberations. In this context, to say of a norm that it is distinctly 
authoritative is to offer a normative assessment of it, implying that these norms ought to weigh more heavily 
in our practical deliberations than norms which do not have distinctive authority. 
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The proliferation challenge is typically directed at the version of minimalism 
defended by TM Scanlon, though it has been suggested that it presents a problem for all 
forms of metaethical minimalism.  I will argue that metaethical minimalism can resist the 29
proliferation challenge by abandoning two core theses of Scanlon’s particular version of 
minimalism. This first is the thesis that because the truth of a proposition is always settled 
by standards internal to the domain of which it is a member, there are no privileged 
domains of discourse. Following Wodak (2016), I will call this Scanlon’s Autonomy 
Thesis.  The second is the thesis that there is no “general idea of existence”, implying that 30
“genuine ontological questions are all domain-specific” (Scanlon 2011, n.10). I will call 
this Scanlon’s Existence Thesis. 
The Autonomy thesis contains at least two components. First, it suggests that the 
truth of propositions which have a certain subject-matter is determined by the standard of 
correctness internal to the domain of discourse of that subject-matter. Normally this 
would not sound like a controversial claim—after all, the question of whether “torturing 
someone for fun” is true seems rightly settled by moral principles. However, more 
controversial claims follow when marrying this aspect of Scanlon’s Autonomy thesis with 
his Existence thesis. Scanlon thinks we should understand seemingly domain-external 
existence-claims like “moral facts exist”  as claims whose truth is established by reasoning 
“internal to the moral domain” (29), not as claims whose truth is established by our 
broader metaphysical/explanatory commitments. For Scanlon, there is no sense of 
29 See Donelson (2018, p. 129) 
30 As Wodak points out (2016, p. 2797, n.4), this label is something of a misnomer but is based on Scanlon’s 
use of the term in describing his position (e,g, Scanlon 2011, 21-23). 
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“existence” that cuts across all domains. Of the empirical domain, Scanlon says the 
following: 
“Claims about the existence of objects in the spatio-temporal world do 
seem to involve a ‘thick’ or ‘robust’ idea of existence. But the ‘thickness’ of these 
existential claims is provided by the idea of that world itself. For physical objects to 
exist is for them to have spatio-temporal location, to have various physical 
properties, and to interact causally with other objects. The relevant idea of 
“thickness” is thus domain-specific” (28).  
Building upon the idea that each domain has its own internal standard of correctness, the 
second component of his Autonomy thesis is the commitment that no sensible 
domain-external claim can be made about which domain(s) ought to be privileged over 
any others. 
Scanlon’s motivation for advancing this position is primarily to demonstrate how 
one can claim to be a non-skeptical and non-naturalist moral cognitivist without taking on 
unsavory metaphysical baggage. Coupling his Existence Thesis and his Autonomy Thesis 
allows Scanlon to reject that there is anything metaphysically or ontologically mysterious 
about claims about the existence of numbers or facts about norms. That is, the naturalist’s 
worry over how we could live in a universe in which both physical objects and abstract 
entities existed is ill-founded; each does exist but only according to the sense of “existence” 
operative in their respective domains. Privileging physical existence over numerical 
existence not only requires an instance of a domain-hopping equivocation of “existence”, 
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it is entirely undermotivated because numerical existence is not “thick” enough to give rise 
to any metaphysical mystery in the first place (28).  
Back to the proliferation challenge. Challengers to his view point out that Scanlon 
must reject the conclusion that there is some form of existence undergirding the distinctive 
authority of moral reasons. This is because according to the standard internal to the 
schmoral domain, an analogous ground for schmoral reasons exists, and according to 
Autonomy, no domain’s existence claims should be privileged over any other. 
Additionally, Scanlon’s Existence Thesis forecloses on the possibility of his appealing to a 
domain-transcendent idea of the existence of moral truthmakers in order to explain 
morality’s distinctive authority. This forces Scanlon into grasping the first horn of the 
dilemma as described above: that moral norms do not have distinctive authority. It seems 
Scanlon is willing to bite this bullet; he says, 
“According to my view, as long as this way of talking was well defined 
[and] internally coherent, ... we would be committed to the existence of things 
quantified over in the existential statements counted as true in this way of talking” 
(27).   31
However, this admission comes at a great cost; there seems to be no limit on the number of 
standards imparting the same authority on the norms they license. Even if according to the 
standards governing the moral domain the claim “There are no schmoral reasons” is 
correct, no mistake is being made by the schmoral reasoner making if he accepts the truth 
31 See ​ibid ​(27 - 30) for Scanlon’s full discussion of why he thinks it is unproblematic for him to 
bite-the-bullet on the existence of what I am calling “schmeasons”. 
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of the converse claim about moral reasons, licensed by the domain-internal schmoral 
standard. 
Scanlon does say that the fact that a particular domain’s claim conflicts with 
another domain’s “provides decisive reason to reject” the existential commitments of the 
conflicting domain (21). However, the relation of conflict is symmetrical—while 
Scanlon’s view accounts for the intuitive fact that we can at most opt for one of the two 
domains, it does not account for the fact that opting for schmorality would be the wrong 
choice. We want to say that it is simply untrue, irrespective of what the schmoral standard 
says despite what the schmoralist may coherently think, that it is a good reason to perform 
an action just in case that action causes pain. It is reasonable to believe that if this is what 
minimalism is committed to, the line of reasoning from minimalism to this conclusion 
demonstrates minimalism’s falsehood by ​reductio​. 
 
Transitional Clarification 
Before I offer my proposal for how the minimalist should answer the proliferation 
challenge, it will be important to clarify precisely what is and is not demanded of the 
minimalist in this dialectic. The truthmaker theorist is ​not​ challenging the minimalist to 
explain normativity nor does he claim that truthmakers are required for anything 
whatsoever to be a reason for acting in some way. That is, the minimalist is not on the 
hook for explaining the nature of a norm’s standing in favor of an action in our practical 
deliberations—only the special kind of authority of a certain class of norms. The reliance 
on truthmakers to explain why “robust” normativity differs from merely “formal” 
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normativity implies that the normativity of the latter may obtain without being grounded 
in a distinctly normative reality. That is, the truthmaker theorist accepts that there are rules 
governing chess are formally normative, but he does not charge the minimalist with the 
inability to explain that in virtue of which these rules are normative. McPherson, the 
apparent genitor of the proliferation challenge, claims that schmoral reasons are like chess 
rules in that they both have merely formal normativity (2011, 10). If normative reality 
were required to explain the normativity of chess rules and schmoral reasons, then the 
truthmaker theorist would need some other way to draw the distinction between these 
formally normative standards and the robustly normative standards besides the latter’s 
tracking normative reality. Consequently, each party in this dialectic agrees that schmoral 
reasons and chess rules are normative (to limited formal extent that they are) in virtue of 
some other fact(s) besides their tracking normative reality. 
Whatever it is that explains normativity in general, the minimalist appears to be in 
no worse off explanatory position than the truthmaker theorist, at least according to the 
present concern being raised. What the proliferation challenge claims about minimalism is 
that it is in a worse off explanatory position with respect to the ​distinctive authority​ of 
standards which are robustly normative. Answering the challenge for the minimalist 
requires their explaining why certain norms have this particular feature, not to explain the 
property of being a norm itself.   
 
The Minimalist’s Negative Solution 
90 
  
Luckily for the minimalist, Scanlon’s strategy of biting the bullet is not the only 
way of answering the proliferation challenge. I will recommend that the minimalist do 
away with both Scanlon’s Autonomy Thesis and Existence Thesis and reintroduce the 
privileging of certain domains on the basis of the domain-transcendent truth of their 
governing standards. First, however, the conditions of a successful minimalist solution 
should be articulated. McPherson helpfully lays these criteria out explicitly in his (2011), 
and I will happily take them on. In order for the minimalist to successfully account for the 
difference between robust and merely formal normativity, the following must be satisfied: 
1) “The correct normative standard would need to have a feature (call it F) that 
explain[s] the robust normativity of that standard.”  
2) “F must be non-detachable from each substantive norm within the correct 
normative standard.  For if it were not, there could be a normative standard that 
was inconsistent with the correct normative standard, but that was nonetheless just 
as robustly normative, in virtue of having F. This would in turn entail that there 
would be no non-arbitrary grounds for choice between the  correct normative 
standard and this alternative.” 
3) “F must not simply reflect the metaphysical nature of normativity, for to do so 
would be to abandon the [minimalist] program.” (all from 2011, p.11) 
The minimalist can maintain the difference between morality and schmorality 
along these lines outlined by McPherson and can do so without explaining away the 
distinctive (robust) normativity of morality. McPherson doubts that any feature that 
satisfies F in the above 3 criteria can be found, but I believe this is because he is conceiving 
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of F ​positively​, i.e. as F being some state or feature of the correct normative standard that is 
constitutive​ of its being. Instead, the minimalist can conceive of F as a ​negative​ criterion, i.e. 
as some property which the correct normative standard ​cannot​ possess and in its not 
possessing it counts as robustly normative.  
Here is my suggestion in two parts: i) norms which are merely formally normative 
stand in favor of performing an action and do so because they are only licensed by a 
standard which depends on choice, adoption, or stipulation, either collectively or 
individually; ii) Norms which are robustly normative stand in favor of performing an 
action and do so ​not ​because they are licensed by a standard which depends on choice, 
adoption, or stipulation, either collectively or individually. 
Put simply, feature F is “depending on choice, adoption, or stipulation, either 
collectively or individually”. As I will explore in more detail later, this feature satisfies 
McPherson’s first condition because being true due to stipulation or convention is simply 
the necessary and sufficient condition of a norm’s being merely formally normative and 
not fully, robustly normative. Insofar as it is normative at all, a norm is either robustly 
normative or merely formally normative. A norm’s non-possession of the property which 
is necessary and sufficient for its being merely formal explains that norm’s robust 
normativity. In this way, robust normativity is similar to the property of being a 
mind-independent ​truth as opposed to a mind-dependent truth. Suppose one were 
interested in explaining the mind-independence of a mind-independent fact by way of 
possession of some feature F*. F* is simply the negative property of a proposition: namely, 
that its truth does not depend upon any facts about minds or mental states. Analogously, F 
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is the property of a norm: that its standing in favor of an action is not because it is licensed 
by a standard whose content is owed to choice, adoption, or stipulation, either collectively 
or individually. Because McPherson uses the term “robust”, the property of being robustly 
normative sounds like a property that is, well, robust. But this is just a quirk of his chosen 
terminology. Supposing that ​robust​ normativity cannot be explained by a negative feature 
because such a feature is not ​robust​ would be to beg the question against the minimalist. 
On my suggestion McPherson’s second condition is also satisfied because each 
norm which is licensed by the robustly normative standard also does not owe their truth to 
having been licensed by a domain-internal standard whose truth is owed to choice, 
adoption, or stipulation, either collectively or individually. Furthermore, insofar as this 
feature is the lack of something, it certainly does not “reflect the metaphysical nature of 
normativity”, so McPherson’s third condition is straightforwardly satisfied. However, a 
natural question arises about my account that might be thought to hint at something 
metaphysical. The moral standard, insofar as it is robustly normative, does not owe its 
correctness to stipulation, convention, adoption, or choice—to what, then, ​does​ the moral 
standard owe its correctness? I will address this question below, but first I will discuss why 
I think formal normativity is adequately explained in light of my suggestion. 
 
‘Merely’ Formal Normativity Explained 
I do not have in mind a formal analysans that lays bare what is shared between that 
which is conventional and what is stipulated that allows them to disjunctively explain 
merely formal normativity, but I will offer examples of each that are meant to render this 
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shared explanatory role intuitive. At my parents’ house, it is understood that the person 
who leaves the dinner table first ought to clear the rest of the dinner party's dishes as well. 
This is a convention to which my family has become accustomed, and according to the 
standard governing the “Franklin Family Dinners”-domain, it is correct that the clearing of 
the dishes be done this way. I.e. “The first person who leaves the table should clear the rest 
of the dishes” is a norm that is true only because it is licensed by a conventionally true 
standard governing this particular context. Of course, the Franklin-Family Dinner 
standard need not have arisen by convention, imagine instead that it was agreed to 
beforehand by each person who was invited to dinner. In this case, “The first person who 
leaves the table should clear the rest of the dishes” is a norm that is true only because it is 
licensed by a stipulative true standard governing our behavior at dinner. In either case, I 
take it, the norm in question is merely formally normative, and its merely formal 
normativity is explained by the fact that it is licensed by a standard which is merely 
conventionally or stipulatively true.  
We can adapt the details of this story to McPherson’s own example of chess. 
Norms which specify how each chess piece is allowed to move on the chess board are 
authoritative because they are licensed by the chess-standard, i.e. the rules of chess. A 
particular move in a game of chess or a claim about chess is mistaken if it is inconsistent 
with what is licensed by the rules of chess. If asked why chess rules are what they are, it is 
correct to answer that they are what they are because of stipulation (perhaps in order to get 
the game started) or by convention (“this is simply how chess is played!”). Again following 
McPherson’s example, imagine someone creating a game called ​Schmess​ which was 
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identical to chess except that its rules allow knights to move one square diagonally. 
Though their rules contradict each other,​ ​there is no normative transgression involved in 
opting to play chess over schmess or vice versa because they are true by either stipulation or 
convention. Consequently, chess and schmess have standards which impart merely formal 
normativity to prescriptions made about their respective subject matters. 
 For minimalism to successfully answer the proliferation challenge, it must be the 
case that it has the resources to establish why there is something wrong with treating 
schmoral reasons as robustly normative. The negative criterion for robust normativity lets 
minimalism satisfy this necessary condition. That is, if the truth of the moral standard is 
not​ owed to choice, adoption, or stipulation, either collectively or individually and the 
schmoral standard ​is​, we have ground for non-arbitrarily judging there to be a normative 
transgression in opting for the latter and the expense of the former. This judgment is 
non-arbitrary because the truth of a normative standard being owed to choice, adoption, 
or stipulation, is itself normatively significant. Suppose that the schmoral standard consists 
of just the following principle: “Necessarily, an action is required if and only if, and fully 
because it minimizes happiness”. According to this standard (in combination with physical 
and psychological facts pertaining to the given scenario), the claim “poking Sam in the eye 
would minimize her happiness” plausibly counts as a good schmoral reason to poke her in 
the eye. If “Poking Sam in the eye is required” is true according to a merely formally 
normative standard, then neither that standard nor that proposition ought to have 
distinctive authority in our practical deliberations​.​ If “Poking Sam in the eye is required” is 
true and it is not the case that it is true only in virtue of being licensed by a merely formally 
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normative standard, then it ought to have distinctive authority in our practical 
deliberations.  
This line of thought reflects our ordinary deliberative practices. It normally counts 
against taking a prescription for action as overridingly authoritative if it is prescribed 
because “this is just how things are done here”, as would be the case according to a 
conventional standard. Justifying the prescriptions of a robustly normative standard 
cannot, by definition according to this solution, involve appealing to the products of 
convention, choice, or stipulation. Consequently, the moral standard cannot succumb to 
the objection that moral prescriptions could be different if somewhere along the line 
someone had made a different decision regarding what ought to matter morally. It is not 
insignificant that nowhere in our ordinary deliberations does one find the practice of 
making reference to a “normative reality” to justify the importance of moral prescriptions, 
the truthmaker theorist’s solution to the proliferation challenge. If, on the other hand, the 
minimalist can answer the proliferation challenge with a successful solution that mirrors 
the practices of ordinary normative deliberation, this speaks well of the relative plausibility 
of the minimalist approach. 
What this solution does not provide is a means by which someone can determine 
whether the moral or schmoral standard is robustly normative. However, the proliferation 
challenge does not demand of the minimalist that they present a solution to ​this ​problem. 
And nor should it; the truthmaker theorist claims that the advantage of their approach is 
that they have a means according to which the schmoral and moral standards can be 
differentiated ​in principle​. Any demand that the minimalist provide an account according 
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to which we may decide between competing moral standards can be placed upon the 
truthmaker theorist as well.  
*** 
It is natural to wonder whether this way of accounting for the difference between 
robust and merely formal normativity actually allows the minimalist to answer the 
proliferation challenge without giving up their minimalism. Nothing yet prevents the 
truthmaker theorist from nodding along with everything I have claimed so far. They might 
say enthusiastically, “Of course moral propositions are not true because of a standard that 
is stipulated or conventional—as I’ve said, they are true because there exist moral 
truthmakers which make them true!”. However, notice that this leap to the existence of 
moral truthmakers is now undermotivated. The minimalist and truthmaker theorist can 
agree that normative claims whose truth is owed to being in accord with a stipulated or 
conventional standard are not overridingly authoritative in our practical deliberations. By 
entailment, the normative claims which are overridingly authoritative in our practical 
deliberations are true not due to being in accord with a stipulated or conventional standard 
of correctness. That is, both the truthmaker theorist and the minimalist agree that the 
proper account of ​that because of which​ moral propositions are true does not make 
reference to stipulated or conventional standards of correctness. This is where the 
common ground runs out for the minimalist and the truthmaker theorist.  
The truthmaker theorist, again, thinks moral truthmakers ought to feature in the 
complete account of that because of which moral propositions are true. But if the 
minimalist can point out what is distinctive about robust normativity because of what it is 
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not​, it is fair for the minimalist to ask what motivates the truthmaker theorist’s ​positive 
ontological/metaphysical claim about moral truthmakers. I.e., rather than implying the 
existence of truthmakers, this response by the minimalist lets them say that what makes 
moral claims robustly normative is what they are ​not​ made true by. Stipulated or 
conventional standards do ​not​ make moral claims true, for if such standards did, they 
would not have distinctive authority in our deliberations. Importantly, this negative 
solution is not an ​ad hoc ​reply designed to get the minimalist off the hook while retaining 
their minimalism. It tracks our normative commitments very nicely. If someone thought 
that the proposition “Torturing children for fun is wrong” was true because it was licensed 
by the conventional standard of the community they happened to live in, we would think 
they were making a grave mistake. Moreover, we would think there was something ​morally 
wrong with him. I.e. there seems to be something ​morally​ deficient about this imagined 
person—their belief seems to imply that in another community it might be possible that 
“it is good to torture children for fun” is true. “Don’t you see that ‘torturing children for 
fun is good’ is just wrong, even if it is licensed by the commonly accepted standard?” is an 
appropriate question to put to this person. 
That the solution to the proliferation challenge involves an invoking of a 
normative commitment squares nicely with the minimalist approach. Recall that the 
minimalist accepts that second-order claims like “Moral propositions are objectively true” 
and “there are moral facts” are true insofar as they convey, entail or are entailed by the 
correct normative commitments. The moral realist is right to defend these claims because 
thinking them false implies holding unacceptable normative commitments, such as 
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believing that every action is permissible. The proliferation challenge has argumentative 
force insofar as it makes a similar normative charge against Scanlon’s minimalism. That is, 
the deficiency of Scanlon’s view is that it does not account for the fact that normative 
claims which are made true by stipulation or conventional standards ought not to matter 
to us in our deliberations as much as true normative claims which are not so dependent. 
Thinking this normative claim false implies having the wrong normative commitments, 
such as believing there is no difference in domain-external preferability between the moral 
and schmoral domains. 
I have no doubt that the truthmaker theorist who is reading along is not satisfied 
with this reply and would perhaps object that the minimalist has not yet done any work 
towards accounting for ​that because of which​ moral propositions are true. I have argued 
that whatever ought to be included in this account, it cannot include a standard of 
correctness which owes its truth merely to stipulation or convention. This blocks the 
proliferation of norms without positing the existence of truthmakers for what is properly 
treated as robustly normative. Does it follow that there ​must ​be something in the account 
of ​that because of which​ a claim is true if it is robustly normative? I fail to see why the 
minimalist ought to accept this entailment. Of course, we can account for that because of 
which particular normative claims like  “Sam shouldn’t be poked in the eye for fun” are 
true. Intuitively, I would try to point to some general principles or abstractly articulated 
norms that account for these particular truths. And it is plausible that the inability of 
someone to account for that because of which they are true implies that there is something 
rationally problematic about accepting them. However, if we work our way back in these 
99 
  
justifications to general moral principles such as “One ought not dehumanize anyone 
arbitrarily”, it is not obvious that there is any further productive answer to be found in a 
search for ​that because of which​ they are true and overridingly authoritative. Importantly, 
the bare minimalist claim here is that this is not ​obvious​, not that any further inquiry is 
unnecessary or unproductive. To be sure, the truthmaker theorist believes that the 
ultimate ground of these general principles is existing moral truthmakers, but faced with 
the minimalist whose default position does not involve acceptance of MTMC, it is up to 
the truthmaker theorist to present reasons to believe. 
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Chapter 5: The Epistemic Condition 
Introduction 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this work constitute an attempt to construct a well-behaved 
version of metaethical minimalism—one that reflects a common strain in the work of 
contemporary metaethicists who are skeptical of metaethical ontology. Chapters 3 and 4 
comprised a defense of this thesis from challenges to it that can be found in the 
contemporary literature. Insofar as metaethical minimalism is a philosophical stance 
regarding what we can do without (moral truthmakers), the work of the preceding 
chapters can be understood as the construction and defense of a largely ​negative​ project. 
While there is nothing wrong with engaging in a philosophical project that is meant solely 
to dissuade, it is fair to wonder if there is anything else for the metaethical minimalist to 
do. There are quietist leanings found in the thought of writers whose work I’ve taken as 
paradigmatic instances of minimalism.  The sense one gets from some of these thinkers is 32
that there is not much (if any) work for the ​meta​-ethicist to do once they have 
acknowledged the grounds of moral truths are domain-internal principles or standards, 
not existent truthmakers. However, this austere domain-internalism is in danger of eliding 
some of the most pressing philosophical mysteries left for the minimalist to solve; first, the 
issue of what secures the difference between truthmaker-backed truths about reality and 
normative truths; and second, the necessary conditions of our having knowledge of 
normative truths in the first place. This chapter is aimed at resolving this first mystery in a 
way which results in an adequate understanding of the distinction between the objects of 
32 E.g. Dworkin (1996, 2011), Parfit (2011), and Scanlon (2014) 
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purely normative thoughts and objects of thoughts about reality. Building on this positive 
picture are chapters 6 and 7, which argue in favor of an account of the relationship 
between emotion and evaluative knowledge that is consistent with metaethical 
minimalism.  
There is positive work left for the minimalist. The minimalist does not have to be a 
quietist, nor do all metaethical minimalists embrace quietism. This is exemplified by 
Skorupski’s (2009) account of why certain actualities exist and certain ones do not exist, 
which marries quite well with his minimalism. If it is a fact that moral propositions do not 
require truthmakers in order to be true, the minimalist ought to be curious about why 
moral propositions differ from reality-reflective propositions in this regard. More 
importantly, the minimalist ought to have a way of responding to questions about why 
these two domains differ so radically—what is distinctive about matters of fact about 
reality such that the things they are about truly exist, whereas value, reasons, and moral 
prescriptions, while actual, cannot be said to exist? Put another way, what is to “exist”? 
How can we analyze the state of ​existing​ such that we can in turn grasp in what sense 
existents differ from mere actualities like reasons, value and fictions? 
According to the semantic condition, there is no difference between what is actual 
and what exists. Following Skorupski, we will regard the semantic condition as the idea 
that “whatever can be thought and talked about is real” (421) or “To be real is to be the 
semantic value of a (possible) term or variable” (421). While first I will briefly review 
Skorupski’s ordinary language evidence against it, the main argumentative work of this 
chapter presupposes the inadequacy of the semantic condition. This is not because the 
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semantic condition is baldly implausible, but for the reason that if the semantic condition 
is true, metaethical minimalism is false. If the value, reason, or other normative objects of 
our normative judgments are real in virtue of these judgments being true, then normative 
judgments, when true, are ​made true​ by this normative stuff existing in reality. For 
metaethical minimalism to work, there must be an alternative to the semantic condition. 
This chapter is aimed at both rejecting one such attempt and offering another in its stead. 
Skorupski takes the widespread acceptance of the semantic condition to be 
explainable by Quine’s influence over the development and practice of analytic philosophy 
in the latter half of the 20th century.  This influence, according to Skorupski, has not 33
been a wholly positive force. This analysis is similar to Parfit’s and Putnam’s in that they 
too reject the Quinean approach to ontology and believe it is at the heart of the mistakes 
made by metaphysically-inflationary metaethics. Expressed in logical terms, the semantic 
condition entails taking every instance of true existential quantification to be an expression 
of the existence of that which is quantified over. I.e. the semantic condition understands 
every proposition analyzable as an instance of the expression “There is an x” to be an 
attestation of the existence and reality of X.  
Rejecting the semantic condition in favor of some other criterion for existence 
allows for the possibility of treating some of the objects of the true claims of our discourse 
as irreal or non-existent. Doing so would not be merely an ad hoc convenience for the 
metaethical minimalist, but it would make a great deal of sense on its own. Discussion of 
non-existent objects is not difficult to find in our ordinary discourse; judgments about 
33 See Skorupski (2010), esp. pp.  420-423 
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fictional characters, imaginary objects, and possible features of real objects are not foreign 
to our ordinary conversation. Skorupski thinks that abstract objects like propositions, 
universals, and possible worlds are also irreals; we can refer to them and make true 
assertions about them, but to say we “refer” to them is not to make a metaphysical claim, 
but rather to assert that it is possible for them to be a value of a variable. I.e. it is a mistake 
to claim on the basis of this semantic fact (their referability) that they are ​real​ and, 
therefore, existent. Importantly, abstract objects are different from fictions or imaginary 
objects in virtue of the fact that their nature—i.e. what is true of them—is not dependent 
upon what we or anyone else thinks about them. 
The non-quietist minimalist wants to be able to draw a distinction between what is 
real/existent and what is not (and is perhaps only “actual”) using a philosophically sound 
principle that vindicates their minimalistic treatment of norms. This is the role Skorupski 
wants “the causal condition” to play. According to it, the objects of pure normative 
judgments (value, reasons, etc.) can be the value of a variable in an existential claim and 
therefore ​referred​ to unproblematically. However, like propositions, universals, and 
possible worlds, they are not the kind of thing that can bump into, act upon, or be acted 
upon by any other object. Consequently, they cannot be measured, weighed, or 
documented in space and time. According to the semantic condition, these facts about 
norms place no restriction upon their reality. According to the causal condition, these facts 
entail that norms are not part of reality and therefore do not exist.  If the causal condition 
is a suitable replacement for the semantic condition for the metaethical minimalist, then it 
must be able to do two things: 1) neatly divide up the domain of discourse into real objects 
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and irreal objects and 2) determine that normative objects fall into the latter category. In 
the first part of this chapter, I argue why the causal condition fails to meet these goals. In 
the second part of this chapter, I offer my replacement condition which, I argue, does a 
better job. 
 
The Inadequacy of the Causal Condition 
First, I wish to emphasize that I will not argue that the causal condition fails 
because I believe we have good reason to think either that there are causally inert objects 
which exist or that there are causally efficacious objects which do not exist. That is, my 
replacement condition is likely perfectly consistent with an intuitive division of objects 
according to their causal efficacy. The problem with the causal condition is that 
Skorupski’s notion of causation is too vague to secure a ​principled​ line-drawing between 
real and irreal, which is the intended purpose of the causal condition. Consequently, the 
division of real and irreal objects according to it is not sufficiently determined such that we 
are able to avoid relying on a merely intuitive understanding of what is real in order to 
prevent problematic classifications. I illustrate this point in what follows. 
Skorupski finds support for the causal condition in the works of Plato and other 
historical figures, according to whom “the real is whatever has causal standing” (30). A 
consequence of this standard is that it is either the case that the objects of normative 
thought have causal standing or any question about their existence is committed to a 
presupposition error. For many if not most metaethicists, even among those who are 
truthmaker theorists, norms are not causally efficacious, and Skorupski agrees: “reason 
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relations are irreal; they have no causal standing” (439). Therefore, norms, value, and 
reasons are not, according to the causal condition, to be included in a complete account of 
reality, even if it is possible to make true claims about them. Skorupski is sensitive to the 
idea that “causal standing” is often presumed to be a natural phenomenon. He does not 
want his cognitive irrealism to beg the question against non-naturalists, so he leaves open 
the possibility of non-natural causation in his account, making room for a divine 
progenitor of the natural world. According to Skorupski, this undetermined idea of cause 
is of no relevance to the concern about the reality of norms:  
“The real is that which has causal standing. How widely the notion of cause should 
be understood is a further philosophical question; but however widely we 
understand it, I argue, this criterion makes reason relations irreal. It does not 
follow that propositions about them cannot be true, and it does not follow that 
reason relations are fictions or constructs. They are what they are, independently 
of what we think they are.” (30) 
Whether or not causation should be understood naturalistically is perhaps a further 
philosophical question. I am willing to concede that Skorupski does not need to resolve 
this debate in order for his cognitive irrealism to work. Whatever it is we mean by 
“causation”, we should not think that it is a definitional matter that it only occurs between 
objects that exist in time and space.  
However, Skorupski does owe his reader ​some​ account of causation that allows for 
a proper determination of difficult cases. Here is a partial list of objects Skorupski wants to 
regard as causally engaged and therefore real: natural objects, including mental and 
106 
  
non-mental events, and possibly God. Here is a partial list of objects Skorupski wishes to 
regard as not causally engaged and therefore irreal: normative objects and relations, 
fictions, abstractions, and numbers. I agree completely with this division of objects, but 
what I aim to show is unclear is whether the causal condition decides how each kind of 
object should be categorized. Most pressingly, what is required is an account of why 
ostensibly efficacious interactions between irreals and reals ought not be counted as 
instances of causation. 
Consider the claims  
1) “Sam is going to fulfill her promise because that is what she ought to do” 
and  
2) “The moral goodness of Barry’s act moved Alan to tears.”  
In 1) and 2) physical behavior is ostensibly being explained by what Skorsupki 
certainly would regard as irreal: a moral duty and the moral value of an act. If it is ​because 
of her moral duty that Sam fulfills her promise, then why is it not true that this duty 
caused her to perform whatever action is required of her? If it is the moral goodness of 
Barry’s action that ​moved​ Alan so, why is this not an instance of this value exercising its 
causal power upon Alan? Skorupski might answer plausibly by pointing out that there are 
easy reinterpretations of these sentences that succeed in confining their normative 
subject-matter to an irreal domain. Perhaps the sense of “because” in the first sentence is a 
justifying ​sense; that Sam is duty-bound by her promise ​justifies​ her acting in such a way 
that she fulfills her promise. Perhaps in 2) it is not the moral goodness itself that is moving 
Alan, but rather the thought or perception of Barry’s action accompanied by a judgment 
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of its goodness. Even supposing these reinterpretations plausible, the problem with the 
causal condition is that it does not provide a means by which we decide between them and 
a literal reading of 1) and 2). I am inclined to opt for the reinterpretations, but this is 
because I believe norms and value to be non-real and therefore incapable of causing 
movement in the physical world. But of course neither my nor anyone else's ​inclinations 
should matter at all in this debate, especially if the reality or irreality of normativity is 
exactly what we looked to the causal condition to determine. 
1) and 2) are examples of difficult cases in which there is an ostensible interaction 
between what Skorupski regards as irreal and the real. The causal condition also runs into 
difficulty when trying to account for interactions between fictional entities:  
3) “Voldemort’s attack caused a lightning-shaped scar to form on Harry Potter’s 
forehead.” 
Voldemort does not exist, nor does Harry Potter, and nor does his scar. According to the 
causal condition, this means that none of these objects has “causal standing”. How then 
should we explain the truth of 3)? Skorupski’s cognitive irrealism is meant to allow for the 
possibility of true beliefs and statements about fictional entities. This is a good 
consequence of Skorupski’s position: after all, if I believed that Voldemort’s attack caused 
there to be an avocado-shaped scar on Harry Potter’s forehead, I would be quite clearly 
getting something wrong. More importantly for our purposes, if I believed that 
Voldemort’s attack ​did not​ cause there to be a scar on Harry Potter’s forehead, then I 
would also be incorrect.  
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We ​of course​ know that the characters and events in Harry Potter are not real. We 
also ​of course​ know that 3) does not describe a genuine instance of causation. Worryingly 
for the prospects of the causal condition, however, is that upon reflection it appears we 
know the latter fact in virtue of a grasp of the former fact. We know that Voldemort’s 
attack is not capable of genuinely causing a scar because none of the events in ​Harry Potter 
ever occurred and none of its characters are real. But notice that this implies that ​reality​ is 
what explains genuine causation, not the other way around. That is, it appears our ideas of 
reality and existence ​precede​ causation. What is needed to make the causal condition work 
is an account of “genuine” causation that does not make reference to the reality of the 
causal relata while also discounting the possibility of genuine causation occurring between 
fictional objects.  
According to Skorupski, “The causal condition says that a real object has a set of 
attributes in virtue of which it is affected by and affects other things in its distinctive way” 
(427). There is no obvious candidate for what is distinctive about interactions between real 
existents, especially if Skorupski wants to leave open the possibility of non-natural 
causation. His dilemma is this: If interactions between irreals ​are​ instances of causation, 
then irreals turn out to be a kind of real existent. If such interactions are ​not​ instances of 
causation, then the reason for this should be captured by an account of genuine causation 
that does not beg the question in minimalism’s favor. Skorupski offers no such account 
while also rejecting the first horn of this dilemma. Consequently, we are forced to help 
along the causal condition’s categorization of objects as real and irreal using our intuition. 
This leaves the metaethical minimalist on just as unprincipled ground as when they offered 
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their rejection of the semantic condition. A fundamental dilemma for the minimalist thus 
presents itself again: find some other principled distinction between the existent object of 
thoughts about reality and the object of normative thought or else embrace quietism. 
 
The Epistemic Condition 
The non-quietist minimalist needs a criterion for what is real/existent which 
grounds their belief in the difference between true propositions which do require 
truthmakers (reality-reflecting truths) and true propositions which do not require 
truthmakers (e.g. normative truths).  For it to be an improvement over Skorupski’s causal 34
condition, this criterion should also vindicate the common sense idea that fictional entities 
are non-real, even if some propositions in which they are referenced are true. This is the 
role I suggest for the “the epistemic condition”. Whereas the causal condition claims that 
what is distinctive about real entities is their ability to stand in causal relations, the 
epistemic condition says that what is distinctive about real entities is the manner in which 
it is possible to have non-inferential knowledge of them. 
According to the epistemic condition, something (X) is real/existent insofar as 1) it 
is, ​in principle​, possible for some epistemic agent have non-inferential knowledge of X and 
2) a necessary condition upon having this non-inferential knowledge of X is a 
conception-independent presentation of X to the epistemic agent.  
34 As always, it is worth flagging again that many, if not most, normative judgments involve claims about 
what is the case physically and temporally (e.g. The opposing generals at the battle of Thermopoyle were 
both brave).  I hope the reader will allow me to proceed under the assumption that by “normative 
proposition” I mean that a proposition that has purely normative subject-matter or a proposition for which 
it is possible to isolate its normative subject-matter and ask what it is in virtue of which its normative 
assessment/claim is true. 
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There is a great deal to unpack in this claim. First, By “non-inferential” knowledge 
I mean the sort of knowledge that can be acquired  by an epistemic agent immediately, 
without deliberation, upon being presented with the object of that knowledge . A 
paradigmatic case of this kind is perceptual knowledge; one doesn’t need to consider 
premises in syllogistic form in an effort to deduce the color of the objects of one’s visual 
experience. A sighted person with the capacity to experience color simply sees that the 
fire-engine is red; in the seeing of this object (under normal conditions), they come to 
know that it is red non-inferentially. Conversely, if you see smoke rising above a forest in 
the distance, you may come to know that there is a fire occurring in the forest on the basis 
of this experience. However, it is through inference that you form your belief about the 
fire, not non-inferentially upon being directly presented with the fire.  
It is important to emphasize that I am referring to inference or lack thereof at the 
level of conscious deliberation. There may be some notion of subpersonal inference that is 
indispensable for adequate causal explanations of direct perception, but this is not of 
immediate relevance to the epistemic distinction that the epistemic condition relies on. 
I do not wish to place any strict restrictions upon the kind of knowledge that we 
must be able to gain of real objects in order for them to satisfy criterion 1) of the epistemic 
condition. That is, I take it that when we gain non-inferential knowledge of real existent 
object X, the content of this knowledge can vary; we may, along with judging there to be 
such an object (“There is an x”), judge this object to have certain attributes or properties. 
The minimal constraint is that this knowledge must be analyzable as involving an 
existential claim about its subject matter. That this is necessary can be shown by 
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considering a case without such a claim: if I look out my window, see a bird, and form the 
belief with the content “All birds are blue”, it is a) difficult to see how a justified version of 
this belief could not be a product of inference and b) not apparent that there’s a referenced 
object whose reality or existence is in question.  
 There are many things which are or were at one time in existence which we 
humans do not have the ability to form non-inferential knowledge of due to our spatial or 
temporal distance from them. The epistemic condition does not contradict this fact. For 
the epistemic condition, what is distinctive about objects in reality is that it is “in 
principle” possible for an epistemic agent to have non-inferential knowledge of them. That 
is, for an object to exist it must be possible to come up with a set of conditions under 
which it is or would have been possible for an epistemic agent, perhaps one with 
superhuman epistemic capacities, to form non-inferential knowledge of it. Sometimes this 
test involves imagining a person at a temporally and spatially distant point with 
microscope-like vision, able to withstand the hostile environment of a black hole. 
Sometimes it involves imagining an interaction with a particle posited by physicists which 
no human could ever perceive directly, but some other imaginary species’s perception of 
involves a tingly feeling in their big toe. I use the term “perception” because it is an easily 
grasped instance of non-inferential knowledge formation, but it should not be understood 
restrictively as vision. The non-sighted person can ​perceive​ a ball through the experience of 
systematically-occuring patterns of pressure felt in their hands and fingers.  
The principle referenced by the locution “in principle” in the epistemic condition 
is not a natural or causal principle, but a principle governing the possibilities we can 
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conceive of for this type of object and an epistemic interaction with it. For some objects 
referenced in our discourse, it is not possible to conceive of conditions under which we can 
have non-inferential knowledge of them; these objects are not real/existent in virtue of 
being unable to satisfy criterion 1) of the epistemic condition. Plausible candidates include 
objects which are ​only​ constructs of imagination (we are right to think our imaginary 
epistemic agent with microscope eyes is not real), mythological entities, posits of incorrect 
scientific theories, and fictional entities. Even if it is true that Voldemort’s attack caused a 
scar to form on Harry Potter’s head, neither Voldemort, the attack, the scar, or Harry 
Potter are capable of being the object of non-inferential knowledge of an epistemic agent. 
This is because they are non-existent fictional entities. We come to know them through the 
words written about them by J.K. Rowling—as the author of ​Harry Potter​, her process is 
not one of “finding out” about these events but rather imagining them. If the epistemic 
condition is an improvement upon the causal condition with regard to the categorization 
of fictional entities as non-real, it is because its first criterion disqualifies them from being 
real.  
At this point, you might be asking: “Can’t we imagine that there was an epistemic 
agent present for Voldemort’s attack on Harry Potter and the formation of his scar? 
Doesn’t this satisfy criterion 1) of the epistemic condition?”. I can see this question being 
asked in two different ways. First, it may be that you are imagining a case in which the 
attack as described in ​Harry Potter​ actually occurs for someone to witness; if this is the 
scenario, then I believe you are imagining fictional events to be real. If this is the case, then 
there is no problem for the epistemic condition because it says that all real events must be, 
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in-principle, able to be non-inferentially known. The epistemic condition successfully 
predicts our intuition that such a scenario would involve real entities.  
Second, it may be the case that you are imagining a witness being present in the 
context of the fiction—i.e. as part of the story itself. If it were, in principle, possible for this 
fictional witness to have non-inferential knowledge of Voldemort’s attack, this would 
suggest that the epistemic condition is too permissive and represents no improvement 
upon the causal condition with respect to its categorization of fictional entities. That is, 
just as it was with the causal condition, we would find instances in fictional settings where 
the epistemic condition’s criteria are met. Finding the solution to this problem requires 
attending to the difference between the imaginability of two separate scenarios: a) 
someone being a non-inferential knower of some matter of fact and b) the non-inferential 
knowability of that matter of fact. If I asked you to imagine an expert aura-reader who is 
able to detect a person’s energy upon meeting them, I am asking you to imagine them 
playing an authoritative role with respect to a certain subject-matter and the corresponding 
authoritative function of their non-inferential judgments about it. This is different from 
trying to imagine a set of conditions under which auras can be non-inferentially 
known—this is not possible; any search, imaginary or otherwise, for them will come up 
empty because there are no such things as auras. Because auras are purportedly real, while 
we can imagine that there are auras, this is to imagine them as if there were a set of 
conditions under which we can non-inferentially come to know them. 
We can imagine that there is a witness to Voldemort’s attack on Harry Potter by 
imagining that there is someone who plays the role of non-inferential knower of it in the 
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context of the fiction; perhaps this witness will go on to report the attack to other 
characters, moving the plot forward. However, this is different from trying to imagine a 
fictional event being non-inferentially knowable by a fictional epistemic agent; imagining 
the conditions under which this could take place requires imagining the agent having a 
perspective on these events. Imagining what it is to have a perspective on an event is to 
imagine it to be real; there is no other way for this perspective to be thought of. That is, 
during any successful imagining of this case we cannot help ourselves from imagining what 
it would be like if the event witnessed were real. This is true of all imagined 
perspective-taking on objects we know not to be real, including auras (I can imagine what 
it would be like for an aura-reader to perceive auras—this is to imagine that auras exist for 
them to see). These are things about which it is not in principle possible to have 
non-inferential knowledge of but ​imaginable​ that it is in principle possible to have 
non-inferential knowledge of by imagining them to be real. This is essentially a restatement 
of the epistemic condition. In such cases, while it is not possible to imagine any set of 
conditions under which the object referenced in our discourse can be non-inferentially 
known, it is possible to imagine the object as a different kind of thing—the kind of thing 
for which there ​is​ a set of conditions under which it is non-inferentially knowable, i.e. real. 
The upshot is that there are any number of objects which do not exist but which 
we can imagine to exist. This is often precisely the same act as imagining that is, in 
principle, possible for someone to have non-inferential of these objects. If I am correct, 
then what is impossible is the following: imagining that it is, in principle, possible to have 
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non-inferential knowledge of a spatio-temporal object or event (like those in the ​Harry 
Potter​ case) without simultaneously imagining that object or event to exist. 
If the preceding argument is sound, then criterion 1) of the epistemic condition 
allows for the principled differentiation of real objects from imaginary, hypothetical, and 
fictional objects. Criterion 2) of the epistemic condition is meant to allow the metaethical 
minimalist to differentiate between two classes of objects which both satisfy the first 
condition, i.e. to create a subclass (“existent objects”) among all those objects about which 
it is possible to form non-inferential knowledge. It claims that there is a condition specific 
to forming non-inferential knowledge of existent objects: a conception-independent 
presentation of them to the epistemic agent.  
 
Criterion 2 
Like with criterion 1), there is a great deal to unpack in criterion 2). One easy way 
to illustrate the nature of this condition on non-inferential knowledge of existent objects is 
to contrast it with the formation of non-inferential knowledge that is not conditioned in 
this way. If the epistemic condition works for the metaethical minimalist’s purposes, an 
example of the latter must be non-inferential knowledge about normative subject matter. 
As a test case, I will focus on non-inferential moral evaluations, i.e. immediate judgments 
of the moral worth of actions and traits of character. 
The process of acquiring knowledge of the moral value of actions and acquiring 
knowledge of the empirical properties of objects can look similar, if not identical. I can 
witness someone saving a child from drowning and simultaneously come to know about 
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the physical properties of the objects constituting this event and also form an immediate 
judgment of the exemplary nature of this act. However, this is the essential point: coming 
to non-inferentially know about the act’s moral value does not require our being present 
for its occurrence, but having non-inferential knowledge of the physical properties of the 
event ​does​ require our being present for their occurrence. If I were to describe the situation 
of saving a drowning child to you, it is as easy for you to come to “see” the moral value of 
acting in the way the savior did just as it was for me upon seeing it first-hand. Put another 
way, you are no less an authority on the matter of the worthiness of an act of saving a 
drowning child simply in virtue of your having not been there to see it. This is of course, 
conditioned upon having accurate beliefs about the physical properties of this event; if you 
did not know that by attempting to save the child the savior was increasing the likelihood 
of pain or death for other people, you would not be a reliable authority on any matter 
relating to the event.  
Of course it doesn’t always work like this. Sometimes we need to ​infer​ the 
rightness or wrongness of an act by carefully considering whether it violates or conforms to 
some moral principle. This is often what happens with difficult cases about which it is 
hard to form immediate judgments. However, what is distinctive about normative facts is, 
when we are able to come to non-inferentially know about them​, we are able to do so from 
the armchair, so long as we are given access to the relevant information concerning the 
surrounding circumstances.  
 
“Conception-independent Presentation” 
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The epistemic condition references the fact that non-inferential knowledge about 
objects in reality requires a “conception-independent presentation” of that object. My use 
of “presentation” is intended to be a descriptor of a class of epistemically-relevant events 
which includes both perception and non-perceptual intuition. What unites perception 
and what is sometimes called “intellectual intuition”  is that both factor into explanations 35
or accounts of non-inferential belief formation. While the epistemic condition suggests 
there are important differences between the two kinds of epistemically-relevant events and 
the conditions of their resulting in knowledge, it recognizes the similarity between them. 
Namely, that each requires a “seeing” or beholding of the relevant fact or object. Both the 
object of perception and the object of intuition are ​present​ for the epistemic agent. The 
difference between the two events is the manner in which they are presented, or their 
“presentation”. Presentation is meant to be neutral between representational accounts of 
perception and intuition and direct-realist accounts of perception and intuition. Whether 
the object is directly apprehended as it is or whether it is apprehended via a mental 
intermediary, the epistemically relevant point for our purposes is that it is presented as a 
ground of unmediated belief/judgment formation. Unmediated, that is, by inference. 
“Presentings” are those instances in which an object is available for non-inferential 
judgment. 
A “conception-independent” presentation is one which occurs outside (or in 
addition to) the conception of the epistemic agent. This can best be understood by first 
understanding the nature of a presentation that occurs within the conception of the 
35 See e.g. Humer (2007) 
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epistemic agent. If I asked you to imagine a black cat jumping over a fence, and 
subsequently asked you to report on what color fur this cat has, your judgment of the 
latter is based on your presentation of the cat to yourself in conception. Of course, in this 
case, the fact about the fur this cat has is also ​choice-​dependent. For the metaethical 
minimalist to use the epistemic condition effectively to their desired ends, it must be the 
case that there are facts which can be presented to us in conception, about which we can 
form non-inferential judgments, and are ​not​ choice-dependent. Recall the example of the 
person saving the child from drowning. By “in an epistemic agent’s conception”, I mean 
precisely the medium of thought in which you play out this scenario to yourself and are 
able to come to “see” the moral worth of the savior’s action. The similarity between 
considering the value of this act and imagining the cat is that both are scenarios, upon the 
consideration of their details, involving the epistemic agent playing out the events for 
themselves to make judgments about. This is what I mean by a presentation in conception. 
The ​difference ​between these two presentations is that the presentation of moral worth of 
the action is not a matter of choice on the part of the epistemic agent. We can, of course, 
imagine what it would be like if things were different and play out ​another​ scenario in our 
minds, but we cannot hold every detail of the savior’s act in our minds constant and 
choose to alter only its moral worth. That is, we can’t do so without being incorrect in our 
judgment—what is correct about this normative matter, unlike the color of the imaginary 
cat, is not up to our choosing. 
  A presentation which occurs independently of our conception is one featuring 
objects independent of the epistemic agent imaginative or conceptual medium of 
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presentation. Most naturally, we think of this as perception. It’s difficult to think of 
non-perceptual examples of conception-independent presentations, but one possible 
example is the experience of a divine or supernatural presence, depending on how one 
analyzes this phenomenon. As discussed above, we cannot form non-inferential knowledge 
without being presented with the object of this knowledge, and we cannot form 
non-inferential knowledge of real states of affairs without being presented with the object 
of this knowledge independently of our conception. More simply put, you can’t have an 
experience of something real without perceiving it. We should be permissive with respect 
to how this presentation occurs; video footage of the surface of Mars transmitted by a 
rover plausibly counts as a conception-independent presentation of the surface of Mars. 
However, there are difficult edge cases; judgments formed about the state of play of a 
baseball game based on a radio play-by-play may not count as non-inferential judgments 
because hearing the testimony of the broadcaster may not count as an unmediated 
presentation of the game. Solving these edge cases is not of importance here. For the 
epistemic condition to do the work the metaethical minimalist needs it to do, it must be 
the case that existent objects are those about which we cannot have an experience or 
intuition if they are presented to us merely in conception. For if this is so, then this is what 
is distinctive about them in comparison to objects of normative thought.  
 
Necessity and The Epistemic Condition 
Before proceeding, I want to make clear what kind of claim is being made about 
the conditions upon non-inferential knowledge. One possible interpretation of the claims 
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“It is possible to form non-inferential knowledge of moral facts from the armchair” and “It 
is not possible to form non-inferential knowledge of empirical facts from the armchair” is 
one which takes them to be justified by observation of cases. So construed, it is a fact about 
humans that it is not psychologically possible for us to non-inferentially know empirical 
facts from the armchair and it is not contradictory to believe it possible that this could 
change as a result of a change in our psychology. The problem with this approach is that 
the metaethical minimalist needs the epistemic condition to be (or reflect) a principle 
about the nature of normativity and reality, not an empirical claim about human 
psychology. That is, we set out at the beginning of this chapter to find an account that 
makes sense of the difference between propositions whose truth do depend on 
truthmakers and those that do not. Explaining this difference by appealing to 
psychological facts about how these truths come to be known threatens to reduce the 
minimalist view on the ontology of normativity to psychologism. 
An alternative is regarding the epistemic condition as a claim about different 
conditions under which we are disqualified from being a non-inferential authority on two 
categories of fact. That is, there is a condition under which non-inferential empirical 
judgments are disqualified from being authoritative, but this same condition of 
disqualification does not hold for the authority of non-inferential normative judgments. 
Your non-inferential empirical judgment cannot be authoritative if you had no 
conception-independent presentation of the object of that judgment, precisely in virtue of 
not having that conception-independent presentation. That is, a lack of an accompanying 
presentation of this sort is sufficient for a non-inferential judgment’s disqualification from 
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being authoritative on a matter of reality. Unlike these reality-reflective judgments, 
non-inferential normative judgments are not disqualified from being authoritative in 
virtue of not being preceded by a conception-independent presentation of their object.  
This is simply a restatement of the observation I made about these categories of 
judgment above—we need to be present for an event to form non-inferentially knowledge 
about its physical makeup; we do not ​need​ to be present for an event to form 
non-inferential knowledge about its normative makeup. Put in the language of 
disqualification; my non-inferential judgment about the moral quality of a person’s act of 
saving a drowning child is not disqualified from being authoritative due to the fact I was 
not present to observe the act directly. However, a judgment I make about the color of the 
shirt the child was wearing ​is​ disqualified from being an authoritative non-inferential one 
precisely because I was not present to observe the act directly. So construed, the epistemic 
condition reflects a fact about the necessary conditions of the possibility of non-inferential 
knowledge about normative and existent subject matter. These are reflective of the kind of 
thing these two kinds of judgments are about. Happily for the metaethical minimalist, 
because there are different necessary conditions upon non-inferentially knowing about 
them, this is a good reason to suppose that normative and empirical objects are different 
kinds of things. This means that the epistemic condition is not merely an expression of the 
contingent​ conditions for epistemic agents with human psychology of being able to 
non-inferentially know about normative or empirical objects. 
With this interpretation of the necessity expressed by the epistemic condition, let 
us turn to some final examples to illustrate its plausibility. Imagine we each read a 
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complete and accurate account of the physical details of the battle of Thermopylae. This 
account includes every detail of the battle down to the directions and strength of each 
breeze occurring throughout. Despite our exposure to this credible testimony, our 
thoughts and beliefs about the battle of Thermopylae do not count as authoritative 
perceptions​ of the real objects or state of affairs constituting that event. We do not see what 
physically occurred at Thermopylae upon being exposed to a second-hand account. This is 
because, despite the accuracy of our beliefs, our temporal distance from the event 
disqualifies us from having an “observer” status. Simply put, we do not and cannot have 
non-inferential knowledge of the objects present or states of affairs occurring at the battle 
of Thermopylae.  
However, notice that our temporal distance from the event does not on its own 
disqualify us from having non-inferential ​evaluative ​knowledge of these events. Upon 
hearing this description of the events, I non-inferentially judge that certain actions 
undertaken are courageous and others are cowardly. Upon reading this first-hand account, 
I can intuit or see (in an analogical sense) that a particular instance of a Spartan soldier 
standing their ground in an act of self-sacrifice is courageous. The lack of a proximate 
interaction between the state of affairs and the evaluator does not ​necessarily​ bear on the 
authority of their evaluation, while it does for perception. In fact, a substantial temporal 
and spatial distance may sometimes be ​an aid​ for gaining unmediated, non-inferential 
evaluative knowledge of these events. That is, because the distractions present at the battle 
itself, we may be more authoritative evaluators precisely because of our relative distance 
from it. Of course, our evaluations’ accuracy and relevancy depend upon the accuracy of 
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the testimony and subsequent thoughts we have about the battle. The present point is that 
no maximally accurate discursive or iconic representation of a temporally distant state of 
affairs could result in the perception of those state of affairs. This is not an empirical fact 
about the causal processes constituting human perception, but a normative principle 
about which judgments count as having “observational” status or which persons count as 
first-hand “observers” of an event. These “observation”-statuses have relevance to our goal 
of navigating the space of reasons, i.e. of determining what we are justified in believing and 
saying. My claim is that the mere fact that the object of evaluation is a discursive 
representation or imagined in conception does not, on its own, disqualify an evaluator 
from forming an authoritative non-inferential intuition about what was good or bad 
about the state of affairs represented. This is a fundamental epistemic difference between 
objects of judgments about reality and the objects of normative 
judgments—non-inferential knowledge of the latter is allowable under conditions in 
which judgments of the former are disqualified from having the status of being 
non-inferential knowledge. This is not to say that under these conditions we cannot have 
knowledge of what exists, only that this knowledge is not observational--i.e. it is not 
non-inferential. 
This distinction pervades our deliberations about normative matters: Harman’s 
(1988) example of a cat being set on fire for the amusement of a crowd works because it is 
so intuitively wrong—that is, we have no problem intuiting that any instance like this is 
wrong, if it were to occur. Let us suppose such a situation is occurring right now in a New 
York City alleyway. We do not actually need to be in spatial proximity to that situation to 
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intuit it’s wrongness, while we do need to be in spatial proximity to this particular event to 
perceive the heat of the flame or the size of the cat. If someone insisted on withholding 
immediate judgment about the cruelty of this event on the grounds that they must see this 
event in person before they can justly say that they see that it’s cruel, we would think 
something strange or evasive about them. This defective evaluator is not one who is 
questioning the accuracy or completeness of the account, but rather someone who accepts 
both its accuracy and completeness but still can’t bring themselves to admit that they see 
that such an action is cruel. Conversely, it ​would​ be appropriate for the same individual to 
deny that he can be a stand-alone authority on the size of the cat or color of the flame. This 
is so even if they have been exposed to a written account of both details—after all, he 
hasn’t seen the cat or the flame!  
A corollary of the above point is that the goodness of an act is located in reality 
because its ​goodness​ need not be non-inferentially known only via observation. That is to 
say, while the physical nature of this act is non-inferentially known only if one is 
sufficiently proximate to the event, spatial, temporal, and causal distance does not on its 
own disqualify a person from having an authoritative intuition about its goodness. I have 
only second- or third-hand knowledge of the events surrounding the Chernobyl disaster, 
but if this testimony is true, it is with great confidence that I judge that the actions of those 
who knowingly sacrificed their own lives to prevent a global nuclear disaster are morally 
good. The epistemic quality of my judgments of the goodness of these acts (if they 
occurred) is not compromised because of my temporal and spatial distance from their 
physical occurrence.  
125 
  
 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion to this chapter I wish to make two qualifying points about the 
previous argumentation and the epistemic condition. The first is to point out the 
epistemic condition is not a wholesale departure from the causal condition. The causal 
condition ran into problems for not having a restrictive enough notion of causation to 
prevent problematic cases from being categorized incorrectly. The epistemic condition 
suggests that what is distinctive about existent objects is the necessity of a particular kind 
of interaction to occur in order for them to produce a particular effect. This can be 
interpreted as a kind of restrictive causal condition, one which sets existent objects apart 
from those objects for whom causal descriptions are possible but lack the ​dependency​ upon 
causal interaction to be non-inferentially known. I have chosen to not rely on any 
invocation of causation when offering a description of the epistemic condition so as to not 
rely on a notion which caused problems for the metaethical minimalist in the first place. 
However, once the epistemic condition is in place, it is easy to see how it might ground a 
notion of “genuine causation” that allows Skorupski’s causal condition to do the work he 
intended for it.  
Finally, the epistemic condition is not meant to serve as the final word on that in 
virtue of which objects are real/existent. Recall that its purpose is to provide the 
metaethical minimalist a means of making sense of the difference between propositions 
which do require truthmakers in order to be true and those which do not. As it turned out, 
this involved a distinction between the ​objects​ referenced in our discourse that are 
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real/existent and those which are not. In order to make sense of this latter distinction, the 
epistemic condition points out that non-inferential knowledge of what is existent has a 
necessary condition for its formation that non-inferential knowledge of what is not 
existent though actual does not. The fact that there is this extra condition on 
non-inferential knowledge of existent objects may be explainable by some further 
metaphysical fact about reality and the entities contained therein. It may even be 
reasonable to expect that some further fact about reality ​must​ explain this epistemic fact 
about real objects. In the dialectic as I’ve described it, the metaethical minimalist set out to 
find a principled ground to stand on to draw their distinction between existent and merely 
actual normative objects, they do not need to pronounce this principle as the ultimate 
ground upon which all truths about reality depend.  
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Chapter 6: Transcendental Sentimentalism 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, it is argued that the metaethical minimalist can, despite 
their minimalism, make a positive contribution to metaethics and the metaphysics of 
moral epistemology. This was in an attempt to distinguish metaethical minimalism from 
metaethical quietism. This effort is continued in the present chapter, wherein I present a 
picture of the relation between evaluative thought and sentiment that is consistent with 
metaethical minimalism. However, unlike in the preceding chapter, it is not necessary for 
the metaethical minimalist to accept what is described here in order to defend or articulate 
their minimalist position. It is perfectly coherent to imagine a metaethical minimalist who 
rejects sentimentalism. Additionally, transcendental sentimentalism is a position the 
adoption of which need not be accompanied by the adoption of metaethical minimalism. 
They are each consistent with while also independent of each other. ​A propos​ of this fact, 
the chapter that follows will be a stand-alone articulation of transcendental 
sentimentalism. The lesson ​vis a vis​ metaethical minimalism is that the minimalist can, 
while denying that there are truthmakers which make true moral propositions true, paint a 
positive meta-level picture of our practices of ethical deliberations and judgement-making. 
*** 
The notion that our capacity for sentiment is in some way tied up with our 
practice of offering moral evaluations has a degree of prima facie plausibility that is rare 
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among philosophical theses. This may be for no other reason than we often feel very 
strongly about what is right and wrong, with these feelings often amounting to something 
over and above the sort of convictions we have about non-normative matters. Of course, if 
emotions are “in some way tied up with” our evaluative capacities, the interesting 
philosophical work lies in the specification of this relation. If the strong feelings we have 
about value were nothing but mere correlations or psychological epiphenomena, they 
would in no way help ​explain​ the nature of evaluative judgment. The moral sentimentalist 
rejects this picture; for them, the relationship between emotions and evaluative judgment 
is explanatorily significant. However, sentimentalist theories vary widely on the precise 
explanatory role they find for sentiments. This chapter will add to this variety by 
identifying a distinct form of sentimentalism I will call “Transcendental Sentimentalism.” 
Transcendental Sentimentalism (hereafter, “TS”) claims that having or having had a 
sentimental response to x is a necessary condition of the possibility of a person counting as 
having non-inferential evaluative knowledge of x.  
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: First, I introduce TS by unpacking 
the core elements of its target explanandum and the explanatory role it posits for the 
sentiments—namely, “non-inferential evaluative knowledge”, what it is to “count as 
having” this knowledge, and being a “necessary condition of the possibility” of this 
knowledge. A consequence of clarifying the nature of these components will be a 
differentiation of TS from other forms of sentimentalism presently on offer. Antii 
Kauppinen, esp. in his (2014) and (forthcoming), has led the way in clarifying and 
classifying contemporary sentimentalist views, taxonomizing the field under the following 
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categories: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical 
sentimentalism, and epistemological sentimentalism. Showing that TS is a distinct form of 
sentimentalism will involve demonstrating that TS is either consistent with the rejection 
of, or involves something in addition to, these other forms of sentimentalism. This exercise 
is conducted primarily in the interest of introducing and clarifying the positive 
commitments of an ​independent TS​. That is, I aim to clarify what TS is on its own by 
making it clear what the transcendental sentimentalist need and need not commit to.  
In the second part of this chapter, I address the question of why anyone should 
believe TS. I offer a brief sketch of what I take to be promising strategies for demonstrating 
its plausibility. Explanatorily, TS makes for an attractive position because it retains the 
theoretical advantages of sentimentalism while avoiding some oft-discussed implausibilities 
burdening other forms of sentimentalism. This is an “explanatory loveliness” argument the 
likes of which are common in meta-ethics. A more promising strategy for directly 
establishing TS involves marshaling a transcendental argument in its support. If successful, 
this argument would establish TS by demonstrating that ​not​ having a sentimental response 
towards x result’s in a person’s ​disqualification​ (in the normative sense) from counting as 
having non-inferential evaluative knowledge of x. 
The line of thought pursued in this chapter is mainly exploratory rather than 
argumentative. I do not argue in favor of TS to the exclusion of those views to which it is 
opposed. Each part of this exploration will touch on points of philosophical contention 
that it is outside the scope of this particular project to resolve. Even in my sketch of 
argumentative strategies, there is much that must be filled in and premises which must be 
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further established by the transcendental sentimentalist. The contribution I aim to make is 
the identification of a distinct way of conceiving the relationship between sentiment and 
evaluative thought and a strategy of rendering this conception plausible. 
 
I. Non-inferential Evaluative Knowledge 
Transcendental sentimentalism’s explanandum is non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge. By “evaluative knowledge” I mean the kind of knowledge that is about the 
non-instrumental value of some object, action, event, or other bearer of value. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the moral value of actions, but I am optimistic 
about TS’s ability to account for knowledge of other forms of non-instrumental value. By 
“non-inferential” knowledge I mean the sort of knowledge that, when it occurs, is formed 
immediately, without deliberation, upon the object of that knowledge being presented to 
an epistemic agent. A paradigmatic case of this kind of epistemic state is the knowledge 
sourced from perception; one doesn’t normally need to consider premises in syllogistic 
form in an effort to deduce the color of the objects of one’s visual experience. A sighted 
person with the capacity to experience color simply ​sees​ that the fire-engine is red; in the 
seeing of this object (under normal circumstances), they come to know that it is red 
non-inferentially.  
In the context of value judgments, non-inferential evaluative knowledge of the 
moral wrongness of some act involves the coming to know that is right or wrong on the 
basis of seeing it occur or upon the consideration of it in conception. For instance, if I 
asked you to consider the act of a psychopath torturing innocents for the purposes of 
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experiencing momentary titillation, insofar as you are a capable moral judge, you will 
immediately conclude that this is an abhorrent, morally wrong act. Though there are 
undoubtedly moral principles on the basis of which you could infer the wrongness of this 
act, your immediate judgment did not result from your first considering these principles 
and finding an entailment governing this case. That there is such a thing as non-inferential 
evaluative knowledge depends on the possibility of cases like these, in which the wrongness 
or rightness of some act is as transparent to us as the colors of the objects in our immediate 
environment.  36
Kauppinen uses the term “judgment sentimentalism” to refer to a constellation of 
views according to which judgments of moral value are in some way ​constituted​ by 
emotional or sentimental responses or are ​about​ these responses. TS claims that the 
occurrence of one kind of evaluative judgment is conditioned by sentimental response. 
However, being conditioned by sentiment does not require being constituted by 
sentiment. This is true of all conditioning and constitution generally. For example, though 
a steak’s being medium-rare is conditioned by exposure to some heat source, this 
medium-rare steak is not constituted by that heat source. Insofar as sentiments are not 
ordinary belief-states (which I will assume without argument for this chapter), to say that 
moral judgments are ​constituted​ by sentimental responses is to commit to a type of 
non-cognitivism that understands the judgment  “φ-ing is morally wrong” as the 
expression of the non-cognitive attitude towards φ-ing which constitutes it. 
Transcendental Sentimentalism is plainly inconsistent with judgment sentimentalism of 
36 Of course the physical or mental process of acquiring these pieces of knowledge may be a difference 
between these cases even if the truth of what they claim is alike in transparency. 
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this variety because TS implies that there are judgments of value that express factive 
cognitive states, namely non-inferential evaluative knowledge.  
This point does not foreclose upon the possibility of TS being the kind of 
judgment sentimentalism that takes evaluative judgments to be ​about​ sentimental 
responses. I will reject this possibility in the course of the discussion of how TS employs 
the term “being a necessary condition of” in part XX.  
 
II. “Counting as having” knowledge 
According to Kauppinen (forthcoming), explanatory sentimentalism is the view 
that “sentimental reactions fundamentally explain our moral verdicts,” and “moral 
judgment is deep down driven by emotion.” The work of contemporary moral 
psychologists who advance accounts of the etiology and mechanisms of moral thought 
straightforwardly fits this description. Jonathan Haidt’s model of cognitive systems, for 
instance, understands immediate evaluative intuitions to be caused by non-reason 
governed affective responses. According to Haidt’s model, the occurrence of this class of 
moral thought is causally explained by the sentimental states of the thinker.  Prior to the 37
advent of empirical psychology, explanatory sentimentalism is found in the work of early 
modern British Sentimentalists such as Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam 
Smith.  Each of these thinkers advanced pictures of evaluative thought on which 38
sentiment served as its mechanism or constituent. 
37 See Haidt (2001) and (2012) 
38 See Hutcheson (1725) and (1728), Hume (1739) and (1751), and Smith (1759). 
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Transcendental Sentimentalism, in holding that sentimental response is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge, is 
consistent with the view that sentiments serve as a causal antecedent of moral thought. 
However, insofar as explanatory sentimentalism is an empirical thesis justified through ​a 
posteriori ​observation of cases of correlations between affective response and evaluation, it 
does not entail TS. This is for at least two reasons. The first relates to their respective 
scopes; TS is a claim about non-inferential evaluative knowledge, so a complete account of 
the necessary conditions of having an evaluative ​thought​ will not necessarily exhaust or 
account for the necessary conditions of a particular subset of that sort of thought. That is, 
even if the causal story about evaluative thoughts that explanatory sentimentalism offers is 
correct, there are plausibly further constraints on being an evaluative thought of a 
particular kind. Relatedly, the second reason is that insofar as TS is a thesis about what 
conditions evaluative ​knowledge​, empirical observation is an insufficient means for 
discovering its necessary conditions. Consequently, the transcendental sentimentalist’s 
work differs from that of the empirical psychologists insofar as knowledge is a category of 
thought the necessary conditions of which cannot be discovered using purely 
non-normative methods.  
According to the independent transcendental sentimentalism I will present, 
“counting as having non-inferential knowledge” is not a physical state of a subject that is a 
product of a causal chain, it is a normative description of the authoritative status of the 
knower’s reports of evaluative states of affairs. This is meant as an echo of Sellars’s famous 
dictum from “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, “The essential point is that in 
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characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical 
description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of 
justifying and being able to justify what one says.” (p.169). Even if the explanatory 
sentimentalist were to show that every case of non-inferential evaluative knowledge was 
preceded by a sentimental response, this would not be evidence of TS’s truth. This is 
because ​being an episode of knowing​, according to an independent TS, is a property that is 
not in the category of that which can be the product of causal forces. More clarification of 
this idea of knowledge will be offered in subsequent sections. 
In the interest of seeing how TS requires substantiation beyond that which is 
appealed to by the explanatory sentimentalist, consider another example of a context in 
which sentiments play an explanatory role: motivated reasoning. Plausibly, a person is 
engaged in motivated reasoning when their desire or motivation to form a certain 
conclusion influences their deliberation. Cases of motivated reasoning are sometimes 
explained by the reasoner sincerely wanting something to be true or, alternatively, having a 
strong aversion to a particular conclusion. Because wantings and aversions are plausibly 
caused by, constituted by, or instances of sentimental response, the role of the sentiments 
in cases of motivated reasoning is functionally similar to the role the explanatory 
sentimentalist finds for them in the context of moral thought. One concern of the 
motivated reasoning theorist, as it is with the explanatory sentimentalist, is to discover, 
using empirical means, the precise role that sentiments play in causing the occurrence of 
their target psychological explanandum. Of course, psychological investigations, like most 
other empirical investigations, should be informed by the conceptual distinctions and 
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analyses uncovered by philosophy. However, the difference between these kinds of 
explanations and TS is that the latter says that having sentiments or emotions about the 
object of evaluation is an epistemic good and necessary for evaluative ​knowledge​, not 
merely the occurrence of thoughts about value.  Consequently, to be a necessary 39
condition of the possibility of counting as having non-inferential knowledge is to play a 
role in the accounting for a species of ​knowing​, understood as a psychological state’s 
positive normative status. This is a separate role from that of being a component of a 
model aimed at explaining the production of psychological phenomena. 
This example is complicated by the fact that accusing someone of engaging in 
“motivated reasoning” is naturally understood as an indictment of the quality of their 
reasoning.  For a conclusion to be the product of motivated reasoning, it might be 40
thought, is for that conclusion to count as having a ​negative​ normative status. A less 
extreme interpretation might be that a conclusion is disqualified from counting as 
authoritative on account of its formation being influenced by motive. According to the 
latter interpretation, this motivated conclusion would ​lack​ normative status of any kind 
such that it could be made relevant in the space of reasons. However, we have come to a 
point dialectically where little further productive discussion can be had without an 
explication of “normative status”. 
 
III. Counting as having a “normative status” 
39 I am deliberately avoiding the claim that sentiments help “justify” evaluative beliefs or judgments for 
reasons that will be made clearer when I differentiate TS from epistemological sentimentalism.  
40 However, the epistemic permissibility or impermissibility of engaging in motivated reasoning is not a 
settled matter in normative epistemology. See e.g. Kunda (1990) for a discussion of motivated reasoning that 
does not entail an epistemic transgression.  
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In the preceding section I referred to a psychological state’s positive “normative 
status” (in virtue of which it counts as being knowledge) in order to differentiate which of 
that state’s conditions are accessible by empirical observation and which are not. The 
implication is that the normative status of a psychological state is not something which can 
be observed empirically nor are its conditions for counting as having this normative status. 
In this section I will elaborate on this point. In an effort to understand what it is for 
counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge to be a normative status I will 
discuss counting having a normative status generally.  
First, it is worth flagging that I prefer to use the locution “x ​counts​ as having 
[normative status x]” (rather than “has [normative status x]” or “is [normative status x]”) 
because it makes more explicit the role of rules and principles in its attribution. To say of 
something that it “counts” is to say that it is an event, object, state, or other entity that is 
governed by rules or principles, often of a game.  For example, to say of a basketball going 41
through a hoop that “it counts!” is to say that this event occurs within the scope of the 
rule-governed game according to which this event results in at least one point for a team. 
This is a ​normative description​, or game-relative description, of this event, as all 
attributions of normative status are. The polar opposite of the description of “counting as 
x” is “disqualified from counting as x”. To say of an event, object, or state that it “doesn’t 
count!” is to claim that it violates the rules or occurs outside the scope of that which is 
governed by the rules. Imagine now a stray basketball flying in from off court and going 
through the hoop during our game—this event counts for nothing because this wayward 
41 The analogy between knowledge-attributions and moves within a game will be pursued here because I find 
it immensely clarificatory, but caution is in order. The reader is promised that an explication of their 
disanalogies are forthcoming.  
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ball has no normative status in the context of our game. The ball that does count is 
typically called the “game-ball”. This is the object that at the beginning of the game it is 
agreed will be made subject to the rules governing a particular run of basketball. Pointing 
at this ball and saying “this is the game-ball!” is to make a normative description of it and to 
anoint it with its normative status. 
We can think of other game-relative descriptions like “being a pawn” or “being a 
bishop” for a game of chess, which are normative statuses that an object can have that 
entails it is subject to rules which dictate how a player is allowed to move it on the 
chessboard. Again, the point here is that insofar as these are normative statuses, their 
attribution is not something that is discoverable strictly through empirical observation of 
the object. There is nothing about the game-ball’s causal profile that is relatively different 
from the non-game-ball’s such that we can find it to be the one with the normative status. 
The difference lies in the former’s being made subject to rules, which of course is itself an 
event with a causal description, but, insofar as “rules” are being invoked, demands a 
normative description as well. The same is true of the anointing of any normative status. 
That is, a (perhaps implicit) grasp of the rules of the game is necessary to understand and 
articulate what is meant by describing something as “counting as” having a normative 
status. 
What sort of “game”-relative description can we offer of counting as having 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge? Here is a plausible account: to count as having 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge of x is, in part, to be able to offer immediate 
authoritative judgments about the value of x upon being presented with x. If, for instance, 
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you have non-inferential knowledge of the moral value of a type of charitable act, you are 
able to offer reports of that act’s value upon being presented with tokens of that act-type. 
Part of my recognizing you as authoritative with respect to that act-type’s value is 
recognizing that I am licensed to infer the truth of the propositional content of your 
evaluative judgments about acts of that type. For lack of a better term, call these a subset of 
the “rules” of the space of reasons—the “game” in which we give and ask for justifications 
for our beliefs and actions. Your cognitive state having this normative status (i.e. being an 
instance of non-inferential evaluative knowledge) just is for it to be subject to these 
epistemic rules, and many others still. For evaluative knowledge, especially moral value, 
these rules also plausibly have to do with what behavioral dispositions one should form in 
light of their knowledge. The idea is that any person who has non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge really “counts” as having knowledge of this type because they not only can 
immediately produce a judgment but also because they are ready to act on it. Failure to 
form the latter dispositions is evidence of a person’s lack of conviction with respect to their 
evaluative judgment, and we should not countenance such lack of conviction from a true 
non-inferential authority of evaluative matters. 
The analog for the game-ball-object or pawn-object in the context of knowledge is 
a psychological state of the subject, understood as a natural occurrence. Though not 
without hesitation, I will call this a cognitive state.  Just as a game-ball is a natural object 42
with a particular normative status and a pawn is a natural object with a particular 
42 I do not wish there to be too much read into what is meant by “cognitive state”, including any implication 
that such a state has representational content as one of its natural properties. The most I want to say is that 
cognitive states have a particular subject matter. The temptation is to say that they have aboutness or 
intentionality, but I want to leave open the possibility that this aboutness may be reducible to some other 
natural property or is itself a normative status. 
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normative status, an episode of knowing is a natural cognitive state with a particular 
normative status.  
We can restate TS with this idea built in:  
“A necessary condition of the possibility of a natural cognitive state having the 
normative status of “being non-inferential evaluative knowledge” is that the person 
in this cognitive state also is having or has had a sentimental response towards the 
subject-matter of that cognitive state.” 
Again, the idea is that we may be able, with empirical observation, to discover the nature of 
cognitive states, but we cannot through our bare observation of them alone observe when 
they have a normative status or the conditions of this status obtaining. 
The preceding account is meant to be a workable picture of the game-relative 
description of the normative status of “counting as having non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge” and the natural object that takes on this status. Defending the details of this 
account is not my concern in this chapter; my present concern is demonstrating that this 
kind of account that is based on epistemic and practical principles is possible, even if its 
details are up for debate. 
*** 
Here is the disanalogy which allows us to not regard epistemic or evaluative 
deliberation literally as a type of game: unlike in chess and basketball, epistemic rules or the 
rules of what is appropriate conduct for evaluative authorities are neither a product of 
convention or stipulation. Or at least, if they are, it is not obvious that they are. There is no 
shortage of other plausible non-epistemic normative statuses that require reference to 
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principles that are not obviously the product of convention or stipulation: counting as 
being an “innocent”, counting as “belonging” to a particular person, a relationship 
counting as a “friendship”, counting as being a “person”, counting as “being guilty” of a 
crime, etc.. None of these are uncontroversial cases, and some may be less obviously 
rule-relative statuses than the basketball or chess related statuses discussed above. One test 
for whether these kinds of cases are in fact ​normative​ statuses is whether the 
disqualification from counting as having them makes essential reference to moral, 
practical, or other kinds of normative principles. I will expand on this point in the section 
that follows. 
In pointing out this disanalogy I do not want to concede too much. I believe that 
being a game-ball and being a chess-piece are normative statuses, literally speaking. The 
dimension along which they differ with the examples in the preceding paragraphs is 
robustness—the extent of their importance/relevance outside the context of a 
circumscribed game. The core of what I’ve described in this section has relevance to the 
notion of both robust and obviously non-robust normative statuses. Apropos of this point 
and in the interest of tying it back to the overarching purpose of this section, consider 
William DeVries’s elucidation of Sellars’s position on attributions of knowledge and 
concept-possession. If what I have said is correct, DeVries’s point here applies to all 
attributions of normative status:  
“Such descriptions presume a background of rules that define and 
constitute the positions, objects and moves concerned. In none of these cases is the 
game-relative description analysable into or reducible to a description that makes 
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no reference to the rules of the game: having a bishop is not analysable into or 
reducible to having a certain physical relation to an object of a certain physical 
kind.” (2005, p. 131) 
Transcendental Sentimentalism is not explanatory sentimentalism for the reason expressed 
here.  Its articulation is tied up with the normative principles/constraints governing 43
attributions of non-inferential evaluative knowledge. 
 
IV. A “necessary condition of the possibility of” counting as... 
I have claimed that according to TS sentimental response is a necessary condition 
of non-inferential evaluative knowledge in a way that’s distinct from its being a causal 
condition. For all the talk in the previous section about knowledge and its positive 
normative character it might be suspected that, on TS, sentiments are an ​epistemic 
condition, i.e. a condition of the ​justification​ of our non-inferential evaluative knowledge. 
This is not necessarily the case. Epistemological sentimentalists, again following 
Kauppinen’s terminology, “believe that moral justification bottoms out in sentimental 
response of a certain kind” (2014, p. 4). For these theorists,  having an emotion is not to 44
be gripped by an irrational episode or to merely feel a certain way; emotions are means of 
experiencing aspects of the world which may be inaccessible via ordinary perception. As 
experiences,  they confer justification upon beliefs that are formed on the basis of what 45
43  DeVries makes a stronger claim than the transcendental sentimentalist needs to make in rejecting the 
reducibility​ of normative description along with its non-analyzability into non game-relative description. 
The transcendental sentimentalist can remain agnostic about the synthetic reducibility of norms. 
44 See Prinz (2004), (2007); Goldie (2007); Roeser (2011); Tappolet (2011), (2016); and Kauppinen (2013). 
45 Depending on the epistemic sentimentalist, these emotional “experiences” are cached out either as literal 
perception, on analogy with perception, or non-perceptual intuitions. I use the neutral term “experience” to 
cover all of these possible cases. 
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they represent. To be in a state of anger towards a token act φ, for instance, is to experience 
φ as having the property of being outrageous—a belief that this φ-ing is outrageous is thus 
prima facie justified on the basis of having this anger-experience. The analogous case is that 
my belief that the fire engine is red is prima facie justified on the basis of having a 
perception of the redness of the fire-engine. Of course, a hurdle for epistemic 
sentimentalists is to specify under what conditions emotions accurately represent, as it is 
not difficult to come up with cases in which someone’s anger seems to be inappropriate 
because the object of their anger is not, in fact, outrageous. Count my (pre-caffeinated) 
feelings about morning traffic among these kinds of cases. 
Transcendental sentimentalism is likely entailed by many forms of epistemological 
sentimentalism. That is, insofar as “being justified” is a property that all forms of 
knowledge essentially have, the epistemological sentimentalist will likely concur that 
justification-conferring sentiments are “necessary conditions of the possibility of” some 
evaluative knowledge. However, I believe the most plausible form of TS is held 
independently of, and accompanied by a rejection of, any justification-conferring role for 
sentiments. This is a difference from independent TS’s relationship to explanatory 
sentimentalism, a position with which it could align itself without theoretical cost. On 
independent TS, sentiments are not the sources of moral knowledge; they are 
psychological states which lack the epistemic power to confer justification. A consequence 
of this is that according to TS it is not a legitimate justification of a moral belief to make an 
avowal of one’s emotional state. For TS, this is not necessarily because emotions lack the 
proper propositional structure to serve as premises, but because they are irrelevant to the 
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justificatory task. Such a view coheres with intuitive thoughts like, “Irrespective of how I 
might feel about the matter at hand, I should believe that murder is wrong and that it is 
wrong for me to murder.” 
*** 
So far I have said that according to TS sentiments do more than serve as causal 
antecedents of evaluative thought, emphasizing their role in conditioning the normative 
status of counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge. I claimed this on the 
grounds that counting as having knowledge is a state of a subject that is not the effect of a 
causal chain of events, but rather a normative status that is not the subject-matter of 
empirical description. I have also said that, according to TS, sentiments need not play the 
normative role found for them by epistemic sentimentalists—that of conferring 
justification upon evaluative beliefs. What, then, is it for sentiments to be necessary 
conditions of the possibility of a kind of knowledge in a way distinct from that of a cause 
and that of a justification-conferring mental state? 
The answer, too simply put, is that the sentiments’ role is that of a ​transcendental 
condition​—i.e. a condition that figures into an ​a priori​ explanation of the possibility of a 
conditioned phenomena. Importantly, transcendental conditions are discoverable via 
armchair reasoning that takes the conditioned as given and seeks to establish what is 
necessary for it to obtain. In the final section of this chapter, I sketch a transcendental 
argument with this form aimed at establishing transcendental sentimentalism. In what 
immediately follows I illustrate the general nature of transcendental conditions by 
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example, relying on ground already covered by focusing on transcendental conditions of 
counting as having certain normative statuses. 
In the previous section I suggested that having knowledge was like being a pawn in 
a game of chess and like being the game-ball in a game of basketball. I claimed that these 
statuses were similar insofar as their attribution involves regarding whatever has that status 
as being subject to or being governed by some set of rules or principles—i.e. they are all 
alike in being normative statuses.  However, there is another similarity among all these 
cases: there are necessary conditions of the possibility of counting as having these 
normative statuses. For an object to count as being a game-ball in basketball, it is necessary 
that this object is manipulable, that it has a circumference that is less than that of the 
game-hoops, that it is made of solid material etc.. Having the status of being the game-ball 
entails the possibility of being made subject to the rules of the game by its players. What I 
just enumerated are some of the physical conditions that must obtain for a natural object 
to be made subject to the rules of basketball. The point is that the object couldn’t have 
been made subject to the rules of basketball had the ball been 80 inches in circumference 
and made of molasses.  Similarly, the necessary conditions for a natural object to possibly 
count as a pawn in a game of chess, this object must be smaller than the individual tiles on 
the chess board, it must be moveable relative to the board and the other pieces, etc.. If the 
object was larger than the chess board, its position in the game would be indeterminate, 
making it impossible for the rule-relative description of “being a pawn” to apply to it in a 
game of chess. These are transcendental conditions.  46
46 It might be wondered: if transcendental conditions are all physical conditions, the kind which can be 
observed in the object with normative status, why isn’t the discovery of these transcendental conditions just a 
matter of ordinary empirical investigation? So construed, transcendental sentimentalism would collapse back 
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As we will see in the transcendental argument I sketch later in this chapter, 
counterfactuals are necessary for determining and articulating transcendental conditions. 
Were the ball or chess piece too big, no basketball or chess could be played, for example. 
However, like in the case of explicating “normative status”, these game examples are 
limited by the fact that they are determined by convention or stipulation. Luckily, there 
into a type of explanatory sentimentalism. The discovery of transcendental conditions can result from 
empirical observation, but importantly, it is not ​necessary​ that their discovery occurs in this way. Insofar as 
we can articulate the rules of a game, we can discover the transcendental conditions of objects counting as 
having a normative status in the context of that game. Imagine a game I am making up right now involving 
two trees and two people with one rope each. Each person is assigned a tree and the goal of this game is to be 
the first to tie the rope to the top branch of each tree, starting with the tree they are assigned. A 
transcendental condition of the possibility of a tree counting as a “game-tree” in this game is that it is 
climbable, for if it weren’t the game couldn’t be played. We’re able to discover this condition by considering 
in conception​ the conditions necessary for this game’s components to count in the game. This act of 
conception is possible because we are able to stipulate the rules of the game that make it possible for someone 
to play.  
Plausibly, games which are played according to conventional rules are discoverable by empirical 
observation. If you watched enough games of basketball, you could come to articulate these rules on the basis 
of this observation. This is possible because, plausibly, conventional rules are nothing over and above 
conditioned agreement on which behavior is sanctioned or prohibited in particular contexts. But these rules 
also exist in rule books for our consideration, and it is not necessarily by observation that these written rules 
are articulable. 
The transcendental conditions of non-inferential evaluative knowledge are discoverable by us 
insofar as we are able to apprehend the epistemic rules governing the space of reasons. However, this act of 
apprehending epistemic rules is different from our choosing their content or observing patterns of human 
behavior. That is, these rules are neither stipulated nor mere conventions, or at least it would be a surprise to 
learn that they are given that we treat them differently from rules which are uncontroversially stipulated or 
conventional. We do not permit individuals to stipulate their own rules of rationality, nor should we think 
that epistemic principles are empirical generalizations of observed behavior. In support of this latter point, 
consider that an idea that is perfectly comprehensible is one of living in possible world in which 
circumstances are such that vast majority of people exhibit deliberative behavior that is prohibited by the 
principles of rationality (in fact, some of us may suspect we are currently living in a world quite like this). 
Despite its being grounded in the apprehension of rules not discoverable by observation, 
transcendental sentimentalism can cohere with and productively learn from an empirical investigation into 
sentimental response. This is true for all transcendental conditions. For example, I claimed that there was a 
transcendental condition of “manipulability” upon counting as a game-ball in basketball. Absent any further 
empirical investigation into the physical nature of manipulability, we would know very little about the 
transcendental conditions of being a game-ball, other than perhaps what a thinly articulated functional 
property can reveal on its own. If the claim of the transcendental sentimentalist is correct, there is plenty they 
can learn about the nature of the transcendental condition of non-inferential evaluative knowledge from 
empirical psychology. This is because, like manipulability, sentimental response is a natural occurrence, 
presumably with an evolutionary origin and a particular physical manifestation. However, that sentimental 
response is a transcendental condition is discoverable only by considering the rules constitutive of the space 
of reasons that determine the normative status of cognitive states. The apprehension of these rules is not 
made possible by observation, nor by stipulation, but by normative deliberation. 
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are less artificial examples to be mined. Consider the normative status of counting as a 
friend or a relationship counting as a friendship. Insofar as you are willing to grant me that 
there are principles governing friendship and there is such a thing as being normatively 
disqualified from being a friend to someone, it is sensical to ask what the transcendental 
conditions of counting as a friend are. Importantly, this is not the same as asking what the 
principles of friendship are or about the rules for how to be a good friend.  You may have 47
no trouble knowing who your friends are and know when to strip someone of that status 
when they’ve wronged you, but it is a separate task entirely to specify precisely what 
transcendental conditions must obtain for friendship to occur.  
Luckily, friendship was a target of inquiry for one of our greatest philosophers. In 
the ​Nicomachean Ethics,​ Aristotle argues that “friendship”  is, among other things, about 48
the mutual recognition of the feeling of good will between two parties. On the basis of this 
observation and previous argumentation he says, “We conclude, therefore, that to be 
friends men must have good will for one another, must each wish for the good of the 
other… and must each be aware of one another’s good will.” (1156a4-5). Questions of 
interpretation inevitably arise when reading Aristotle, but a natural interpretation of this 
passage is that Aristotle is making explicit for us some (or perhaps the complete set) of the 
principles governing relationships that count as friendships. We might quibble with 
Aristotle on the details of his explication, but the point here is that it is not obvious that he 
is conveying the rules of application for an merely conventional term or his own term of 
47  Like with many normative statuses, the principles or rules governing friendship are normally, at best, 
implicitly understood by the parties involved.  
48 There is some question as to whether “friend” or “friendship” in Aristotle’s use is the same as our 
contemporary concept of “friend”. I take the concepts to be sufficiently similar to work as an example in this 
context. (See Kraut 2018 for discussion) 
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art. In the course of his discussion on friends, he seems to think something of real value is 
at stake, and that it is worth getting clear on it. 
On the basis of Aristotle's explication, we can easily reconstruct some of what he 
might take to be the transcendental conditions of counting as being a friend to someone: 
each party in this relationship must have the capacity for good will and must have the 
capacity to be aware of other’s good will towards them. Having both of these capacities is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of counting as a friend. If I lacked one of these 
capacities, or if I lost these capacities, I would be disqualified from counting as a friend. 
This is not a simple restatement of Aristotle’s principles of friendship; what is introduced 
in these transcendental conditions is the (admittedly thin) notion of “capacity” and the 
necessity of their obtaining. Of course, the more we discover about the psychological (i.e. 
causal) conditions of the human possession of these capacities, the better we can articulate 
the nature of friendship’s transcendental conditions. In lieu of “the capacity for good will'' 
and “the capacity to be aware of other’s good will towards them” we might substitute a 
more psychologically-informed rendering like “a capacity for emotional intelligence.” ​The 
transcendentality​ of these conditions lies in the ​a priori ​nature of their initial 
discovery as necessary for the counting as having a normative status. ​Their 
discovery depended on Aristotle’s articulation of the principles of friendship that 
determine its genuine instances, not on the observation of psychological or sociological 
states of affairs. We could have put every self-reported “friendship” and the person’s 
involved under the figurative microscope and still never have arrived at friendships’ 
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transcendental conditions if we had no grasp of the normative nature of this kind of 
relationship, i.e. if we had no grasp of the rules which govern the “friendship-game.” 
Again, the adequacy of Aristotle’s account of friendship is not at issue. The point 
is that his principles of friendship appear to have a more robust standing than the rules of 
basketball or chess. Consequently, friendship itself does not seem to have importance only 
in the context of playing a game. However, like the rules of basketball and chess, on the 
basis of its principles we can uncover the transcendental conditions of the possibility of a 
relationship having this normative status. 
For the transcendental sentimentalist the manipulability of the ball, the relative 
size of the chess-piece, and the capacity for emotional intelligence are all analogs for having 
a sentimental response. That is, without having a sentimental response towards some 
object, a person could not count as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge of that 
object. The former is a transcendental condition of the latter if TS is 1) true and 2) 
discoverable from the armchair on the basis of a grasp of some of the epistemic and 
practical principles governing attributions of non-inferential evaluative knowledge. Again, 
these principles have to do with how the game of attributing and justifying non-inferential 
evaluative knowledge should be played. For knowledge generally, these principles have to 
do with what we are licensed to infer and the justifications the knower is expected to be 
able to offer. For evaluative knowledge these principles also plausibly have to do with what 
behavioral dispositions one should form in light of their non-inferential judgment. 
 
V. A “necessary” condition... 
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For the transcendental sentimentalist, in what sense are these conditions 
“necessary”? On a kind of view like independent TS, a normative status like “being the 
game-ball” is not ​analyzable​ in terms of its transcendental conditions. Put another way, 
the transcendental conditions of counting as having a normative status are not 
definitionally​ necessary. Evidence of this is garnered by a simple test of conceptual 
confusion through contradiction. The claim “a game-ball in basketball must be 
manipulable and its circumference must fall within a certain range relative to the size of the 
hoop” is a proposition the denial of which does not commit one to an obvious logical 
contradiction. Alternatively, consider the assertion, “Bob’s ball is this game’s game-ball but 
it's not the ball we’ll be playing with during this game.” This claim involves the negation of 
the truism (albeit a conventional one) that a game-ball is the object that is played with in a 
game of basketball. Anyone, like our assertor, who sincerely makes a claim committed to 
the negation of this truism is apparently ​conceptually​ confused, just as they are if they assert 
“It was courageous for the sun to rise this morning” or “Redness has three edges but 
blueness has two.” Someone who sincerely makes a claim committed to the negation of a 
statement of the ​transcendental​ conditions of being a game-ball is surely incorrect, and if I 
am right this incorrectness is demonstrable using a priori argument, but they are not 
obviously committed to a ​logical​ or ​conceptual​ error.  49
49 For these reasons, transcendental sentimentalism is not the kind of judgment sentimentalism which 
commits to an analytic reduction of evaluative thought/judgment to sentimental response.  This type of 
view, unlike non-cognitivism, may be made consistent with TS. For instance, neo-sentimentalist and 
fitting-attitude theories of value claim that judgments of what is of positive value are analyzable in terms of 
the appropriateness of pro-attitudes towards the bearer of value. For instance, to judge of something that it is 
desirable is to judge that it is appropriate or fitting for someone to desire it. Depending on the view, the 
non-inferential knowledge of what is an appropriate object of our attitudes may logically entail the 
occurrence of a sentimental response towards that object (i.e. TS). Other analytic reduction programmes 
include those which claim that evaluative beliefs or sentences make reference to actual sentimental responses 
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Insofar as there are transcendental conditions that are discoverable on the basis of 
stipulated or conventional rules, the necessity involved in transcendental claims is not 
always of an absolute or “for-all-time” variety. If the epistemic, practical, and evaluative 
principles governing counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge were 
absolute, then this would plausibly render their transcendental conditions absolutely 
necessary. Also relevant is the subject-matter of evaluative knowledge; if instances of 
having value were objective, absolute, and timeless, this would further constrain the 
conditions under which we could know them. However, the metaphysical status of these 
principles or value itself is not of present concern;   I have only suggested that they may be 50
disanalogous with game-rules in virtue of being not ​obviously​ the product of convention or 
stipulation.  
Transcendental claims of necessary conditions of possibility are ​necessary​ simply in 
virtue of being expressions of what ​must​ obtain for a conditioned object to count as having 
of the evaluator or the sentimental response of an ideal judge. Transcendental sentimentalism is distinct from 
both of these camps. 
These analyses of value are controversial. Happily, defending an analysis of value need not burden 
an independent TS. As an aside, I will mention that on the view I prefer, the thin concepts of “good” and 
“bad”, as well as the evaluative component of thick concepts (e.g. “courageous” and “cowardly”), resist 
analysis into other concepts, even though the non-inferential knowings whose content they figure in have 
numerous conditions, including sentimental response. However, the proper analysis of these terms is simply 
orthogonal to the claim that sentimental response conditions the possibility of a subject counting as having 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge. 
50 Because this is not something that needs to be addressed in the course of articulating TS, TS is distinct 
from metaphysical sentimentalism. Whereas certain forms of judgment sentimentalism advance claims about 
the reducibility of value-concepts, metaphysical sentimentalists advance claims about the reducibility of 
value-properties. According to these theorists, facts about value are nothing over and above facts about 
sentimental responses. While many sentimentalists offer a package view about the conceptual and 
metaphysical reducibility of value to sentiment, they are logically distinct theses. Even if value isn’t analyzable 
in terms of sentimental responses, its metaphysical constitution may be such that a synthetic reduction of the 
former to the latter is correct. An example of this type of view is Prinz’s speaker subjectivism, on which an 
action is morally wrong “just in case there is an observer who has a sentiment of disapprobation toward it.” 
(2007, p. 92). Other metaphysical sentimentalists believe that value is grounded in sentiments that are not 
always actual but which are possible under ideal conditions. 
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the status it has. Because I have said they are not definitionally true these claims are 
plausibly categorized as “synthetic” judgments. Because their truth is discoverable from the 
armchair and this discovery relies on a grasp of rules or principles that are not detectable 
via empirical observation, these claims are plausibly categorized as ​a priori​ judgments. 
Whether these synthetic a priori judgments are all relative to our communal or historical 
perspective is a question for another day.   51
 
VI. Argumentative Strategies 
Even if all that has been said so far is coherent, an obvious unanswered question 
remains: why think that​ sentimental response​ is a necessary condition of the possibility of 
counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge? In this section I will sketch two 
argumentative strategies aimed at establishing TS. The first of which will rely on the 
explanatory attractiveness of TS. The second of which will be a form of transcendental 
argument aimed at proving TS directly.  
 
VI.i Explanatory Attractiveness 
I began this chapter by stating that the interesting philosophical work of 
sentimentalism lies in its specifying the explanatory relationship between sentiments and 
evaluative thought. The variety of sentimentalisms mentioned so far represents the variety 
of possible ways of conceiving this relationship. The relative explanatory attractiveness of 
each of these variants can be measured against each other by comparing and weighing how 
51 I suspect they are not.  
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much they explain vs. the implausibility of their consequences. By giving each position 
credit for the former and docking them credit for the latter, we may calculate at what 
David Enoch has termed the “plausibility points” of each.   52
Generating a full ledger of the plausibility points of every sentimentalism is a task 
for a longer work, but surveying oft-discussed attractions and implausibilities of each 
variant suggests that TS acquits itself well by comparison. Like explanatory 
sentimentalism, TS can easily make sense of the close relationship between motivation and 
disposition to make moral judgments. It can also explain moral development and moral 
expertise in terms of the proper conditioning of our sentimental responses. Insofar as there 
is qualitative “what-it’s-likeness” associated with sentiment, TS can also account for the 
phenomenology of deeply-felt evaluation. The ability to cohere with plausible 
evolutionary etiologies of our evaluative tendencies also numbers among TS’s attractions.  
As discussed above, because TS is a distinct form of sentimentalism it need not 
require an expressivist semantics of evaluative judgments, need not require emotion to be 
epistemically on a par with perception, nor does it entail that moral judgments are merely 
subjectively true. It is the task of sentimentalist theorists to convince us that the perceived 
implausibility of each of the requirements of their respective position is not dispositive of 
its falsity. Though each requirement may end up proving true, absent any decisive proof, 
they cost the plausibility of the sentimentalisms of which they are a consequence. This cost 
of plausibility points must be made up for by each sentimentalism’s ability to productively 
explain evaluative phenomena. The conclusion of this form of argument is clear: TS, 
52 Enoch (2011) 
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unburdened by such requirements, and capable of explaining what sentimentalism sets out 
to explain, is clearly in the black with respect to plausibility points relative to its 
sentimentalist competitors. 
A complete argument of this variety would have to account for TS’s 
implausibilities, of which there are potentially many. It would also have to reckon with the 
defenses offered by sentimentalists of the supposed implausibilities mentioned above. Still, 
I hope this brief discussion is indicative of the viability of this strategy in making the case 
for TS’s truth.  
 
VI.ii Transcendental Argument 
A potentially more satisfying approach involves a transcendental argument aimed 
directly at establishing TS. Transcendental proofs are many different things to many 
different philosophers, but what is generally agreed upon is that they begin with a given 
phenomenon and attempt to derive conclusions about what conditions that phenomenon, 
commonly to an anti-skeptical end. In the case of TS, what is conditioned is 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge. For a transcendental argument like TS to get off the 
ground, the transcendental sentimentalist needs to have convinced us that this kind of 
knowledge is possible. Once this common ground is agreed to, the next task is establishing 
that sentimental response is necessary for it to actually obtain. This argument will not have 
the same anti-skeptical stakes as the classic transcendental proofs that are familiar from 
Kant or Korsgaard, but plausible reconstructions of the latter should share this argument’s 
formal characteristics.  
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Drawing conclusions about necessary conditions for the possibility of counting as 
having a normative status is, if my previous examples work, a relatively intuitive task in 
many cases. Much of the preceding discussion relied on the fact that we have an implicit 
understanding of the transcendental conditions of counting as having a normative status 
in the context of games. My recommendation is to look to these examples once more in an 
attempt to make explicit what kind of implicit reasoning we are engaging in when we 
intuit these transcendental conditions. I claimed that a transcendental condition of the 
possibility of counting as a pawn in a chess game was that this piece was both moveable 
and smaller than the individual tiles on the chess board—in virtue of what is this claim 
correct? It’s tempting to say “things just have to be that way for pawns!”, but while 
perhaps a viable retort in the context of setting up a game of chess, this is not a suitable 
premise for inclusion in an argument, since this would just be a restatement of the 
necessity that is in question. A way forward is revealed by asking “What would the 
situation look like if these conditions did not obtain?”. The answer for a would-be pawn is 
that it would be a large immovable object that takes up more than one tile of the chess 
board. Such an object, were we to try to treat it as if it were a pawn, would render the game 
unplayable. That is, it would make it impossible for the rules of chess to be followed. 
Insofar as this piece violates the rules of chess or, more accurately, cannot be made subject 
to its rules for how a pawn should behave, it is disqualified from counting as a pawn.  
It is this notion of disqualification that should be employed in the transcendental 
argument aimed at establishing TS. An understanding of cases of disqualification from 
counting as having a normative status can be drawn on in an attempt to formulate 
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conditions under which such disqualifications are prevented. The complete set of the 
necessary conditions under which all disqualifications from having a normative status are 
prevented turn out to be the complete set of transcendental conditions of counting as 
having that normative status. This idea is made up of a number of moving parts which 
deserve careful tracking: 
 
a​n​: A case in which an object is disqualified from having the normative status ​N​. 
(E.g. the case in which the would-be pawn is bigger than the chessboard tiles).  
 
A​: The complete set of cases in which an object is disqualified from having the 
normative status ​N​. (E.g. all the possible ways in which a would-be pawn can be 
disqualified from counting as a pawn). 
 
b​n​: The condition under which the particular case of disqualification a​n ​is 
prevented. (E.g. the condition of the pawn-object being smaller than the individual 
tiles on the chessboard). 
 
B​: The complete set of conditions that, when obtaining together, prevent all of the 
disqualification cases in A from obtaining.  (E.g. all of the conditions relating to 
the pawn-object that are necessary for it to be prevented from being disqualified 
from counting as a pawn). 
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B​ is the complete set of transcendental conditions for counting as having the normative 
status ​N​. This complete set is potentially infinite, given that there are potentially infinite 
ways in which an object can be disqualified from counting as having a normative status. 
Happily, enumerating a complete set of transcendental conditions is not our goal, nor is it 
clear why anyone should have that goal. The important point is that it is necessary that b​n 
is a member of B. Let c​n ​be a condition that is not a member of B. It would be unnecessary 
that the c​n​ obtain for an object to count as having the normative status ​N​ because c​n​’s 
obtaining does not prevent any cases of disqualification. An example of this kind of 
condition in our chess example is the condition of the pawn-object being made of wood. 
This is not a necessary condition of the possibility of counting as being a pawn in a game 
of chess—according to the argument-form I’m suggesting, this is because ​not​ having been 
made of wood would not have disqualified this object from counting as a pawn. 
*** 
Applying this strategy to TS requires being able to answer the following question: 
when are we disqualified from counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge of 
x? Producing an answer to this question will rely on our (sometimes implicit) grasp of 
epistemic principles. Let “x” stand for some existing object. One plausible entailment of 
epistemic principles is that when a person is completely unaware of x, it is impossible for 
them to have knowledge of any of x’s properties. Therefore, unawareness of x is 
disqualifying of counting as having knowledge of x’s properties. That is, even if they 
somehow guessed right about them, this unaware person cannot possibly be a reliable 
authority on the matter of x’s properties. For this disqualification to have been prevented, 
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this person’s awareness of x must have obtained. Using the terminology of the philosophy 
of mind, this awareness is plausibly constituted by a person being in a cognitive state which 
has the subject-matter “x”. Our conclusion is thus that being in a cognitive state with the 
subject-matter “x” is a necessary condition of the possibility of counting as having 
knowledge of x.  
Of course, mere awareness is not ​sufficient​ for counting as having knowledge. 
After all, there is no shortage of cases in which a person believes or is aware of something 
but should not be treated as an authority on it. I have previously implied that ​knowing​ is to 
be in a state conditioned by this awareness (i.e. to be in the cognitive state which 
constitutes it) and for this state to count as having a certain normative status. Analogously, 
being a pawn​ is to be an object that is moveable and of a certain size and for this object to 
count as having a certain normative status. 
This case may sound trivial, but the point is to take note of its form which may be 
of use in the context of an argument for the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge. I suggest that this useable form of transcendental 
argument is as follows:  
1) Non-inferential evaluative knowledge is possible.  
2) For a person to have knowledge of any kind is for them to be in a cognitive state 
with a certain normative status. 
3) For a person to have non-inferential evaluative knowledge is for them to be in a 
cognitive state with a certain normative status. 
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4) There is a set of possible cases “A”: for each member of A “a​n​”, a​n​ obtaining is 
sufficient for a cognitive state’s disqualification from counting as non-inferential 
evaluative knowledge. 
5) a​1 ​is one such member of A: it is the case in which a person is disqualified from 
counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge of x because they do not 
form or reinforce any approbative or aversive dispositions upon being presented 
with x. (In other words, they are unmoved by x). 
6) b​1​ is the condition under which disqualifying case a​1​ is prevented from 
obtaining. This is the condition that a person has or has had a sentimental response 
to x.  
7) It is necessary that b​1 ​obtain for it to be the case that no member of A obtains. 
8) b​1​ is a necessary condition of the possibility of non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge. 
 
Consider the following concrete case that tracks this line of reasoning: Sam cannot count 
as having non-inferential knowledge of the wrongness of stealing, for if he did, he would 
have formed the disposition to not steal the pie when faced with the temptation to steal it. 
We can stipulate that the evidence is decisive that he did not form such a disposition 
because he, in fact, stole the pie under conditions that would not have prevented this 
disposition from actualizing. This lack of knowledge must be explainable in some way by 
the occurrence of a condition that disqualified him from being a non-inferential knower 
with respect to the wrongness of pie-stealing. It is explainable by the fact that Sam lacks the 
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proper conditioning to have a negative sentimental response to his intention to steal the 
pie. Not having a negative sentimental response disqualified Sam from counting as a 
non-inferential authority on the wrongness of pie-stealing and explains Sam’s knowledge 
deficit. Having a negative sentimental response is a necessary condition of the possibility of 
counting as having non-inferential knowledge of the rightness and wrongness of 
pie-stealing. That is, this necessary condition obtaining (the sentimental response) is the 
means by which Sam could have been prevented from being disqualified from counting as 
having non-inferential evaluative knowledge. 
*** 
That this section is only a sketch of this transcendental proof is a consequence of 
this chapter's being largely exploratory rather than argumentative. For this proof to work, 
the transcendental sentimentalist must not only ​explicate​ each part of their position, as I 
have done in the first part of this chapter, they must ​argue​ for it. That such argument is 
necessary is evident from the controversial nature of many of the premises presented 
above. Premise 1 will be resisted by rationalists who reject intuitionism about value. 
Premise 2 will be resisted by those who think we can offer purely empirical descriptions of 
states of knowledge. Premise 5 will need to be established on the basis of the epistemic and 
practical principles governing non-inferential evaluative knowledge—debates over 
internalism and externalism about moral motivation will have application here.  
The contributions that I hope to have made are 1) the illustration that this way of 
conceiving the explanatory relationship between sentiments and evaluation is distinct from 
other sentimentalisms on offer, i.e. the illustration of an independent TS; and 2) the 
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demonstration that this transcendental sentimentalism should be treated as plausible in 
virtue of the fact that there are two promising lines of argument that could be marshaled in 
its favor.  
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Chapter 7: Transcendental Sentimentalism for the 
Meta-Ethical Minimalist 
Introduction 
There are two primary purposes of this concluding chapter: first, I will draw upon 
the arguments made in the previous chapters in order to present a positive account of 
evaluation that is consistent with metaethical minimalism. In so doing, I aim to show how 
each commitment of metaethical minimalism I have identified can work together in the 
interest of showcasing not only what metaethics should ​not​ be concerned about but what 
positive philosophical contributions a metaethics scrubbed free of moral truthmakers can 
make. The model of evaluation that follows will be a transcendental sentimentalist 
one—i.e. one that takes sentiments to be a necessary condition of the possibility of 
counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, transcendental sentimentalism is a position which is capable of standing apart not 
only from other forms of sentimentalism, but also from metaethical minimalism. 
However, a beneficial consequence of marrying transcendental sentimentalism with 
metaethical minimalism is that the former’s conception of “sentiment” can become more 
developed. Though first I will show how the explanatory demands placed on metaethical 
minimalism by the epistemic condition can be met by appealing to sentiment. The result 
of this coupling is a pair of positions that become stronger in virtue of being packaged 
together. 
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Simultaneous to presenting a model of evaluation, this chapter will also function as 
a summary of the substantive elements of metaethical minimalism as it is developed and 
defended in this dissertation. Throughout this work, I have been careful to isolate 
components of metaethical minimalism and argue in favor of them in a piece-meal fashion. 
I stand by this approach as the best way to get clear on the plausible building blocks of 
metaethical minimalism, but it admittedly makes it difficult to evaluate the position as a 
whole. This final chapter represents an opportunity to step back and attend to the holistic 
vision of maintaining the possibility of moral truth without truthmakers coupled with all 
the consequences of that stance found in what precedes. The psychological venue playing 
host to the epistemological aspects of this vision is our faculty for sentiment. What follows 
is by no means a complete and perfect picture; however, my position is that we can learn 
something about the minimalist position on the basis of this incomplete account that we 
could not if we only consider the conclusions of each of the arguments of the preceding 
chapters in isolation. 
I.  Finding a Place for Sentiment in Metaethical Minimalism 
A natural question one might have about metaethical minimalism is whether we 
have any distinctly ​metaethical​ need for appealing to sentiment. Of course, there are 
first-order questions about the appropriate sentiments we ought to feel towards particular 
persons, objects, or states of affairs. But this is not in the purview of metaethics. 
Additionally, it may be a contingent fact about human beings that we are better off 
developing dispositions to feel strong sentiments towards morally relevant features of 
persons, objects, or states of affairs. Perhaps this may be for no other reason than it is not 
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prudent to place too much trust in our capacity to quickly come to the right moral 
conclusion upon a sober consideration of the relevant moral principles. However, this also 
is not a metaethical conclusion, but a first-order practical assessment of a psychological 
state of affairs most likely to benefit us. Furthermore, because metaethical minimalism 
finds no need for truthmakers for moral truths, a metaphysical reduction of value to 
occurrent or dispositional sentiment is certainly off the table.  
If there is a role for sentiment in the metaethical minimalist’s picture, it is one that 
allows the minimalist to flesh out or answer a lingering question about their account. One 
such question for the minimalist falls out of the Chapter 5 discussion of the Epistemic 
Condition on reality/existence. Therein, I suggested that the metaethical minimalist 
should not regard causal efficacy as the mark of what is a real/existent object, but instead 
point to the presence of a particular condition on the possibility of non-inferential 
knowledge of that object being had by an epistemic agent: that the object be presented 
conception-independently to that epistemic agent. In articulating this position, I 
contrasted the kind of non-inferential knowledge we have of real objects with the kind of 
non-inferential knowledge we have of matters of value; in the case of the latter, such 
knowledge can come on the basis of ​either​ a conception-independent or in-conception 
presentation of the value-bearing object, action, or state of affairs. The lingering question 
for the minimalist is this: what can we say about how it is possible for epistemic agents 
with our particular constitution to have non-inferential knowledge of value, especially if 
this knowledge is not dependent upon a causal relation with real objects in the world? 
That is, how does the possibility of an object-presentation which is either 
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conception-independent or in-conception link up with a plausible story about human 
psychology? 
The reason why this question is particularly challenging for metaethical 
minimalists is that they cannot appeal to the psychology of perception for their answer. 
Perception is an inherently conception-independent form of object-presentation, so it can 
at best explain only a portion of cases of non-inferential evaluative knowledge—those 
which occur on the basis of a conception-independent presentation of the bearer of value. 
It is telling of a person’s conceptual confusion for them to imply that they had a 
perception of an object, but they have had no direct acquaintance with it outside of their 
imagination. At the same time, so long as I have a full grasp of the facts of the Battle of 
Thermopylae, there is no barrier to my forming non-inferential evaluative knowledge of 
the courage of its combatants. This is just as I have no problem forming such evaluations 
of grotesque historical acts of genocide—my inability to perceive such events should not 
prevent me from immediately seeing (using an analogical sense of “see”) that they are 
wrong. In order to explain the instances of non-inferential evaluative knowledge which 
occur on the basis of an in-conception presentation of the object, some other mechanism 
must be appealed to. In the interest of marshaling a coherent explanation, the metaethical 
minimalist should find what is shared between all potential cases of non-inferential 
evaluative knowledge; that is, they should look for a presentation-involving psychological 
process that can plausibly condition non-inferential knowledge irrespective of whether the 
object of evaluation is presented conception-independently or in-conception. 
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At this point, it should be no surprise that my contention is that sentiment fits this 
bill exactly—but it is important to understand why this is so. This explanatory fit is 
grounded in a perfectly ordinary fact about our psychology: sentiments and emotional 
responses are the sorts of psychological states we have in response to objects, persons, states 
of affairs, and events present both in-conception and conception-independently. There are 
at least two components of this fact that are relevant to the metaethical minimalist’s 
question posed above: 1) we have sentimental responses about all the categories of things 
about which we make non-inferential evaluations—objects, acts, persons, states of affairs, 
events, etc.; and 2) our sentimental responses occur, like non-inferential judgments, on the 
basis of considering their object either conception-independently or in-conception. That 
is, one may be disposed to feel sad about their pet being put down both whether they see it 
in person, when they remember it happening, or when they imagine what it would be like 
if it were to happen. The first of these cases is presented conception-independently and the 
second and third are presentations of the event in-conception. While I do not intend to 
provide a theory of sentiment, it seems to be a constraint on any successful such theory 
that it takes into account the tendency of its explanans to occur in the absence of any ​real 
version of its object. While sentiments on the basis of in-conception presentations may be, 
on average, less intense than those felt on the basis of conception-independent 
presentations, this does not appear to discount the former variety’s authenticity or validity. 
After all, the intensity of sentimental responses felt on the basis of 
conception-independent presentations may vary between subjects, but we don’t take my 
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relatively low-intensity anger to be any less of an instance of anger just because you may 
experiencing a very high-intensity version of the sentiment in reaction to the same object. 
If the preceding account of sentiment is adequate, then sentiments fit nicely in the 
metaethical minimalist’s explanation of the possibility of the kind of non-inferential 
evaluation that is implied by the epistemic condition. However, it is the role of sentiment 
in ​transcendental​ sentimentalism that is of particular help to the metaethical minimalist. 
This is due to a number of factors: First, it is to the metaethical minimalist’s advantage if 
they find a fit between sentiment and the conditions of non-inferential evaluative 
judgment that doesn’t rely solely on empirical findings. This is for some of the same 
reasons that made transcendental sentimentalism attractive as an a priori thesis in the first 
place; it helps make sense of what conditions a particular kind of ​knowledge​ while 
acknowledging that having knowledge is not to merely have a particular causal profile or 
description. This is of particular importance for the minimalist; if it is the case that it is 
possible to have knowledge of moral truths absent any truthmakers, then ‘having 
knowledge’ must involve something other than being in the right causal relation with a 
truthmaker. Consequently, the metaethical minimalist is helped by the transcendental 
sentimentalist conception of having knowledge as being a ​normative status​ instead of an 
empirical description. If having knowledge is a normative status, i.e. a state determined by 
the rules of a ‘game’, then there is no obvious requirement that there be truthmakers 
present to causally condition gaining this status. The minimalist wants to say “whatever it 
is that causes sentimental response, it is not a causal reaction to the existence of a moral 
truthmaker”; transcendental sentimentalism gives them the vocabulary to say this and 
167 
  
simultaneously hold that they make a difference to non-inferential knowledge of moral 
value. 
This is because there are ​transcendental​ conditions on qualifying as “having 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge”, as was detailed in the preceding chapter. The 
metaethical minimalist can take sentiments’ role to be transcendental in their allowing for 
the possibility of non-inferential evaluative knowledge on the basis of either an 
in-conception or conception-independent presentation of the object of evaluation. 
Following the transcendental argument-structure outlined in chapter 6, the minimalist 
could argue that absent a sentiment preceding or accompanying a presentation of the 
object of evaluation, a person cannot have an objectual presentation necessary for 
counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge. In other words, “having 
non-inferential knowledge about value requires having a sentiment” is true not because of 
a causal connection between the two, but because the occurrence of the latter involves an 
in-conception and/or conception-independent presentation of the object of knowledge. 
And bereft of a presentation (which may be of either kind) of the object of knowledge, a 
person is ​disqualified ​(in the normative sense) from counting as having non-inferential 
knowledge of that object. Again, this last fact points us to ​sentiment​ rather than any other 
presentation-involving psychological state. This is because of the required persmissivity of 
the sort of presentation we may have about the object of non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge—it can occur in-conception and/or conception-independently. Using 
transcendental sentimentalism, the metaethical minimalist can answer the lingering 
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explanatory question left over from the epistemic condition without opening up another 
potential line of attack on their minimalism. 
 
II. What Transcendental Sentimentalism gains from Metaethical Minimalism 
I have argued that metaethical minimalism is made stronger by pairing it with 
transcendental sentimentalism. In this section I aim to show that the reverse is true as well. 
The goal of the preceding chapter was to offer an independent account of a distinctive 
form of sentimentalism—one that found for sentiment a role in philosophical explanation 
but did so on the basis of an a priori transcendental argument. One consequence of taking 
a transcendental approach is that whatever is doing the conditioning (in this case, 
sentiment) is defined/understood entirely in its relation to the conditioned 
(non-inferential evaluative knowledge). That is, the transcendental sentimentalist, in not 
relying on empirical observation, can only include in their account of the phenomenon of 
sentiment whatever disqualification-prevention work it does for non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge. The problem they face is that, absent a further development of this 
disqualification-prevention work, they are left with a very thin notion of “sentiment”.  
In the example transcendental argument I provided for transcendental 
sentimentalism, I identified the following disqualification work for the sentiment: it 
prevents it being the case that the non-inferential evaluator is unmotivated or “unmoved” 
by their non-inferential evaluation. That we are motivated by our moral judgments is a 
central explanandum of almost every sentimentalism, so if transcendental sentimentalism 
were to be explanatorily fruitful at all, it would at least need to account for this fact. 
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However, because this conclusion is arrived at via a priori transcendental argument, it is 
not the case that the transcendental sentimentalist can straightforwardly equate this 
inertia-preventing state with what is commonly understood to be “sentiment” or 
“emotion” by empirical psychologists. All that they know about this state is that it is 
motivating—but it is not as if sentiments are the only naturally possible manifestation of a 
motivating process. Consequently, it would be helpful to the transcendental sentimentalist 
if they can identify other disqualification-prevention work for this antecedent 
psychological state to do, and doubly helpful if in doing so this state becomes more 
recognizably a ‘sentiment’. 
The metaethical minimalist, in their commitment to the epistemic condition, has 
identified an additional condition on non-inferential evaluative knowledge—that it be 
preceded by an in-conception or conception-independent presentation of the object of 
evaluation. In the context of chapter 5, this was presented as an articulation of the more 
permissive conditions on non-inferential evaluation when compared to perception, which 
can only involve a conception-independent presentation. However, it is not the case that 
non-inferential evaluative knowledge can obtain absent ​any​ form of presentation—in such 
a situation the evaluator would lack the proper epistemic relationship to the object of 
evaluation to count as a non-inferential authority on it.  Therefore, in order to not be 53
disqualified from counting as a non-inferential authority on a matter of value, a 
presentation-involving psychological process must obtain. More specifically, it must be a 
53 I am intentionally leaving open the possibility of inferential evaluative knowledge that occurs on the basis 
of an inference from a general moral principle to an evaluative judgment. In such a case, there may be no 
non-inferential evaluative reaction to the in-conception or conception-independent presentation of the 
object. In this instance, it is still, in principle, possible to consider the moral principle relevant to the situation 
and then infer the moral value of the object. 
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psychological process that is similarly responsive to objects presented in-conception and 
conception-independently, unlike perception. 
The transcendental sentimentalist, if they pair their position with metaethical 
minimalism, can more plausibly regard their disqualification-preventing psychological 
process as a ‘sentiment’ because they can identify it as the very same 
disqualification-preventing process described in the preceding paragraph. Sentiment is 
thus the single psychological process that is responsible for both conditioning the 
motivation of the non-inferential evaluative knower and while also involving the objectual 
presentation which conditions the knower’s appropriate epistemic relationship with the 
object of evaluation. Transcendentally speaking, both conditions obtaining are necessary 
for the evaluator to count (in the normative sense) as having non-inferential knowledge. If 
there was no sentimental response antecedent to the evaluative judgment, then the 
judgement would be disqualified from counting as a piece of non-inferential evaluative 
knowledge because 1) it would not be motivating and 2) it would not be conditioned by 
an objectual presentation. This matches up well with our ordinary understanding of 
sentiment—emotions and sentiments tend to move us to act in various ways and they are 
responses to objects, events, and states of affairs both as they occur in the world and 
in-conception. 
I have deliberately chosen the term “presentation-involving psychological process” 
to avoid any specific characterization of the representationality of sentiment. The only 
commitment either the transcendental sentimentalist or metaethical minimalist need make 
is that sentiments are always accompanied by presentations of objects—this is not the same 
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as saying that sentiments are a sui-generis kind of mental representation or even that 
sentiments themselves have a representational nature. It is perfectly consistent with the 
pairing of positions under discussion that there are exactly two kinds of sui-generis 
objectual presentations—perceptions and imaginings. Under this kind of view, sentiments 
are presentation-involving psychological states in virtue of occurring only on the basis of 
either a perception or imagining; plausibly on this view, sentiments are a kind of 
motivating ​attitude​ toward these cognitive bases.  This clarification is necessary for 54
ensuring that, when paired with metaethical minimalism, transcendental sentimentalism 
does not necessarily become a variety of epistemological sentimentalism. This need not be 
the case if sentiments themselves do not have representational content nor any other 
justification-conferring properties, as is conceivable on the kind of view I am presenting. 
To repeat a conclusion from the previous chapter, sentiments can condition the possibility 
of knowledge without it being the case that they play a justification-conferring role. This 
applies ​mutatis mutandis​ to the new conditioning role identified for it by the minimalist. 
 
III. A Metaethical Minimalist’s Sentimentalist Model of Evaluation 
Our last task is to bring into view a sentimentalist model of evaluation which is 
consistent with metaethical minimalism as it has been described in this work.  
The minimalist thinks that there are objective moral truths but that there are no 
truthmakers which make these truths true. The use we ​can ​get out “made true by” 
language in the moral domain is this: “Moral propositions, when they are true, are true in 
54 See Deonna & Teroni (2012, 2015) for excellent introductions to this kind of view of emotion. 
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virtue of their being licensed by moral principles of varying generality.” Why is it the case 
that torturing innocents for fun is wrong? Because it violates the moral principle in virtue 
of which “Torturing innocents for fun is morally wrong” is true. Perhaps this principle is 
something like “The pointless dehumanization of innocents is categorically forbidden.” 
There is simply no further answer to the question “In virtue of what is torturing innocents 
for fun wrong?” besides the moral principle(s) which serve(s) the proposition’s 
justificatory ground(s). If it is the case that we can have non-inferential knowledge of 
moral value, then it must be possible for us to come to know that a moral proposition is 
true without inferring it is true from the principle in virtue of which it is true. Sentimental 
response conditions the possibility of coming to know moral value in this way. 
Sentimental response is a necessary condition of the possibility of counting as 
having non-inferential evaluative knowledge because, absent this response the evaluator 
would be disqualified from being an authority on the evaluative matter at hand. This is for 
at least two reasons: 1) the evaluator would be unmoved by their evaluation and develop 
no new dispositions on the basis of it, and 2) the evaluator would not exhibit the 
antecedent psychological process which ensured that their evaluation was responsive to 
either a in-conception or conception-independent presentation of the object of evaluation. 
To repeat, while I have not offered an argument in favor of the judgment internalism 
asserted to be necessary in 1), my argument that the conditioned aspect of evaluation 
represented in 2) is a necessary feature of evaluation occurs in chapter 5 of this work.  
It is not the case on this model that the sentiment represents, responds to, or 
correlates with a “real” manifestation of value. This is because, according to metaethical 
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minimalism, it is a philosophical mistake to regard value as real.  However, it is at least a 55
minimal constraint on non-inferential evaluation that sentimental response be sufficiently 
correlated with the presentation of objects, events, and states of affairs which are morally 
valuable or disvaluable. This proper correlation, if not a consequence of the causal effect of 
value, is plausibly the effect of socialization, broadly understood. However, it would be a 
mistake to regard a dependence on socialization as evidence that what is valuable or 
disvaluable is relative to what we are socialized to non-inferentially evaluate as such. This 
socialization is effective or ineffective on the basis of whether it results in the development 
of a sentimental-response disposition that’s actualization correlates with the presence of 
that which is mind-independently and convention-independently valuable or disvaluable. 
On this picture, it would be a mistake to regard sentiments as conditioning the 
“accessing” moral truths, principles, or value. As we saw in chapter 3, “access” language is 
most appropriate for explaining a knowing relation between epistemic agent and 
truthmaker (or evidence of the latter). As an alternative, I suggested “apprehension” as the 
correct descriptor of the epistemic relation between an evaluator and moral truth. 
However, it is not always the case that someone with non-inferential evaluative knowledge 
will non-inferentially apprehend the principle in virtue of which their knowledge is true. 
This directly parallels the state of things for perception and empirical truthmakers; I may 
have non-inferential perceptual knowledge that this mug in front of me is red, but I may 
not have immediate epistemic access to the physical grounds of this truth. The difference 
between the two cases is this: plausibly any true evaluative authority will be, in principle, 
55 Following Putnam’s similar point, this fact does not impugn the propriety of speaking of value as if it is 
real in the course of ordinary moral discourse.  
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able to approximate or make explicit determining moral principles. In practice, this may be 
no more complicated than the evaluator being able to answer the question “Why is it that 
X is morally wrong?” upon non-inferentially judging that X is morally wrong. However, 
sentimental response is not a necessary condition of the possibility of this reconstructive 
activity; or at least it is not obvious what disqualification work sentimental response has to 
do in this context.  
Finally, it is worth once more summarizing the state of the dialectic between the 
metaethical minimalist and the truthmaker theorist. You’ll recall that the outcome of 
chapter 2 was that the minimalist is licensed to take up an ​ab initio​ attitude of 
non-acceptance towards MTMC—the conditional which states that every moral truth 
requires an existent truthmaker. At that point, the truthmaker theorist is obligated to offer 
reasons to believe MTMC. Chapters 3 and 4 discussed two attempts at moving the 
minimalist off of their stance, which I claimed the minimalist could successfully defend 
their minimalism against. Chapters 5 and 6 offered positive developments of metaethical 
minimalism as a demonstration that a quietism or antipathy towards metaethical 
theorizing is not a necessary consequence of the minimalist stance. The truthmaker 
theorist may find any number of points on which he could push back on the positive 
developments I have offered, but it is important to note that minimalism does not depend 
on the viability of either the epistemic condition or transcendental sentimentalism. At its 
core, metaethical minimalism remains the non-acceptance of MTMC accompanied by the 
belief that there are objective moral truths. If this chapter along with the preceding one is 
175 
  
successful, they succeed at adding on to this core stance by making it more explanatorily 
productive and philosophically satisfying. 
There is no doubt that the truthmaker theorist will be left unsatisfied with the 
state of the dialectic as I have described it. Some of their complaints may take the following 
form: 
“There must be some value that is being responded to by our sentimental 
capacities” 
“There must be something that makes moral propositions true rather than not 
true” 
“There must be something that grounds true moral judgments beyond true 
principles” 
Nothing in this work has discounted the possibility that each of these complaints is true. 
This is because the metaethical minimalism I have demarcated, defended, and developed is 
not one that is premised upon a rejection of moral truthmakers, but rather a lack of belief 
in them. Consequently, if the minimalist is missing something, it is up to the truthmaker 
theorist to make it clear what fault there is in the minimalist account that is a consequence 
of missing truthmakers. What is not sufficient to advance this debate is a simple 
restatement of the central thesis in contention: that there must be moral truthmakers for 
there to be objective truth. What I have aimed to do in this work is to show that there is 
work for the metaethical minimalist to do besides standing pat in their non-acceptance. 
They can and should engage any substantive truthmaker theorist objections to their 
minimalism; they can and should make their position more attractive by developing a 
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complete account of what our evaluative practice looks like if minimalism is true; they can 
and should identify philosophical allies like transcendental sentimentalism which can 
strengthen their minimalism. Instead of falling into quietism, the metaethical minimalist 
can and should do the plentiful philosophical work left for them to do. 
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